

# A $\neq$ A UNIVERSE

*From the contradiction of change to the limit of thought*

A theory of circular constructivism \*

Adrian Gudra †

We assign truth-value to everything in the world: either something is, or something is not. However, does that apply for the world herself? Seemingly not, as she changes. Our limit of cognition does therefore not lie in the content of our thoughts, but in their arbitrary form and the associated truth-definition. As long as we want to speak out what is, we can therefore not do justice to the world. This limit is thereby so foundational, that we can neither circumvent it through its criticism nor through its prediction. This text thus presents two incompatible views of truth we often associate with constructivism: thought is the actual object of truth. And thought does not have to do anything with the actual world outside. A positive and a negative theory of truth. Both lead into a circle: neither can thought hold its own mirror within, nor can it destroy it to break out. Neither the positive, nor the negative theory of truth is true, although they exclude each other. The concept of truth does simply not apply to them, as they represent meta-theorems about the only object in which truth lies in the first place.

## Abstract

This thesis presents two radical, but incompatible theories of truth. However, neither of the two contradictory theories will turn out to be true. The first theory is based on our ultimate captivity in thought and thereby on the connection of material existence and mental certainty, seeing thought as the only object of truth and existence. This captivity forbids us leaving thought by thinking positive or negative meta-thoughts, either affirming or rejecting thought with thought itself. (eg. "Thought is an all-embracing object" - "There is a world outside of thought" etc.) Theories of truth we formulate about the form of thought can thus neither be thought, nor assigned a truth value to. Instead, we can only find out about the form of thought by a meta-induction, can only understand in which trains thought moves by unsuccessfully trying to break out.

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†Student at the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the LSE. Mail: [a.gudra@lse.ac.uk](mailto:a.gudra@lse.ac.uk). For the online version of this project go to [aunequalsa.com](http://aunequalsa.com). You can find more information on the author at [personal.lse.ac.uk/gudra](http://personal.lse.ac.uk/gudra).


Certainty thereby lies in the factual unnegatability of points of thought through the law of identity, which is a factual law of true objects in thought rather than of propositions on external objects. Thoughts are thereby interpreted as sets, for which both the paradox of the liar and the set of all sets are seen as representatives of the impossible metathoughts "this thought is false" and "this thought is true". A solution to the two paradoxes is thereby presented preventing both their solution and rise. Propositions are interpreted as representations of thoughts that we compare with our own thought, making them theories on thoughts. Logic is regarded as a decision method for the certainty of theories on thoughts. The laws of logic are thereby factual, as the objects our theories want to reach agreement with are themselves obeying unbreakable laws. This interpretation of logic forbids theories on contradictions, which thereby also criticizes the truth-table of the conditional and sees the existential quantifier as the condition of the universal quantifier. As truth is regarded as a metaproperty of thoughts and not of written propositions, this limits the validity of laws of thought to thinkable objects. As we are captured in thought, our entire view of the world is determined by the form and the laws of thought, resulting in the view of the world as a sequence of true points in time. It is shown that natural laws are only interpretations of those sequences, ultimately resulting in an unchanging world by incorporating the future into the present, by abusing the law of identity for the necessity of change instead of non-change. This only seems against intuition because we divide processes until the sequences that are to be explained are so natural, that they seem necessary. We can thereby only understand events through states, for which both causal and hard determinism implicitly assume an unchanging universe. To avoid this contradiction, physics falsely assigns truth-values to descriptions of sequences and events, trying to hide, that by incorporating sequences in single objects, one is claiming a non-identity. Practically, this cheat then fails because not all sequences are yet perceived, leading to induction, thus fails exactly because the world is never an object according to our truth-definition.

The second theory tries to overcome the hierarchy established in the first one: it claims that our truth-definition is flawed, as the law of identity is violated by change, and builds a theory of change on that basis. It sees entropy, energy conservation, thought, freedom, randomness and uncertainty as unphysical phenomena that don't lie in existence and can only be understood through the lack of it. It is shown that our definition of universe as everything that exists is arising from the invalid mixture of our truth definition with change. (Imagine a red ball that cannot change in the middle of the universe. Does it exist in the universe? Imagine the whole universe is gone. But the ball is not, as it can't change. Does it belong to the universe?). Instead, the world is seen as a change space in which there are no single objects nor events. As the world is independent of all other worlds, it is then argued that the world can only change if it never exists but loses itself, representing a logically decaying single entity losing

her truth value in a single, unfinished event, in which information bound to existence is destroyed and information bound to change is conserved. This theory is thus no ordinary theory: instead of trying to find out what is, it tries to find a world that is allowed to change at all. The theory is thus entirely independent of observation, and still finds laws that are very similar to thermodynamics. It sees energy-conservation as the equivalence of change-conservation. This gives rise to two contradictory definitions of determinism (change, state) and explains our inability to find a satisfying solution to the problem of responsibility, freedom and randomness with our flawed truth -definition. Furthermore, one can then formulate a metatheorem on science not being superior to religion due to its inability to find an explanation for change. Yet, religion then also loses all rational justification, exactly because we are searching something outside of thought with means of thought. As we are dealing with an object outside of our truth definition, both the propositions "god exists" and "god does not exist" don't have a truth value.

Eventually, the second radical theory collapses in circularity through the radical hierarchy of the first theory - and thereby confirms herself. The two theories thus present two incompatible views we commonly attribute to constructivism: Firstly, that truth is happening in the mind, making it the only instance and object of truth. Secondly, that the world is the actual true object that sets itself apart from the construct in our mind we are ultimately also subject to in the formulation of such a thesis. Yet, those two aspects that this text presents are not only contradictory, leading to a negative circle if both assumed, but rather lead into either positive or negative circles on their own, exactly because they are metatheories about the actual object in which truth lies. Therefore, neither of the two theories of truth presented here does have a truth value, exactly because thought represents the only and unsurmountable object of truth.

**keywords:** certainty through hierarchy of thought, foundations of the laws of thought, deduction from induction, mental form of the world, mental limits of physics, unmathematical nature of change, change and contradiction, philosophical entropy, logical decay, conservation of information, change-determinism, circular constructivism.



**Fig. 0.1.** Both theories of truth don't have a truth value, although they are contradictory. The concept of truth value does not apply to them, as they are metatheorems about the object from which truth value is derived in the first place.

## Synopsis

This work associates two fundamental questions: the one for mental certainty, and the one for physical truth. Right in the beginning, it sets itself the highest possible goal in the search for an all-embracing theory and is thereby already confronted with its most difficult problem, setting the theme for the whole work: What exactly makes a theory all-embracing? Two theories are presented that both seem to fulfill the objective of this work: a complete theory of certainty, including all certain thoughts on the world, and a complete theory of the world, including all material truths about the brain. This interlacing prevents us to start any of the two theories before using the other theory as their foundation, as each theory forms a sub-objects of the other theory's object. One therefore needs the truth definition of thought for the theory of the world and the truth definition of the world for the theory of thought, needs to see logic as the foundation of physics and vice versa. It is shown that this interlacing is evoked by the aim not to leave our truth definition unfounded, trying to abolish the subjectivity of thought. It thus arises through the assumption of two actual and independent objects of truth (thought, world) and is resolved by the trivial, but ultimate capture of the world in thought: surely there is an external world, but to recognize that, we need thought. To truly think a world independent of thought, we would have to negate thought within thought, resulting in what will later be called a *negative paradox*.

This hierarchy of thought is the basis for the first part of the thesis, making the theory of thought with the aim of mental certainty the only all-embracing theory. It is thereby attempted to gain certainty from a vacuum without any prior certainty to draw from. Contrary to our aim, one already assumes certainty by using a definition of certainty based on unnegatability in thought. Hierarchy makes thought unquestionable, leading to an unjustifiable decision method for certainty: any justification of our definition of certainty, from which all other certainty derives, makes our means an object, leading into a positive regress with infinite levels of justification, trying to get rid of thought as our only instance of decision. On the other hand, if we argue that there is no certainty, we then deny the validity of our own means, leading into a negative regress, equally trying abolish thought as our instance of decision. This leads to the recognition of thought as our entirely subjective, yet factually unquestionable instance from which all factual unnegatability derives.

In what follows, the form of thought is derived from the failed attempt to transgress her, from the factual unbreakability of the limit of thought. Due to the hierarchy of thought over the world, this limit cannot be observed biologically, as every biological observation takes place within the limit defined by thought in the first place. This shows the connection between the law of identity for thought and the law of noncontradiction for logic: the law of identity shows the actual form of thought. Yet, this form can only be discovered by the rejection of an unsuccessful attempt to break out of thought by a contradictory theory. A

thought is thereby seen as a single object or a set with objects in the relation to each other within a single point of thought, where a point of thought limits the validity of the law of identity and thereby the truth of an object.

Every thought is hence certain in its point of thought due to the impossibility to break the law of thought. Are there also thoughts that are generally unnegatable, thoughts that are eternally certain? If we view certainty as the unnegatability within a point of thought, then one can just leave away a certain content in any other point of thought, making it negatable in every point but its own. Yet, this opens the door for the certainty of something we often mix up with thoughts: theories on thoughts. Theories are the attempt of combining its information with its object. They either result in possible or impossible thoughts, making the theory either certain or impossible. Consequently, there are as many unquestionable theories as there are points in thought, as one would need to break thought to combine a thought with its nonexistence. Yet, this does not mean that there are eternally certain thoughts, as an eternally unnegatable thought would not only need to be true and obey the law of thought, but contain the law of thought itself and assign its own truth to itself. The certainty of theories is thus a negative certainty, it arises from the impossibility of thinking a negative paradox, where the certainty of a thought itself would mean a positive breaking of thought in not only experiencing, but thinking the rejection of a negative theory itself. Therefore, there are no eternal truths, there are as many truths as thoughts, but the form of those thoughts prevents contradictory theories, which gives rise to endless true propositions of the same form. Hence, we cannot discover more true theories than already defined by our first thought. Yet, we discover new temporal truth with every thought.

Furthermore, provenness is strictly set equal with undeniability, certainty, truth and existence in thought, for which the search for a proof of the means of proofs also leads into a positive regress, while their rejection leads into a negative regress. Proofs of information are thereby to be seen as the reverse of a theory: while a theory tries to reach agreement with an object of thought, proofs try to find objects their information is a certain theory on. Yet, the object they find cannot be undeniable, as they must contain the information that is to be proven and deniable in the first place. Theories can therefore be proven if their rejection is equivalent to a contradictory theory, but informative thoughts cannot.

Moreover, the difference between theory and thought is set equal with the difference between propositions and thoughts. A thought may be equivalent to the content of a proposition - when we write down a proposition, we hold it for the representation of our thought being equivalent with the theory on him. Yet, when somebody reads it, he tries to combine it with his own thought, making it a theory that is either certain or impossible. The meaning of a propositions can thus both lie in its cause and effect. It can either be a representation of thought or a theory on thought. It is thus not the agreement with an external object that makes true, but rather the agreement with objects in thought itself,

which always have the truth value true, as hierarchy makes thought the actual and only object of truth. Hence, when we claim "something" is true, we cannot differentiate between the factual truth and existence of the object in our thought and the truth of the theory claiming agreement with our own thought.

When we say something should not be contradictory to itself, we both mean a factual law of thought and a normative law of logic: something is factually not both true and false, not both existing and non-existing in a point of thought. Consequently, a theory that is contradictory cannot reach agreement with a point of thought as an object and should not be made as it is always false. We must thereby separate the laws of thought from the laws of logic, although their formulation in symbols might look alike: If we look at the law of excluded middle " $P$  or not  $P$ ", one can regard  $P$  both as properties of objects and theories on objects. The laws of logic are thereby just transcribed from the laws of thought: something that exists is always equal to itself (a proposition always carries the same information = law of identity), something that exists in thought is not nonexistent (a proposition that claims existence and nonexistence is always false = law of noncontradiction), something either exists or does not exist in a thought (a proposition is either is true or false = principle of bivalence) and that something exists in thought is sufficient reason for its existence (every true proposition has itself as an object = law of sufficient reason).

Therefore, logical laws are as factual as the laws of the objects of thought, as theories can only reach agreement with them if they don't break them. This becomes even clearer when we see logic as a decision method for certainty of theories, as certainty can only originate from the factual unnegatability in a point of thought. The logical laws from which the method of deduction follows thereby represent nothing more a meta-induction: we hold them for eternally valid just because we haven't managed to break them yet. Furthermore, there might be infinite rules of inference formulated in language, but there is only one factual law of thought (and its derived equivalents) and therefore only one actual, unbreakable logic. Modal- logical propositions are thereby seen as theories on many possible objects rather than thoughts that have the property possible while being necessary through their affirmation in thought. It thereby seems like logic knows two kinds of truths: Firstly, it can find truth or falsehood either if the information the theory assigns is without information or represents a contradiction (logical truth). Secondly, it can reach agreement with its object if its information is true. Yet, factual truth is nothing more than the logical truth of a hidden conditional, as every proposition represents a theory, whether it is explicit or implicit. Through the connection to thought, it is argued that inferences (theories) cannot be based on contradictions, as one can only try to reach agreement with thinkable objects. If one allows explicit theories on contradictions, then one must also allow implicit ones and take into account that contradictions might become factually true. Furthermore, the truth table for the conditional is flawed through the false use of the principle of bivalence: we

believe a conditional can only be false if the antecedent is true and the consequent false. If the antecedent is false, we just believe that the whole conditional must be true as it is not false. Yet, this principle of bivalence only applies if the object of the theory is thinkable. However, a conditional with false conditions is equivalent to a theory on a contradiction and therefore impossible, it cannot be assigned a truth value (the same applies for theories on false objects like the king of France).

The form of thought as the agreement with itself does thereby not only forbid us to negate thought within thought, forming a negative paradox (liar paradox, empty set, "there's a world without thought"), but also to affirm itself by thinking its form as a law, forming a positive paradox (Meta-thoughts, set of all sets, "this thoughts is true", "thought is all-embracing"). Theories that would break thought (contradictions - "A proposition (including this one), is only true if it has a proof", metathoughts - "our truth -definition is true"-) are impossible, and thus never true - metathoughts and contradictions are never part of thought for which they are always false theories on thought as they cannot be combined with it.

We can make claims without actually thinking their content, for which we should limit the use of the laws of logic to where they are derived from: strictly to thought. We often forget that when we use deductive logic making any premises language allows us like: "let a certain thing change", "assume the laws of logic are not valid", "Let determinism be false". This also gives a simple solution to the liar paradox and the paradox of the set of all sets: the liar paradox is nothing more than the attempt to think something false while automatically being assigned the truth value true to it by thought. The only difference between a contradictory theory and the liar paradox is that it shows the self reference that appears if one tries to think false theories are true more clearly. Surely, there are things that are not part of a thought and thus false within it, but they are not false because their negation is part of the thought. There is nothing in thought that breaks its law, and therefore nothing that is true and false at the same time. The paradox of liar does thereby not break the law of bivalence, as the law of bivalence does only apply to theories on thinkable objects, as they are paradoxes that are unthinkable, one cannot make a true theory on them at all (nor a false on them). Making theories on paradoxes would be like inferring something from contradictions. The paradox of the set of all sets, on the other hand, arises when one makes a thought an object of himself, e.g by assigning its own truth or existence to himself. The content of a thought is automatically true by being thought, yet, if one tries to actually think a thought that has this property, one then tries to think and think about thinking at the same time, which is impossible, as thought is the only object we have, for which thought does thus not know any metalevel above him, it only knows the object level of itself. If one breaks thought forgetting that theories can only be true if they are thinkable,



one then needs to break thought a second time introducing meta-and object-levels that are just as impossible in thought as paradoxes.

Through the hierarchy of thought, the world is seen as a simple object of thought, for which the laws of thought become laws of the world. The world is seen as nothing more than a sequence of temporarily true and undeniable objects in thought. We can thereby only differentiate her from other objects through the course of points of thought - the only difference to abstract objects is that the world is more obtrusive. An account of truth seeing the world as an object of thought does thereby exactly match our account of the world as truth in a point in time. This is not surprising at all, where else then from thought would it come from? Physics can thereby only be seen as an activity that makes certain theories if it describes the information in point of thought - if it predicts or explains it does not produce truth: change can only be perceived through different states, for which it can only explain change by explaining states. Yet, it can only explain states by pseudo-proofs that beg the question by using the combination of a natural law and the past as an object of proof. Those natural laws can only be obtained through the interpretation of at least two points in thought: past and present. Furthermore, explanatory physics does not only use induction by assuming the future will be similar to the present, it rather also assumes that the sequences of points in thought that appeared in the past will appear in the future (If a stone is thrown at a window, then it breaks) giving rise to the law of sufficient reason for states we often call causation. Yet, the question arises whether one can gain certainty by falsifying natural laws. Every point of thought verifies its own content and falsifies what's not part of him. A new point of thought automatically falsifies its predecessor. Natural laws that claim something about all points of thought ("All Swans are white") can be seen as a combination of theories on every point of thought can be falsified as a whole in every point of thought, but this falsification does not give certainty in telling us something about a point of thought but the one that was used for falsification. Natural laws about the sequence of points of thought ("All Swans that are hit run away") can be falsified by any sequence of points starting with the Swan being hit, but this falsification tells us only something about the relationship between points of thought, which cannot be object of certain theories. Instead of criticizing that propositions on sequences, equally representing natural laws, have the same form as theories on single objects, one can also turn the argument around: there are then two kinds of natural laws that have the same form, although one of them does not explain processes, but only describes single states. Explanatory laws are then equivalent to theories that only explain because they restate. Through our language, we are very good at hiding that scientific propositions that want to reach agreement with their objects often don't have proper identities as objects: we give sequences a name, integrate them to present objects through properties of change, then assign such properties to objects that seem to stay stable through many points in time ("The swan is timid"). It then seems as if one could assign

truth values to all scientific propositions, although some of them are in fact theories on contradictions. It is therefore an abuse of logic to assign truth values to events, sequences, or anything aside points in thought as the actual objects of truth.

The second part of the work tries to flee the restrictions put upon himself in the beginning by hierarchy: it examines whether the picture of the world as a sequence of true points in time imposed to us by thought is compatible with the world. It is thereby shown that thought is based on two inseparable, but irreconcilable foundations: on agreement with itself in thought and on change in the world. How wrong such truth model of material truth in the form of thought is can be seen when one uses it for thought itself: thought would need to see itself as information at a certain point of thought. Yet, without self reference and the immateriality of thought, there is no thought in such form. It is then argued that the world cannot both obey the law of identity and allow the change necessary for thought obeying the law of identity. If we try to avoid this conclusion by limiting the world to a certain point in time or by limiting the law of thought to a certain point in time, we either lose the world as a related object or the law of identity. After all, the contradiction is trivial, maybe too obvious to be even noticed, but still unavoidable and not even that surprising: why would the truth definition we depend on through our dependence on thought necessarily be linked to the truth definition of the world herself?

Even if one tries to circumvent the contradiction with a sufficient explanation for change one arrives with an unchanging but deterministic world as we cannot understand change without truth definition: we know the world before change, we know her afterwards, but we never know her in-between, although she is always in between. Consequently, we search the explanation for change in logical form of proof of states, resulting in a world in which all future states are already included in the present state, with no prospect of change at all. In fact, every form of determinism, whether it is causal or logical leads to a world in which the future is necessary condition of the past and the other way round. Using natural laws explaining change as logical premises is thus an unabashed abuse of logic. If a certain state of the world would be necessary or the case, why would the world as a whole continue changing? Furthermore, if one still holds up to logical determinism, this has the consequence that a world that has different states leading to a logical contradiction. Moreover, if one argues the world thereby has parts that stay the same, one thereby either allows (contradictory) circularity or subsequent points in time, that are entirely different and thus exclusive.

To show the contradiction in change more clearly, an  $A = A$  universe based on the law of identity is built. In him, all notions that refer back to the notion of existence are entirely fulfilled, but cannot be experienced. This shows that we want to break the notion of existence while being subject to her: we want to access all information of the world, but also want to change her. We want information we gain from the world not to be lost, although we need her

loss so we can gain her in thought. We want to stay the same, but for that we need change. This incompatibility leads to countless Complementeness- and Impossibilityrelations. For example, both mental and physical certainty lead to a still-standing universe in which no one can perceive or think.

If one sees change as a contradiction, one then needs to steal her truth according to thought. One needs to make an Anti-theory that describes the world through the negation of truth. This Anti-theory sees phenomena such as time, entropy, energy conservation and quantum mechanical uncertainty as anti-physical phenomena, as phenomena that defy every physical description based on existence, although every physical description is based on them - they hover above all processes in the world without being open to enquiry of thought and its truth-definition.(nobody has ever seen energy "existing", but we always see her effects as all observation needs her). These essential phenomena are thereby described by the amortisation of existence and are therefore entirely independent of observation in their prediction. Physics within thought can thus neither describe the world as she is, nor describe actual processes or explain them. Every natural law is thereby nothing more than an everyday bet and nothing less than an incredibly successful game. Moreover, mathematical descriptions with derivatives are seen as simple interpretations of change that are added to a sequence of points of thought afterwards, indirectly claiming a determined universe with only one point. ( functions represent a set of theories on distinct points of thought, which add the property of change within a point of thought dependent on the future point, magically explaining the future by incorporating it in the present.)

It is then shown that our notion of universe as everything that exists leads to contradictions and is entirely based on the indistinguishability of change and existence in thought. Instead of many independent entities, the world should be seen as a single entity representing a change space, as objects are only allowed to change if the contradiction of change lies in the whole change space. Within that change space, we cannot say where a thing we perceive ends and another one starts, just as we cannot tell when a thing ends being a certain thing becoming another (if things either existed or stayed the same over time there would be no time).

We know three notions when we talk about time: the past, the present and the future. The only notion that always truly exists for us is the moment. It is exactly that moment that cannot have truth value if the other two notions can be used. With the  $A \neq A$  universe, a world is created that does not correspond to herself at any point of perception due to that perceptions, representing the unfinished event in which a single entity is logically decaying and losing its truth value. Change is thereby conserved until the world is entirely decayed, being just another formulation of the conservation of energy. In this model, the world represents a house of cards that is in the course of falling down because we think, observe and communicate in it. Information as a property of matter according

to the content of thought is lost, while information based on change that creates the content of thought in the first place is conserved until the world is entirely decayed, helping to built up a perceivable future in the process of the destruction of something old. While the theory of thought does not allow physics to predict the future nor explain the present and still find certainty, only leaving us with the truth of states, the theory of change claims physics can only change because she cannot find certainty in states, as there is no true physical object according to our truth-definition.

Moreover, it is argued that there is a valid principle of sufficient reason for incomplete change, which is equivalent to the conservation of change and the conservation of energy, but no principle of sufficient reason for the truth of states. This combines two seemingly incompatible perspectives: on the one hand, the future is open, on the other hand, we determine her completely by our change. This thus represents an entirely new approach to the problem of determinism, responsibility and freedom, that cannot be made without the recognition of the contradiction in change: We usually make responsibility either dependent on the possibility to do otherwise (the responsibility of the world for our own actions) or on our own responsibility for the outcome of something else. If one does not differentiate between change- and state-determinism, one comes to the following unsatisfying conclusion: We cannot do otherwise because the world is determined, but we somewhat can do otherwise because we decide. We are responsible for the outcome because our change influences the future, but we are not logically responsible because others are equally responsible for the future. Through the distinction between change- and state- determinism, we obtain: We could not have done otherwise if one interprets decisions as determined by change. Yet, we can always do otherwise because we are not state-determined, not forced to stay the same, enabling a decision in the first place. Furthermore, the change we cause to the world does not-state determine her, we do not explain her logically, but we are responsible for her course, together with every perceivable object, together with the whole change space. We are unfree because we are only dependent on change, but free because we are not bound to a certain truth value and can change. This weird phenomenon of the possibility of certain notions through their incompleteness appears with many other notions as well, forming Possibility/-Incompletenessrelations. (e.g. information without storage, energy without matter, thought without certainty, securing without security etc.pp)

The results on change- and state- determinism are based on the world being a single entity. What now, if we ask ourselves about objects within the world? How about ourselves as part of the world? Constructed identities don't change anything about the results for the world. The world is change-determined, so we must be too. However, we are part of the process of decay and therefore equally determine the world. As we cannot understand this process, we hence divide the world in two objects: ourselves - and the rest. We then interpret the change-relationship between both objects logically: the world determines us

and we determine the world. Yet, those interpretations are not compatible as the world changes, getting us into a circle, as the determined object determines the other, although they both change: in the first interpretation, we are unfree and the world is the actual object - in the second interpretation, we are free, representing the actual independent object that explains the world through its own will. We now mix the advantages of those interpretations depending on our preferences. Depending on which change reaches us, we decide whether we try to isolate ourselves from the world being free, or whether we profit from her, letting us determine by her. Depending on how we believe she will develop, we want to explain her, or see her as an own object that we leave alone for it can determine us for our own good. Naturally, this is constructed. Neither do we determine the world, not does she determine us, as there is only one object, and this object is no logical identity.

After all, the two theories of this work outline two aspects that we usually attribute to constructivism: a. the world is part of thought, (Hierarchy - Constructivism) b. she is created in thought by certain biological mechanisms. (Biological Constructivism)/ what she creates is different then the actual world (Negational Constructivism). It is thus two things that make radical constructivism radical, the captivity of the world in thought and at the same time the opposition to the actual world, that might be different then in thought. This work starts with the first radical view and the hierarchy of thought. It shows the trivial captivity in thought, shows how certainty is only based on arbitrary laws of thought and how dependent our image of the world on the form of thought thereby is. Yet, it tries to break out of thought with all means, showing how contradictory the form of the world in our thought ultimately is. It gets rid of the world as an object of truth and thereby makes the captivity in thought itself an object of its description. The first view thereby sees material certainty as part of mental certainty and the second one sees mental uncertainty as part of material uncertainty (by having more then one point of thought).

Yet, this does not mean that the positive theory of truth, that the first aspect of constructivism is a true theory instead. Both radical aspects of constructivism lead into circles although they are contradictory. The positive theory of truth tries to hold up a mirror of thought within thought. The negative theory of truth tries to break its own mirror in itself. The two theories thereby clearly show the invalidity of the law of excluded middle for unthinkable objects. Thought is the only object of truth - only what can be in thought can have truth value; for everything else, the laws of thought simply do not apply. Truth values are therefore not bound to propositions, but to thought, which they may or may not represent. If we now assign a truth value to the linguistic concept of thought, then thought needs to be true before it can be true in the first place. However, it needs its own truth-definition to be true in the first place. It thus needs to assume itself to judge its own truth. If one now sees provenness as a criterion for the truth of propositions, then thought and its attached truth definition is

false according to its own truth-definition. On the other hand, if we claim that thought was false, then we lose the truth definition that we need for claiming its falsehood, for which we also have to let go falsehood of thought. No matter whether we claim truth or falsehood of thought, we enter a circle. If we wanted to positively think thought as being unnegatable, then we would have to transcend ourselves. However, if we negatively wanted to get rid of thought, then we would have to get rid of ourselves. This is the carrousel of circular constructivism. It does not only spin when we try combining both radical aspects of constructivism, but already when we claim one of them at all. The unification of both of them can thereby be seen as the claim of the negative aspect that gets circular not because the first positive aspect is true, but because it is factually valid.

Yet, the second view contradicts directly with the view of hierarchy constructivism. It is not compatible with it: if the world is constructed, then we cannot observe thought within the world biologically, nor can we claim it is false. This negative breaking of thought in the Anti-theory, being a theory that arises from the negation of existence abolishes itself. A consequent combination of both aspects we usually attribute to the view of constructivism in its most radical kind predicting our own incapability but captivity in thought, does not therefore just distance itself from the truth of thoughts about the world, it distances itself from the definition of truth the mind assigns to the world, becomes circular and collapses. It fails due to the hierarchy of thought that it tries to overcome, that it tries to make an object, which it can't flee after all, because we are subject to the construct. This work will hence provide an illustration of the imprisonment in our thoughts, its unbreakable laws and limits, as well as the inconsistency of those laws. It shows that the contradiction in change enables thought, and thereby sets thought an unsurmountable barrier. It will drive thinking to the highest level, then degrade it, just to recognize our natural limits as inevitable. Therefore, this work can be seen as a far-reaching fight against thought that goes as far as thinking allows us, but no further, only to lose the fight in the end.

This thesis abolishes the value of scientific cognition as science is based on a truth-definition that does not allow change: science does not explain anything outside of our truth-definition and does therefore not explain anything in the world. This thesis thereby also gives a new argument in the debate for the existence or non-existence of god. In fact, it is thereby not even an argument, as arguing is already assuming our truth-definition, whereas this specific argument arises from its criticism in the first place. In the debate about the existence of god, two questions appear again and again: 1. Do we need a god to explain the world? 2. Even if we don't necessarily need him, does he exist, or does he not exist? If we don't see the flaw in our truth definition, we then believe that we would not need god for the sake of explanation. Explanations then have a logical form and can be made through science. Even if there then was a god, he would then be accessible to scientific methods. He would then just be a scientific object, just like all other objects. However, what if we get rid of our truth-definition? We

then need something outside of our truth definition to justify a changing world. Something as vague and undefined as god could therefore well fit the world. If we thus at least theoretically drop our truth-definition (practically, this would mean thinking a negative paradox), science then loses all superiority over religion. Yet, as we are still caught in our thought and its attached truth-definition, religion then equally loses all superiority over science, as it takes religion all justification that could lie within thought, as religion then wants to reach something outside thought. In any case, the question for the existence of anything lies outside of thought. When we talk about the existence of god, we thereby always implicitly assume the law of excluded middle, believe that would either have to exist or not exist. Often, one then tries to solve the question with the help of scientific argument or evidence. Yet, through the lack of change of a world in the form of our thought, neither the thought of his existence or non-existence fits the world. Neither the proposition "God exists" nor "God does not exist" has a truth value, as the object of such a proposition is no identity and as truth value can only follow from objects in the form of thought. Therefore, no matter in what we believe, whether in something undefined and inaccessible to our thought we call god, or in the results of physics - our believe always takes place in thought. It can never find an explanation for a world outside of a thinkable world without change.

Eventually, we have to argue on a higher level than we are used to: instead of asking us what exists, instead of making theories that try to reach agreement with something, just like this one, we must consider that our definition of truth in our thought is fundamentally flawed. Science thereby loses its entitlement to truth and cognition of anything in the world. We cannot understand the world with thought - understanding her with our truth-definition would kill the change in her. Whatever we have been searching in our own thought indirectly by scientific methods can only be found outside of it. Maybe in god, in confusion or dizziness. Certainly in nothing that we could think. And thereby outside of everything that was just said.





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## CIRCULAR CONSTRUCTIVISM

*BREAKING OF HIERARCHY SUBJECT TO HIERARCHY JUST LIKE  
ITS CONFIRMATION*

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## HIERARCHY: THOUGHT VS. WORLD

### *THOUGHT CREATES THE WORLD - THE WORLD CREATES THOUGHT*

Before one can reply, one must ask. However, before one can ask the right question, one must already have justified oneself: This work aims to answer a question, but which one? The answer should represent an all-embracing theory, but on what? The object of the all-embracing theory should include everything. Yet, which object includes everything? The world with thought as one of her objects? Thought, with the theory of the world as one of its objects? The problems thus already begin with the fact that I wonder how I should begin. With thought? Each theory takes place there. With the world? All thought takes place in her. I want to create an all-embracing theory, but what is her object? The thoughts or the world? Is a theory all-embracing if the world is her object, or if the theory of the world is herself only one of her objects? Are we physicists or thinkers? If we are both, what are we first? Are we trapped in the world or in thought? If we are trapped in both, what limits us more fundamentally?

#### **0.1 Intellectual certainty - physical truth: two theories seem to be all-embracing**


As already indicated, there are two theories that both seem to fulfill the objective of this work, although they appear to be unrelated at first glance. However, the questions they answer both seem to demand the right to be called the only meaningful ones. If one had the answer to one of them, all answers were given. That's odd, because that would mean that one must already have answers before one can ever ask meaningfully.

I can ask: *How is the world?* If we had a complete answer to the question, even the truths of the brain were explored. Such an answer would be a *theory of the world*, her objects were the things in the world. However, the question of certainty seems equally fundamental: *Which thoughts are certain?* Are there thoughts that cannot be doubted? If we had a complete answer to the question, all certain thoughts containing the world were given. Such an answer would be a *theory of thought*, a theory that gave us all-embracing certainty.

##### **0.1.1 *Theory of world object of thought - theory of thought contains theory of world***

The claim that the theory of thought is all-embracing can be supported as follows: A complete theory of thought includes all thoughts that are certain. Since a theory needs to be thought before one can rightfully say that it is made, the theory of the world is a thought that manifests itself in a proposition. Since the theory of the world needs thought and takes place in it, it belongs to the object


of the theory of thought. This does not yet mean that the world is primarily part and object of thought, but rather that all propositions that are made can only be made through thought. If a theory is all embracing, then one can say that it has higher hierarchy than all other theories. Such hierarchy of the theory of thought arises since the theory of the world is only an object of the theory of thought. If one had a complete theory of thought, one also had a complete theory of the world. One would not even need to start a theory of the world anymore if one had established a complete theory of thought, since it would already be included in intellectual certainty. It is also important to note that the theory of thought is only possible with thought itself and is thus part of her own object, which will later lead to a critique of her objectivity (and strictly speaking also her possibility).



**Fig. 0.1.** All thoughts including the theory of the world compose the object of the theory of thought.

#### 0.1.2 *Thought as an object in world- theory of the world as a theory of thought in world*

However, the problem of hierarchy of theories is not yet solved, but rather just emerging as one can equally well support the claim that a theory of the world is herself all-embracing: all thinking takes part in the material world and is therefore part of the object of the theory of the world. We must therefore also consider the theory of the world higher in hierarchy, since the world is condition of all material existence, including all thoughts that happen in the world.




**Fig. 0.2.** Thinking is part of the material world and thus part of the object of the theory of the world.

## 0.2 Impossibility of any theory - interlacing of theories

### 0.2.1 *Other theory as object- theory itself only an object*

So far, the following interlacing of theories was established:

- (1) The thoughts are the object of the theory of thought. The theory of the world takes place in thought. Thus, the theory of thought is also a theory of the world.
- (2) The world is the object of the theory of the world. The thoughts are part of the world. Thus, the theory of the world is also a theory about the mind as a material object, which includes the thoughts.



**Fig. 0.3.** Interlacing: theory of thought with theory of the world as a mental object and theory of the world with theory of thought as a material object.


The theories seem so be interlaced into each other in a way that makes each theory object of the other theory and vice versa: A theory of thought includes the thoughts about the world and thus the theory of the world. However, thought and the theory of the world in it are themselves only possible through the world and thus an object of the theory of the world. The theory of the world, on the other hand, is only part of thought. Yet, thought takes place in the world. As one can easily see, one can continue with this circle endlessly, since the theories are interlaced into each other by being object of the other theory themselves.

### 0.2.2 *Innability to start a theory without the other theory as a foundation*


However, what significance does the interlacing of theories have for our aim of an all-embracing theory? Why would it be relevant for the theories themselves? It seems like we can ask for mental certainty independently from the world and that we can at the same instant observe the world without having to think about mental certainty at all. Whether the theory of thought contains the theory of

the world or not does not seem to have any relevance for the theory of the world, unless we wanted to decide which theory is higher in hierarchy.

Yet, if one looks closer at the interlacing, one will find that one cannot start any of the two theories theory without the other theory as a foundation. If one starts a theory of the world, this theory is part of the object of the theory of thought. How is one supposed to make a complete theory of the world without already having made part of the theory of certainty? Yet, for a theory of certainty one needs to have certain thoughts - one must therefore rather start with the theory of thought instead. On the other hand, if one starts a theory of thought, it is then part of the theory of the world and cannot be made without a theory of the world as a foundation.



**Fig. 0.4.** The theory of thought is part of the object of the theory of the world and therefore needs the theory of the world as a foundation




**Fig. 0.5.** The theory of the world is part of the object of the theory of thought and thus needs the theory of thought as a foundation.


### 0.2.3 *Physics as the foundation of logic vs. logic as the foundation of physics*

The problem of interlacing corresponds to the search for a theory without the need for a foundation. The question we thus need to answer in order to even start a theory is the following: Does the theory of thought form the basis of the theory of the world or the other way round. One is thereby tempted to set this equal to the question whether logic sets the foundation for physics or the other way round. Yet, one needs to be cautious of holding them for the exact paraphrases of theory of thought and world. Yet, there is a connection between them that still allows us to formulate the problem of foundation with respect to logic and physics. The theory of thought is about the certainty of thoughts and not of propositions. Still, as it will be shown later, it can be seen as a mechanism that creates certain

theories that are based on the certainty that arises from the theory of thought in the first place. On the other hand, the theory of the world is not equivalent to physics. The theory of the world is a set of thoughts about the world that are certain, as a theory about the world needs to be thought before she can written down. Yet, if she is written down, she can then be seen as a physical theory that we can communicate (the fact that physics does then just give us properties of the world, rather than explanations and predictions for change should again, just like when we had to consider thoughts a material part of the world, make us very suspicious). If we don't get rid of the interlacing between theory of thought and theory of the world, we thereby arrive at the following interlacing of logic and physics: The object of logic creates the foundation for mental certainty about the world and therefore for physics. The object of physics, on the other hand, then equally creates the material foundations for for the object of logic, namely objects in thought. If however, both objects form the foundations of each other, then one is trapped in a circle that forces one to search the foundations of logic in physics and vice versa - one then neither has mental certainty nor physical truth nor the written theories that are born from them.



**Fig. 0.6.** Physics, as it has the world as an object, creates the foundation of logic as a mechanism for certainty of theories on thoughts.



**Fig. 0.7.** Logic, as it tries to reach agreement with thoughts creating certain theories, has the the thoughts of the world as an object and therefore creates the foundations of physics.

The first, most basic and thus most difficult problem of this work is therefore that it doesn't know what to talk about. If it speaks about the world, then it must already have been talking about thought. Yet, before it can speak about thought it must already have dealt with the world. Consequentially, it cannot talk about anything before it hasn't found out which theory is all-encompassing and thus forms the foundation of the other theory. The aim of the first part of


this work must therefore be to overcome these difficulties, in order to start any theory.

#### 0.2.4 *Truth-definition through world or thought?*

A theory of thought needs two steps: Before it can identify certain thoughts, it must have justified why our definition of certainty is certain herself - one would first need to question why we hold certain thoughts for true and why the attached decision method is herself certain. Only after having created such a foundation, one could begin to actually use the decision method to identify thoughts that cannot objectively be doubted. The theory of thought would thereby also be concerned with thoughts about the world as a subset of all thoughts which we can check for certainty.

The situation is similar with the theory of the world. I can ask: *What are the factual truths in the material world?* To answer the question, I must first know whether there are truths in the material world, and whether the world in which we ourselves think is true. For this I must first have a definition of truth. Only if this definition was objective could I start searching for objects in the world that fulfill her. I could then also discover the truths about the brain, including the material basis for the psychological laws that govern and naturally limit it. Those truths about the brain would thereby only be a subset of the object of the theory of the world.

The interlacing is thereby born by the interlacing of the two objects of truth; the associated problem of foundation can therefore also be formulated in terms of the two attached definitions of truth: Before we can ever begin a theory, we must have a definition of truth. However, we believe that we cannot take it from the object of the theory itself, because that would mean to accept a certain theory before having started it. We thus naturally want to obtain the definition of truth from the object of the other theory: If we want to start a theory of thought, we want to use the world as the object which defines and represents truth. That makes sense insofar as it is questionable which value a theory of thought actually has, if its definition of truth is neither dependent nor confirmed by the world herself. On the other hand, however, how would we start a theory of the world without having a definition of truth that does not come from the mind? The problem of hierarchy thus becomes also apparent in the natural shift of the definition of truth to the object of the other theory. One can hence also formulate the problem as follows: Where does our truth definition come from? From the world or the thoughts? Can the definition of truth be originated from the thoughts and not comply with the world? Can, on the other hand, the definition of truth originate from the world and just not be confirmed by the mind?



**Fig. 0.8.** a) The foundation of the theory of the world lies in the truth-definition of thought due to interlacing of both theories.  
 b) The foundation of the theory of thought lies in the truth- definition of the world due to interlacing of both theories.

### 0.3 Definition of "all-embracing theory"

Until now, it was mainly shown that both theories *seem* to be all-embracing *according to intuition*. However, it was not explicitly said on which criterion such a conclusion is based. It was never stated under which circumstances a theory is all-embracing and under which not. So far, we have just accepted that both theories are all-embracing, although this belief is based on two very different definitions, as can be seen in the single arguments we make to argue that the two theories are "all-embracing":

- (1) The object of the theory of the world is the totality of material objects. As the object of the theory of the world includes the theory of thought, the theory of the world is all-embracing.
- (2) The object of the theory of thought is the totality of thoughts. Since the object of the theory of thought also includes the theory of the world, the theory of thought is all-embracing.

If we accept both arguments for each theory, then there are two theories that are all-embracing. This leads us into the ugly circle which forbids us to start any of the two theories. The interlacing is thereby created through two different definitions of all-embracing.

#### 0.3.1 Theory with all-embracing object: world


We hold the theory of the world for all-embracing, *since its object is all-embracing*. Such thinking is thus based on the following criterion:

- (0.1) A theory is all-embracing, if its object is all-embracing.

If we accept (0.1) as a criterion, we get the following result for the two theories:



- (1.1) The object of the theory of the world is the totality of material objects. Since the object of the theory of the world is all-embracing and therefore also includes the brain, in which the theory of thought takes place, the theory of the world is *all-embracing*.
- (2.1) The object of the theory of thought are the thoughts. Since the object of the theory of thought is not all-embracing (it is part of the world although the theory of the world takes place in it) The theory of thought is thus *not all-embracing* according to the above criterion. Consequentially, if we accept (0.1) as a criterion, then the theory of the world is the only all-embracing theory, since thought is only a material part of the world.



**Fig. 0.9.** The object of the theory of the world is all-embracing - the object of the theory of thought is only part of the world - the theory of the world is thus the only all-embracing theory.


### 0.3.2 Theory with all-embracing object as an object: thought and world

In contrast, we consider the theory of thought all-embracing because *it contains theory of the world as an object*. This belief is thus based on the following criterion:

- (0.2) A theory is all-embracing if its object contains a theory that has an all-embracing object. If we now accept (0.2) as a criterion, we obtain the following result for the two theories:
- (1.2) The object of the theory of the world is the totality of material objects. Since the object of the theory of the world is all-embracing, it also includes the theory of the world as an object which takes place in the

world. Thus, the theory of the world is *all-embracing* according to the above criterion.

- (2.2) The object of the theory of thought is the totality of thoughts. As the theory of the world, which has an all-embracing object, is itself object of the the theory of thought, the theory of thought is *also all-embracing*. Although we established (0.2) mainly with the theory of thought in mind, the theory of the world also fulfills the criterion, since she contains all thoughts and therefore also the thoughts that are concerned with the world herself.



**Fig. 0.10.** The object of the theory of thought is the theory of the world. The object of the theory of the world contains the thoughts and thus the theory of the world, too.

### 0.3.3 Other definition of "all-embracing object"?

Thus, if we accept (0.1) as a criterion for the hierarchy of a theory, then the theory of the world is the only all-embracing theory, as her object is all-embracing and the theory of thought is not. If, on the other hand, we use (0.2) as a criterion, then both theories can be seen as all-embracing. If we thus believe that either both criteria or just the second one can be accepted, then we get two all-embracing theories and the circle to which this leads. However, if we accept (0.1) as the only criterion, we obtain a clear hierarchy, but violate our intuition, telling us that the theory of thought cannot be *not* all-embracing and at the same time contain the theory of the world. It seems as if we have to hold on to the second criterion, in order to hold on to the belief that the theory of thought remains all-embracing. However, if we accept (0.2) as a criterion to save our

intuition, we lose hierarchy and thus both theories. The criterion thus solves one problem while creating another one, since we lose the possibility to establish a hierarchy allowing us to avoid interlacing. Might we be able to modify the second criterion so that hierarchy is re-established? According to the second criterion, a theory is all-embracing if its object contains an all-embracing theory - this applies to both the theory of thought and the world since the theory of the world in thought is material part of the world. If we thus hold the world for an all-embracing object, then the second criterion cannot be useful to avoid both hierarchy and the severe violation of intuition.

Should we perhaps rather be concerned with the definition of an all-embracing object, which made the second criterion possible in the first place? An object is all-embracing if it contains everything, but what exactly contains everything? In the beginning, we implicitly assumed the world to be such an object. However, if we accept that view, we also need to accept that the theory of the all-embracing object is part of another object that is not all-embracing, for which we need to form a second criterion.

Yet, how can one hold on to the view that the world is an all-embracing object although its theory is only part of another object, for which we thus need to establish a second criterion, so that the theory of thought can also be seen as an all-embracing theory? It was the assumption that the world is an all-embracing object that led into the mess of interlacing in the first place. Now, if we dropped the world as an all-embracing object, we could hold thought for an all-embracing object without having to introduce a second criterion - we could then just use the first criterion.

#### 0.4 Hierarchy of objects: thought as home of truth


##### 0.4.1 *All-embracing object/home of truth: World within thought or thought within world?*

Before we can decide which theory is higher in hierarchy, we need to decide which object is higher in hierarchy. If the world were higher in hierarchy, the theory of the world would be all-embracing and the theory of thought would not be an all-embracing theory, which entirely contradicts our intuition. If, on the other hand, thought would be higher in hierarchy, the world would just be part of thought and thus be subordinate to thought, which is also against our intuition. If the world would only be part of the thoughts, she would have to comply to the definition of truth of the thoughts and the mind. If however, the world contained the thoughts, the definition of truth could only be based on the world in which they take place. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked, is whether the world or the thoughts are the actual home and object of truth.

The problem in finding a solution to that problem is that, deep inside, we are convinced that both objects are all-embracing. We see both objects as the home of truth by establishing the second criterion with an attached new definition of truth based on the thoughts rather than on the world, while still keeping up

to the first criterion. We thereby seem to acknowledge both of the following hierarchies:

- (1) The world contains the thoughts, they are only objects of the world.
- (2) Thought contains the world, she is only one of its objects.




**Fig. 0.11.** We implicitly assume both that the world is part of thought and that the thoughts are part of the world.

#### 0.4.2 Which instance precedes the other?

The problem of hierarchy of the two theories thus originates in a more fundamental problem of hierarchy: Is the world object of thought or thought object of the world? If we accept both, not having a clear definition of what makes an all-embracing object, we won't obtain an all-embracing theory due to interlacing. We need to establish a hierarchy that defines the top level of the interlacing, so that we have a safe starting point of our all-embracing theory.

To achieve that, one needs to change the definition of the all-embracing object. If the world is all-embracing, then it precedes the thoughts in so far as one can see the birth of thought in the birth of the world and not the other way round. If, on the other hand, thought precedes the world, the world is only born with thought and is thus just a regular object within thought. Now, which instance has the power to decide and therefore represents the foundation of the other instance? Which instance gives birth to all objects? Which object is the only object that really exists? Well, to answer that, let's look at which instance actually makes the decision about hierarchy.




**Fig. 0.12.** A decision needs to be made as to whether thought precedes the world and represents her foundation or the other way round.

#### 0.4.3 Subjective decidedness: thought precedes the world


Although we may believe that the world embraces everything that exists, this view is shockingly, but trivially dependent on thought - without thought we could simply not hold the view that the world precedes the thoughts. Nobody could seriously doubt that without at the same claiming that he can think without thinking, which will later be set equal with the impossible thought of a simple contradiction, negative- or liar paradox. However, it seems like one can with the same right claim, that without a world that materially enables thought, there would simply be no thought that could create thoughts of the world. Nobody could seriously doubt that - but this is just because there is always a world in our thought that seems to contain thought materially. If the world preceded thought, physics would form the basis of logic. Yet, where would physics originate from other than thought, which other rules of inference would it use other than logic? This would mean thinking without thinking as logic originates from the certainty within thought. By contrast, if thought preceded the world, physics would gain its foundations from mental certainty.

It seems like we cannot make a decision, but the means from which the decision arises already represents a decision in itself: We can only write theses on hierarchy with the means of thought and *nothing outside of it*. Surely we need the world for that, but this view is bound to thought. Surely something can exist without living and thinking brains in it, but this view is entirely bound to a thinker that thinks exactly that it is possible. The world without thinker is then just a common thought. One can also see this from another angle: How should physics be the foundation of logic? How can thinking receive its foundations by something outside of thought? One might say that this view is entirely constructed and bound to the world. But this view is again only possible from the perspective of a thinker. Therefore, if we ask which object is predominant,



**Fig. 0.13.** No matter which object we choose to be the home of truth, we must decide with thought and thereby implicitly assign the highest hierarchy to it.

higher in hierarchy and preceding all other objects representing the *only* home to truth, we must accept that we already made a decision by thinking about it. Material existence is only possible due to the consciousness of such existence. Conscious being thus precedes material being and creates it, although it allows us to claim otherwise.



**Fig. 0.14.** Thought creates and contains the world with thought as a material part.

#### 0.4.4 *External world independent of thought within thought*

The claim that thought is the only all-embracing object is thereby equivalent to the claim that there is no external world of thought. When we claim that there is no external world this is often set equal with the claim that the world we perceive is not existing in itself. Yet, if one sees this existence in itself in thought rather than in the world she can exist in herself within thought. If we claim that there is a world independent of thought, we would then have to think a thought with

the content that there is something outside of thought. We would therefore have to think that we do not think. The claim of an external world independent of thought is therefore equivalent to a negative paradox as the negation of thought with thought, which is, as it will be argued later, factually impossible within thought.

One must thereby see this claim in the context of the actual object of truth that this thesis sees in thought, rather than in the world, for which the actual truth definition we use is derived from thought rather than from the world. When we now interpret the claim "there is no external world" without bearing in mind that we derived our truth definition of the world from the dependence of our truth definition in thought, we then believe we claim that the world herself within thought is not within thought for which we then hold the claim for paradoxical. Yet, if we consider the world being part of thought in the first place, there is nothing paradoxical about that claim. Maybe there is in fact an external world (and this external world then breaks with our truth definition given to us by thought), but we can only imagine so within thought where we are captured forever. There is no more trivial claim than the hierarchy of thought. There is nothing with less doubt, as all certainty we have is derived from this very subjective boundary of hierarchy.


#### 0.4.5 *Objective undecidability: detection of lack of objectivity subject to lack itself*

The highest decision making body must fulfill the criterion for hierarchy - thinking is thus the only all-embracing object, strictly speaking the only object that exists, as it includes everything and thereby defines our notion of truth. However, while making this argument, one must in the same breath know that it cannot be objective, since it is only successful due to its unquestionability and therefore its subjectivity. Yet, if one claims such subjectivity of thought, one is oneself subject of such subjectivity. One does therefore not flee subjectivity by claiming or predicting it. If we acknowledge that thought is the highest decision body, then we cannot call the decision objectively undecidable without being object of the hierarchy and subjectivity of thought herself. No matter how hard we try to ascent the hierarchy of thought by making it a simple object we describe, our description will always be a simple object of the hierarchy we try to escape. Deciding objectively on undecidability would thereby mean not being able to decide at all - the lack of hierarchy would cause a lack of truth rather than objective truth. Thinking is therefore forced to be higher in hierarchy because it *can* decide, due to that, however, it is never objective. (which is itself representing a thought that claims to be objective ;)

### 0.5 The all-embracing theory

#### 0.5.1 *Limit of thought as foundation of certainty*

From the hierarchy of thinking we establish a hierarchy of theories:



**Fig. 0.15.** Thought decides on the undecidability of hierarchy and is therefore object of the hierarchy of thought.


- (0.0) Thoughts composes the only all-embracing object.
- (0.1) A theory is all- embracing if and only if its object is all-embracing.
- (1.1) The object of the theory of the world is the totality of material objects. The world is not an all-encompassing object - although it contains thought as a material object, such a view is only possible within thought. Therefore, the theory of the world *isnot all-embracing*.
- (2.1) The object of the theory of thought are the thoughts. Thought represents an all-embracing object that contains the world. Therefore, the theory of thought is all-embracing.

The first and all-embracing theory thus needs to be a theory of thought. Furthermore, hierarchy tells us more than that the theory of thought includes the world: thought represents the highest instance and can thus not be judged by any instance outside of itself. It was previously shown how we try to gain our definition of truth from a different object then the object of the theory to pretend objectivity. If we shift our definition of truth to another object that is claimed to have higher hierarchy to save objectivity, we end up in a circle and can't start any theory. If on the other hand, we acknowledge the hierarchy of the theory of thought, we can only find the definition of truth in the theory of thought herself. The foundations of the theory of thought thus lie within the theory of thought herself, lie within thought as the only object in which we move while making such a theory. Before one can start a theory of thought one therefore already has to have made a theory of thought by accepting its hierarchy. This is due to the fact that we cannot question the truth definition of thinking, since we would need to use the truth definition of thought exactly for that purpose.

This presuppositionslessness of thought is already determined through the hierarchy of thought, as there is simply no higher authority that could judge the results of our thinking. Thought cannot negate itself and can thus only rely on what it can think and not think, what it can affirm and not affirm. Certainty, which is what we are looking for in the next part of this work, can therefore only be found in the negation of the negation of thought itself and thereby in the negation of the infringement of its natural limit as a confirmation of its



hierarchy. Or put differently: certainly lies in the unnegatability of the objects of thought itself.




**Fig. 0.16.** The foundation of the theory of thought is the negation of the infringement of its limit. The definition of truth of thought lies in thinking itself.

#### 0.5.2 *Form of thought as form of world - logic as foundation of physics*

Our method of gaining knowledge is thus restricted by the limit of thought and bound to the form of thought that arises from it. Thought defines the form of all possible objects since it is all-embracing and hence also defines the form of the world. We can thereby only realise and understand what conforms to the form of thought. The truth definition of thought thus automatically applies for the truth definition of the world, since the world can only be an object if it is part of thought and thus satisfies the law of thought (which will be introduced later). The theory of thought and the rules of inference that preserve the content of thought enabling us to make

the rules that follow from it to recognise certainty therefore form the foundation of physics. A trivial as it sounds - physics then just represents a part of the theory of thought that is concerned with a special class of objects that are not higher in hierarchy than any other object of thought.




**Fig. 0.17.** The limit of thought defines the form of the world - the theory of thought represents the foundation of physics.

## 0.6 The Anti-Theory

### 0.6.1 *Hierarchy does not undermine interlacing and self-reference*


Although the world is only an object of thought, such hierarchy does not abolish the interlacing at all, it just assigns the highest level to a certain object. The world as an object of thought can thus include thought as a material part and cause a conflict between the different levels in which thinking takes place: a description of the world would also be a description of the object in which such a description takes place and open the door to self reference if the theory of the world stated something about her that contradicts with thought as the means of description.



**Fig. 0.18.** The object of the theory of thought are the thoughts with the world including thought as one of her objects.

### 0.6.2 *Questioning of hierarchy through contradiction in thought*

What now, if the theory of thought tells us something about the world and thereby the thoughts in it that would abolish thought? The world represents, as it will be shown later, a temporary truth in the mind and cannot be negated in a point of thought without breaking the law of thought. On the other hand, we can also create a world in the mind that obeys the law of thought making *thought impossible due to a lack of change*.



**Fig. 0.19.** The object of the theory of thought are the thoughts with the world as a common object including material thinking as a sub- object, whereby thinking in the thought of the world contradicts with thinking about the world.

### 0.6.3 *Attempt of theory of word with higher hierarchy - letting world break form of thought*

To enable change and thinking in the world, we will consequently try to turn the table and establish a theory of the world that contradicts with thought, breaks the form of thought and therefore tries to overturn the hierarchy of thought that was established in the beginning. We will thereby see thinking as a simple object of the world that cannot overcome its natural limits of thought and which does thereby neither understand the world nor gain knowledge on her due to its natural limitations.

### 0.6.4 *Triumph of hierarchy: Double contradiction through double self reference*


However, such a theory will be subject to hierarchy in two aspects and thus fail on two levels. Firstly, she will try to form an object that does not conform to the laws of thought, although she is created with thoughts that conform to them. She can thus be seen as the attempt to break thought with thought, trying to make the negation of thought an object of it. Evidently, such a theory will not overcome the limitations imposed to us by our thought.

Secondly, she will try to make such inability an object of a description and predict that within the world no knowledge of the world can be gained through the disability of our thought to differ from its form. Even more evidently, such an attempt is subject to hierarchy as well and will fulfill its own prediction by being subject of the inability of thought itself. We will negate knowledge in the world due to the form of thought and try to establish this restriction as something that tries to break it. However, if we believe in what the rule about our inability says we must follow her and believe the rule is false leading into a vicious circle of self reference.

Similar to the prediction of the subjectivity of the decision for thought as the all-embracing object, the Anti- Theory will predict that we are subject to hierarchy and not be able to flee from it since its prediction will validate herself.

Exactly since we make the right prediction about our inability will we be trapped in her.

This work will hence provide an illustration of the imprisonment in our thoughts, its unbreakable laws and limits, as well as the inconsistency of those laws. It will drive thinking to the highest level, then degrade it, just to recognise our natural limits as inevitable. Therefore, this work can be seen as a far-reaching fight against thought that goes as far as thinking allows us, but no further, only to lose the fight in the end.



**Fig. 0.20.** The theory of the world is still a theory of thought. The theory of the world lets the world break the laws of thought within thinking and can't overcome exactly this limitation. The prediction of this limitation that makes the mind part of the world will be confirmed since it refers back to the object in which such a prediction takes place.



## THEORY OF CERTAINTY - TRAPPED IN THOUGHT

### *POSITIVE REGRESS SOLVED BY INDUCTIVE FOUNDATION OF CERTAINTY*

Technically, due to the hierarchy of thought we already know that certainty is based on the limit of thought, that the foundations of the theory of thought are without presuppositions and not subject to any other instance than thought itself. Still, this theory of certainty will not take that for granted and first try to begin a theory of thought without assuming that is based on the boundary of subjectivity, just to show how much it really needs it for orientation. It will thus demonstrate that the attempt of an objective theory of truth is bound to the loss of an instance of decision.

#### 1.1 Certainty in vacuum

##### 1.1.1 *Certainty as the goal of thought*

All thinking consists of thinkable objects that we call thoughts. There are many criterions on the basis of which one could evaluate the success of those thoughts - one could base it on usefulness or on joy, on complexity or conformity to moral laws, but one could also base it on their certainty. An important goal of the mind can be seen in producing products through its means, that can therefore not be questioned anymore without breaking the law of those means. An important criterion that this section looks at is therefore whether we can produce thoughts that cannot become unthinkable, that can endure over time and that can remain forever in the mind.

The answer that this section will thereby give to the question, whether such thoughts are possible, will be against intuition - it will negate the possibility of such thoughts as positive paradoxes, but it will only do so due to the actual certainty of every thought in every point of thought, that gives rise to an infinite number of certain, but written theories. The confusion that this chapter brings about thereby arises from the distinction between written and actual thought, as written thoughts are eternally certain theories on thoughts rather than thoughts themselves. They thereby represent a certainty that is inductive, that cannot be thought, but only arises from the eternal impossibility to break thought, giving rise to negative certainty, rather than the positive certainty of eternally certain thoughts

##### 1.1.2 *Completeness of certainty*

Every single day, we have thoughts that we are so much convinced of that we call them certain. Usually, we don't judge the success of our thinking on whether we can find certain thoughts *at all*, but rather on *how many* we can find. Apparently, it does not seem to be the ultimate goal of our thinking to find a *single thought* but rather to find *all possible thoughts* that cannot be denied.

### 1.1.3 *Certainty in a vacuum - the foundation of thought*

However, before we can try to find all certain thoughts and pursue ultimate certainty, we need to find a certain thought that is itself not based on any other thought and thus establishes certainty without accepting it as any form of precondition. The first step of this theory of thought therefore has a very modest goal: It does not want to find the totality of all certain thoughts, but is rather satisfied with a first certain thought at all. To check whether such a thought exists we are naturally not allowed to use another one as justification, as we want to avoid begging the question. That is why I would like you to forget about everything you think is true, unquestionable or certain while you read this. If this theory of certainty would just assume certainty, it would start where it wants to end. Thus, the art of a theory of certainty is not getting from A to B, but rather finding a reliable first point of orientation. Therefore, please imagine that there were no books on your shelf, as if thinking would just begin and had not arrived anywhere except for the naked state of question. Imagine you find a vacuum and want to fill it. Our goal is thereby not even filling it out entirely, but only to put an end to its emptiness.


#### 1.1.3.1 Dependence of certainty on thought

Formally, we are thus looking for a result of thinking that fulfills two conditions: a. it does not leave any room for doubt. b. it does not gain its certainty from the certainty of any other thought. Before actually trying to fulfill both conditions, we must be conscious of the preconditions of such an attempt: having thought a thought is a precondition of checking it for anything. We can thus only check those thoughts for certainty that find their way into our thinking. We are therefore naturally limited to the thoughts that we have -thoughts that we can't think or that that are just not thought cannot be checked for certainty.

#### 1.1.3.2 Hierarchy - certainty and self-reference

Before I can hold a thought for certain, I must first have a decision method to distinguish between certain and non-certain thoughts. What would such a decision method be based on? I can only decide whether I can doubt a thought by checking whether I can affirm its negation, whether the nonexistence of a certain thought in a thought breaks thought. If the negation of a thought is impossible, then it is certain, since affirming its negation is equivalent to the impossible breaking of hierarchy itself. Yet, where do we get our definition of impossibility from? Something is impossible, if it cannot be affirmed. How then do we decide whether something cannot be affirmed? Naturally, we can only say something cannot be affirmed with thought as an instance. When we are convinced of the certainty of a thought, we can therefore only base this belief on the experience that we are not able to think its negation. Consequently, such a decision method is already giving a definition of certainty that needs to be certain, thereby already defining a certain thought - the simple fact that certainty


can only be based on the unnegatability within thought, needs to be unnegatable and at the same time not beg the question by already assuming certainty. Well, what is our justification for the decision method then? Such justification can naturally only lie within our thinking and through that in our inability to think certain thoughts itself. Thus, the decision method is a precondition of asking for a justification for it. How should we then decide about the method objectively without using it? We must not use it, if we want to fill the vacuum without begging the question. However, how would we check the decision method for a property it must already have to run the check? This is the point when we are confronted with the hierarchy of thought that was already established in the beginning of this work.



**Fig. 1.1.** The decision method for certainty is itself one of the objects on which it decides.

#### 1.1.3.2.1 Affirmation of certainty - justifying thought with thought- positive regress

When we try to justify the correctness of thinking and our decision method for certainty, we need thinking itself and thus the derived decision method we are trying to justify. Due to that, we are trapped in a positive regress - whenever we try to defend the validity of thinking we must use it. We thereby create endless levels of observation that try to make thinking an object which we can transcend, just to realise that we need to establish another pseudo level to judge thinking with thinking.




**Fig. 1.2.** The correctness of thought in judging certainty can itself only be judged by thought. The object about which one should judge are the only means one can use. What else than thought could judge certainty? Can certainty then objectively justified?




## 1.1.3.2.2 Negation of certainty - breaking thought -negative regress

We enter a positive regress when we try to found certainty without already using and thereby assuming its validity. Why then don't we just claim, that it is impossible to fill the vacuum? Would we thereby fill it more then we could by trying to justify our thought? We thereby claim the following: *There is no thought produced by the mind that is certain* since it is always based on the subjective authority of thought itself, which is not itself derived from a reliable authority.



**Fig. 1.3.** *Claim:* Thought and the decision method for the certainty that emerges from it is not certain. However, who should judge certainty other than thought?

The problem with this attempt for an escape is, that it is itself a thought and thus denies that a set of thoughts of which it is itself part does not possess a property that it must possess to be successful. It thereby denies itself, since holding the thought for certain is a precondition of claiming it. The negation of certainty can only be objective if it certain itself. If it is not based on a reliable authority outside of thought, it could simply be as flawed as thought, since it is itself based exactly on thought. Thus, by affirming the thought: *No thought is certain* one negates the thought itself and thus indirectly confirms it.




**Fig. 1.4.** If the thought affirms the property of uncertainty to himself he must hold himself for uncertain.

The thought of uncertainty would thus not possess a property that it needs to possess in order to deny the property of not possessing it. The problem is thereby not that the thought negates a certain property for a group of objects, but that it is itself member of that group and that additionally, being convinced

of the property is a necessary precondition for affirming something at all. If we affirm the thought of the uncertainty of all thoughts, we also affirm that the thought is itself uncertain and thus would have to negate and affirm, think and not think a certain content at the same time, thereby breaking thought.

Hence, we don't avoid being subject to the hierarchy of thought by claiming its subjectivity, since we thereby use the decision method we try to negate and hold for flawed. One can regard this failed attempt to negate hierarchy and thinking as a *negative regress* since it must create endless levels that transcend and abolish thought to negate it, although it is part of it, taking place on the same level within the object of thought. At this point, we can detect our limits even more clearly through trying to suspend them.



**Fig. 1.5.** The thought of uncertainty affirms the property of uncertainty to all thoughts and thus negates its own certainty since it is part of the object of its description.

#### 1.1.3.2.3 Pseudo higher level regresses

The natural reaction when facing the regresses is to make them an object of a thought that claims to be certain itself. When we are confronted with a positive regress, trying to give our decision method for certainty an objective foundation we now try to claim: It is impossible to give thought an objective foundation. Yet, through that, we just enter the negative regress that was already presented. On the other hand, when we are confronted with a negative regress, trying to abolish thought as an instance, we now try to claim: It is impossible to negate thought within thought. Yet, through that, we just enter a positive regress, as we are trying to confirm thought and the attached impossibility of its breaking within thought. Furthermore, one is then tempted to just make both higher order regresses object of an own thought by claiming: we are neither able to justify thought within thought, nor are we able to reject it within thought. Yet, by that we already assume that thought is a certain instance and thereby again, end

up in a positive regress. All sorts of meta-thoughts thus lack certainty as they can only take place within the instance of thought - it does thereby not matter whether we end up in a first-order regress or make the results of the regresses an object itself, as both end up in a breaking of thought within thought as the only object and thus within the only level.

#### 1.1.3.3 Decision method for certainty: without precondition through hierarchy

As the decision method of certainty is based on the undeniability within thought, which thereby already claims a certain thought, the objective certainty of all thoughts stands and falls with the certainty of the decision method itself. Yet, to find a justification of the decision method would at the same instant mean to found with thought, to create what is already there before creating. This would mean creating an object of thought with our own means as content, without ever basing our thought on the content in question. Such attempt would thus try to overrule the hierarchy that was already established in the beginning of this work and thereby try to question thought with a higher instance, with an instance that has the authority to judge over thought independently. How would we be able to gain distance from the object we are using for our description? How could we objectively look on it from a higher level, while being on the observed level ourselves? Such an attempt would mean to question ourselves with ourselves. We would have to split our judgement about ourselves from ourselves, would thus have to lose ourselves to gain objectivity. Through the hierarchy of thought we hence gain a possible theory of certainty, but lose the ability to question it with anything else then thought just as we are unable to found it objectively, positively within thought. Since all we have is thought, we can therefore not question our theory of certainty at all. Hence, all our cognition lies unquestioned within thinking and not outside of it - and if there seemingly appears to be an instance outside of thought, such an instance is only possible, if it is enabled by and within thought and is therefore subject to the hierarchy of thought as well. We thus need to hold our decision method for certainty for certain itself, although it is not objectively founded (as it will be argued later, it is inductive and cannot even be object of any thought, which would make the thought eternally certain). Our criterion for certainty is thus about as reliable as a prosecutor, who is investigating a case against himself concerning perversion of justice. If he really bends the law, he will continue to do so. In case he even represents the highest hierarchical level in the judiciary, his decisions become objective law, since there is simply no other authority that could check or define the lawfulness of his actions. All certainty is thus only based on a subjective and objectively random decision, but is only through that ever possible.

### 1.2 Limit of thought - foundation of all thought

All human thought and all knowledge that arises from it thus begins and ends with its unsurmountable foundation: the thinkable itself. It gives thought its natural strength, but also assigns a sharply restricted frame to it, in which it is

caught for ever. We do not fall deeper than thinking, but cannot aim higher. Our mind keeps us trapped in ourselves: His chains are his instrument. His liberation is its end. And we are caught in the ability to think at all.

**Universal limit of thought:** It can only be thought what can be thought. Thought is thus confined to itself.

#### 1.2.1 *Hierarchy - thought defines the form of a proposition*

##### 1.2.1.1 Thought bound to language? - irrelevant for theory of thought


This is a theory of thought - not a theory of language. Everything that will be said about the certainty and the truth of thought will refer to thought and not to propositions primarily. Yet, whenever we talk of a thought we have, we can only communicate him through propositions. Consequently, every thought of this work did only reach your thoughts through their linguistic form - I could only make you have the thoughts you had through language. Are propositions thus the mirror of our thoughts? Do thoughts then have the form of propositions? Of course not. It is rather the other way around: all language that evokes a thought must therefore satisfy its form. The question whether language embraces all thought is thus not relevant for this theory, as it is about thought - no matter whether language is the form of all thoughts or not, everything that will be said will apply for all thought in general.

##### 1.2.1.2 Proposition as both representation/effect of thought and cause of/theory on thought

When we talk about thoughts in language, we can only refer to them with symbols. Those symbols however, only represent thoughts when they are either effect or cause of a thought. This is the point where a lot of the confusion attached to the notion of "proposition" arises: A proposition that is evoked by a thought does not cause exactly the thought that evoked the proposition in the first place. When we write down a thought, we thereby have to differentiate between the proposition we write down *caused by our thought, made to represent it and the thought that the proposition then evokes for someone else. For a reader, a proposition is a theory on a specific object: he compares the information within the thought of somebody else with his own thought. He thereby tries to combine the information of the proposition with the information of the object to which the proposition relates to in his own thought. Yet, theories are no special class of thoughts - they can only be checked for anything with the common framework of thought.*

##### 1.2.1.3 Why a theory of language cannot be a proper theory of truth

This theory thereby solves three problems of a theory of truth based on language. Firstly, if we search truth in language we are only dealing with truth of theories - we then don't understand that the actual object of truth lies in thought rather than in the outside world. If we forget that, we believe we think in thoughts



**Fig. 1.6.** Most claims we make are theories on objects of thought that try to affirm the information of the object to himself to achieve agreement with him.

about external objects, although our thoughts build the actual objects to which sentences then refer, to which, they are however equivalent when they are caused by a thought. Secondly, we then don't understand that thought is the only object of truth and need to ask for the absolute meaning of a sentence within many minds. Thirdly, when we see the laws of thought as relation to language, we enter a circle when we try to give our own means a truth value, whereas from the view of thought, it is simply impossible to give such a sentence a truth value, as it does not represent a theory on a thinkable object.

## 1.2.2 *Law of Thought*

### 1.2.2.1 What is thinkable through what is unthinkable

How do we now find out about the actual form of thought? How can we recognise its form within its form? The form of our thought only becomes apparent when we reach its boundary. We need to encounter the unthinkable and thus its unbreakable law to push forward to the core of thought - to be able to assess in which trains it moves, we have to try unsuccessfully breaking out of it. Now, the limit of thought says that we cannot infringe it. But, where exactly lies this limit? Naturally, it must lie in the form of its objects. Just what is thinkable, what is not? I can only say what characterises my thinking by making me aware of what it restricts. So, before we can know the form of thought, we need the unthinkable. Just what is unthinkable?

### 1.2.2.2 Hierarchy: interlacing of impossible content and impossible form

There seem to be two possible ways of finding out what exactly limits our thought: we find out which form no possible thought can have. we find out which thought exactly cannot be thought, which content of a thought is thus unthinkable. However, those two ways of defining the limit of thought seem confusingly interlaced, as each one seems to include the other one, just like when both theory of thought and theory of the world seemed all-embracing.

## 1.2.2.2.1 Impossible content through impossible form

When we try to define the impossible form of a thought, we look at the limit of thought from above and treat it as an object of our thought. Hence, we use our own means of thought to describe them.

The universal limit of thought tells us: *It can generally only be thought, what can be thought.* What does that mean for each single thought? What cannot be thought within a thought is defined by what is not part of it. For the form of the unthinkable thought this means: *The impossible form of a thought is the disagreement with himself.* The unthinkable thought has thus the form  $\neg( \mathbf{a} \ \& \ \neg \mathbf{a} )$ , where  $a$  stands for a single thought. Hence, no possible thought has a content that causes its form to be unthinkable. The impossible content of thought is thus a content that breaks the form of thought. Now, which content causes a thought to disagree with himself? *The form of a thought can only be the disagreement with itself if the content of a thought states the disagreement of a thought with itself and thus denies the limit and the form of thought.* If we deny the limit of thought within thought we make thought an object of our thought and deny it within such a thought:

**Negation of universal limit of thought:** If something cannot be thought, then it can be thought.

**Affirmation of the impossible form of thought:** Something that is a thought does not agree with itself since one can assign a property contradictory to the content of the thought to it. Which formally both ends in:

$$(\neg Px \rightarrow Px)a$$

where  $a$  stands for a thought which consists of the property  $P$  that is assigned to  $x$ , forming the thought  $a$ , which also includes the property  $\neg P$ .

## 1.2.2.2.1.1 Theories bound to thought

The unthinkable thought does not primarily represent a thought  $a$  with two contradictory properties, but rather a thought  $a$  that consists of the attribution of a property to an a sub-object, which possesses the negation of the attributed property. We will later call the property that is assigned to the sub-object *a theory* and the sub-object the *object of that theory*. We must thereby not confuse that *a as an object represents the whole thought* which consists of *a theory on a sub-object*. The *theory about this sub-object* can then be seen as the *content of the thought*. When we try to evoke such a thought we would rather leave away *a in writing* since the theory would itself represent a thought. However, one might ask for the difference between a thought with the affirmation and negation of an property as content and a theory that assigns a property to an object that contains the negation of the property. They both seem to be unthinkable.

Both thoughts are unthinkable. Are they equivalent? When we try to break the form of thought we don't usually try to think two contradictory objects, but rather try to make a contradictory theory about an object. They both lead to

unthinkability and one can thus say that they are equivalent insofar as they lead to a breaking of the form of our thought. They both lead to the same impossible thought.

#### 1.2.2.2.2 Impossible form through impossible content

As we have seen in the beginning of this section, the breaking of the form of thought creates an unthinkable thought. As we can only observe our thought within thought, the hierarchy of the unthinkable thought should be higher than the unthinkable form of thought and not the other way round. One can produce the unthinkable thought with the negation of the form of thought, but one can only get the impossible form of thought *through* the impossibility of its negation *in thought*. Although there is still interlacing of form and content within hierarchy, the content of thoughts has the highest hierarchy - if thoughts and their content within them is observed from above, such an attempt is only possible within the content of a thought.

The only unthinkable and thus impossible thought within the all-embracing object of thought is a thought, that tries to break its hierarchy within hierarchy. Such an attempt is given if one claims that there are no certain thoughts and thereby thinks that the thought is uncertain itself, contrary to the fact that it wants to be regarded as certain by being claimed. The attempt of breaking the hierarchy is thus equivalent to the affirmation of the disagreement of a thought with itself. (One must note that one can also break the hierarchy of thought with thinking that a our definition of certainty is certain itself for which we only look at one possible unthinkable content that both leads to the breaking of thought). Hence, one can more generally say, that

**(unthinkable content of thought through negation)** an unthinkable thought assigns the negation of a thought to the thought himself This applies for the thought *it is certain, that no thought is certain* since it assigns the negation of himself to himself. a. If the thought that no thought is certain, is certain, then this thought is not certain. If there are not thoughts that are certain, then this thought is certain. or formally:

$$(Cx \rightarrow \neg C)a$$

$$(\neg Cx \rightarrow C)a$$

which both fulfills the above definition, when one sees  $a$  as a thought that attributes a property to the thought  $x$  that has the negation of the property as content.

#### 1.2.2.2.3 The special meaning of contradiction: overcoming positive or negative regress

With that, we did not only find out that a contradiction is an unthinkable thought, but also why it is unthinkable: it appears if one either truly *thinks* that thought is false with the truth definition of thought itself or that thought is true

with exactly that truth definition. A contradiction should thus not just be seen as a weird object we deal with in logic, but rather a structure that comes right from the foundation of the hierarchy of thought, since it occurs if one tries to break it while still being subject to it, either by trying abolishing thought, or founding it with thought itself. Yet, although we can formulate contradictions in language representing the demand of thinking them, they never appear in thought, for which one might as well say, that due to the hierarchy of thought no contradiction ever truly exists.

#### 1.2.2.2.4 Law of thought positive paradox- but still valid

Laws of thought say something about all thoughts, they observe the form of thought from above. Yet, they are only possible within thought. Therefore, one should see them as thoughts rather than as meta-descriptions of thought. Yet, are laws of thought therefore undeniable themselves? Can we think which form our thinking has? This would just cause the same breaking of thought as the foundation of thought with thought itself - we cannot think and think that we think, we cannot make our own thinking an object of exactly that thinking, as there is no higher level, no higher instance than thought. Does that mean that the law of thought is not valid? There is a difference between formulating a law for a thought after having it and thinking the law that was created: the proposition evoked by a thought is that he is never contradictory to himself, but he does not contain the thought that he is uncontradictory. This does not mean that the law of thought is invalid, as this would mean that one can break them - it just shows that we cannot make it object of a thought and thereby hold it for eternally certain.

#### 1.2.2.3 Law of of thought: identity or non-contradiction/thought or theory?


What is the actual "law of thought"? Is it formulated in terms of agreement with itself or non-contradiction? Is it formulated as a theory or as a pure thought? A theory lets us try combining object and information of theory creating a pure thought. Therefore, both formulations must be equivalent. Yet, the chronology in which they appear are different for the law of identity and non-contradiction: For the law of noncontradiction, we try making a contradictory theory and then negate it, as it is impossible. For the law of identity, we see it as the form of the pure thought itself. Now, is the law of identity or the law of non-contradiction more fundamental? We can only obtain the law of identity from the impossibility of a contradiction. Yet, the actual form is given to us by the law of identity. When we thereby formulate the law of noncontradiction it should always be seen as the impossibility of a contradictory theory rather than a single thought.

#### 1.2.2.4 Point of thought as limitation of law and range of thought

The law of thought applies to every single thought, but only until a new thought is in the mind. While thinking a thought, he affirms his own content and agrees with himself. A thought is thereby defined by the point when he is in the



mind. By definition, a point of thought only lasts as long as no new thought is in the mind, for which the law of thought then applies for that new thought. The question whether the new thought causes the new point of thought or vice versa is a pseudo-question, since a point of thought is just a paraphrase for the attached thought and vice versa. A thought therefore agrees with himself as long as he is in his point of thought and as long in his point of thought as he agrees with himself.



**Fig. 1.7.** A new point of thought justifies a new thought and a new thought equally justifies a new point of thought.


#### 1.2.2.5 Content of thought

##### 1.2.2.5.1 Information - thought as an empty shell that is filled

A thought can be regarded as an object on which properties are projected, as a thought is something that affirms its content according to the law of thought. He consists of an *empty shell* that we fill up with information. A thought which contains only the law of thought as shell is however impossible because that would a. be equivalent to the negation and affirmation of existence in a point of thought and b. also represent a positive paradox. Therefore, every thought contains information. Another way of putting this is in terms of negatability: a thought contains information, iff the properties that it affirms to an object could later equally be negated within that object in a new point of thought. This already indicates something about the impossibility of certain information.

##### 1.2.2.5.2 Negation as negative paradox

A thought cannot negate a property, since it can only affirm its content. If a thought negated a property, it would have to think not thinking a content. The



**Fig. 1.8.** The empty shell of a thought is filled up with information in every point of thought

negation of a property would break the agreement of the thought with himself and thereby break the law of thought.

Yet, it seems like all properties that can be affirmed can also be negated. This view is, however, bound to the linguistic interpretation of thought in the form of propositions: We can claim the nonexistence of a certain property in a thought after thinking it; by leaving it away in thought we negate it rather than by thinking its negation.

#### 1.2.2.5.3 Double negation as affirmation

What now if one double negates the property  $P$  within a proposition? Can one interpret this as the affirmation of the property? If one negates a negation of something, then one negates the nonexistence of it within a thought/the object of the theory of the proposition. As something can only be affirmed or not be affirmed within a thought a law of double negation applies:


##### **Law of double negation:**

For a property  $R$  representing a theory on an object, if  $\neg R \Leftrightarrow P$ , then

$$R \Leftrightarrow \neg(\neg R)$$

#### 1.2.2.5.4 Excluded Middle/Bivalence

A thought divides all possible information in two sets: in the set that the thought represents, and the set the thought thereby excludes. Therefore, either something is part of a thought, or it is not part of it - there is nothing outside of that rule. For a theory this means: either a theory claims agreement with an object or it claims disagreement. This should not be confused with the claim that the thought itself is either affirmed or negated, for it does not have a possibility outside of itself if it is thought. For each thought in a point of thought a law of



**Fig. 1.9.** One can infer  $P$  from a negation of its negation.

excluded second applies that can also be interpreted as a law of sufficient reason for itself.

Furthermore, the law of excluded middle for theories and the principle of bivalence are equivalent, although the law needs the notion of negation, whereas the principle needs the notion of truth. It must thereby be noted that the law of excluded middle contains two laws a. the law that claims that all thoughts either contain or do not contain a certain information b. the law that claims, that either the negation or the affirmation of a property must be a true theory, where the formulation in truth-functional logic tells us, that such a theory forms a tautology (the proposition "either a theory or its negation" is equivalent to "either property  $A$  within  $a$  or its negation", as they relate to the same object - the tautology just represents a true theory on every object). As the affirmation of information within a proposition is equivalent with the claim of its truth within the object to which it corresponds, the claims "either an information or its negation" is true within an object" and "a proposition is either true or false" are entirely equivalent.

**Law of excluded middle:** Every property  $P$  is either affirmed or not affirmed within a thought/Every theory that claims that a property is either affirmed or negated is true/From two contradictory theories, one must be true.


**Principle of bivalence:** A property  $P$  is either true or false within a thought/A theory is either true or false.

**Law of sufficient reason:** A thought is sufficient reason for his own temporal truth./ An object that is equivalent to the information of a theory is sufficient reason for the truth of the theory

## 1.2.2.5.5 Law of pure thought/possible proposition

Every thought can be seen as the conjunction of what is thought in a point of thought. One can split up a thought and recognize sub-thoughts containing information itself in new points of thought, but then one must see the whole thought not only in its properties and sub-objects with properties, but rather in the relationship of those within the thought.

**Law of pure thought:** Every thought represents the affirmation of the conjunction of information and/ or sub -objects with information including the relationships between them in a point of thought. Yet, the within a thought there is only one single object that cannot be split into sub-objects within his point of thought.



**Fig. 1.10.** A thought contains information and sub -objects with information.

Furthermore, a proposition can only be checked for agreement with its object of reference if and only if its object is thinkable on its own - theories that have objects that are unthinkable due to breaking thought with contradictory information are generally neither claiming agreement nor claiming disagreement - they are simply no proper theories. (As we will interpret later: one can only gain a universally true theory if and only if its object can be temporarily true within thought. Contradictions thereby arise from false theories, which does not mean that contradictions can be objects of theories)

**Law of possible proposition:** The laws of thought only apply for thinkable objects. e.g. a proposition is either claiming agreement or disagreement with its object if and only if object of the proposition is thinkable.


## 1.2.2.5.6 Set-theoretic interpretation of content of thought

One can also interpret the content of thought that was just presented as a set, where the properties that are assigned to it are simple objects and the sub-objects sets themselves. Yet, the actual object is the whole set itself that is not divisible into objects within a point of thought. If one wants to see a thought as a set of objects/sets, then one must include the exact relationships between them not to lose the unity of the thought as an own object:

This interpretation of thought as a set will later be helpful to understand why the *set of all sets* is equivalent to the claim that gives rise to a *positive regress* the *empty set* is equivalent to the claim that gives rise to a *negative regress* ( e.g. *liar paradox* )

#### 1.2.2.5.7 Hierarchy: biological description of thought subject to mental form of thought itself

Yet, it seems like one can easily challenge my view of a thought being pure information. One could argue that, as our thinking takes place in the brain, it can have a different form dependent on how and in which part of the brain it happens - whether for example a thought is produced by our senses, by the part of our brain where math is conducted and so on. How can I then say all thoughts had the same form? With this criticism, we make our thinking an object of our description. However, it was already shown in the beginning that thought is higher in hierarchy than the world- it thus represents the foundation of all biological description and does not permit us to observe our the biological foundations of thought outside of thought. The form of all thoughts that was established from thought can therefore not be subject to the questioning of thought without using its form. Even if we could explain the limit of our thought biologically through theories of chemical or physical processes in the brain, such view would only be possible being subject to those limits. The criticism of the established form and content of thought would therefore be hierarchically lower than the limit with whom the form was established.



**Fig. 1.11.** We can only observe the biological limits of our thought being subject to those limits. We can only establish a biological form of all thoughts being subject to the form of thought. We thus need thought as the highest instance to establish its biological foundation, for which its foundations lie in the foundations of thought, which then lie in its mental and not its biological limits.

### 1.3 Certainty through the limit of thought

As it was already demonstrated, certainty derives from the validity of the law of thought. Yet, it also seems like we can gain certainty through the rejection of a breaking of thought, seems like we can gain certainty through the unquestion-

ability of the law of thought itself. However, those two kinds of certainty are as different as they sound similar - the first one is factual, while the second one is impossible.

### 1.3.1 *Temporary certainty in the point of thought*

A thought is certain if and only if he cannot be denied. In a point of thought, a thought cannot be negated due to the factual unbreakability of the law of thought. He thus forms a temporal certainty that is bound to his point of thought.

#### **Arguments:**


A thought is certain if and only if he cannot be negated.

A thought cannot be negated if he is thought.

A thought is thought in a point of thought.

Every thought  $a$  is certain in his point of thought.

**Certainty in a point of thought:** Every thought  $a$  is certain in his point of thought.



**Fig. 1.12.** The law of thought applies to every thought when he is thought - a thought is thus always certain in his point of thought.

### 1.3.2 *Theory on a temporal certainty - universal certainty in all points of thought*

Every thought is hence certain in its point of thought due to the impossibility to break the law of thought. Yet, are there also thoughts that are generally unnegatable, thoughts that are eternally certain? If we view certainty as the unnegatability within a point of thought, then one can just leave away a certain content in any other point of thought, making it negatable in every point but its own. From this view, there cannot be eternally certain thoughts exactly because there is temporal certainty. However, this opens the door for the certainty of something we often mix up with the certainty thoughts: theories on thoughts. Theories are the attempt of combining its information with its object. They

either result in possible or impossible thoughts, making the theory either certain or impossible. Consequently, there are as many unquestionable theories as there are points in thought, as one would need to break thought to combine a thought with its nonexistence. Yet, this does not mean that there are eternally certain thoughts, as an eternally unnegatable thought would not only need to be true and obey the law of thought, but contain the law of thought itself, assigning its own truth to itself. The certainty of theories is thus a negative certainty, it arises from the impossibility of breaking the law of thought and thinking a negative paradox, whereas the certainty of a thought itself would represent a positive breaking of thought through not only experiencing, but thinking the rejection of a negative theory itself, thereby conforming the form all thoughts have anyways.

**Universal certainty:** A theory is universally certain iff it represents a theory of the form  $(Ax \rightarrow A)$ .

### 1.3.3 *Information - neither universally certain nor impossible*

Information occurs in every thought. Thus, every thought that contains information can both be negated or affirmed (not both) in any point of thought. Therefore, every informative thought is neither universally certain nor impossible.

**Uncertainty of information:** An informative thought is both not universally certain and not impossible.

### 1.3.4 *Thoughts about thoughts - certainty and information seemingly combined in theories*

This result is surprising. We have dozens of thoughts everyday that we hold for certain. Yet, by that, we don't mean that the information of our thoughts stays certain for longer than they stay in thought. When we say *it is certain that it is raining* we don't mean that a world with rain is a universal certainty, but rather that the theory on a world that is raining is universally certain since it claims agreement with itself restating the result of the law of thought in the agreement of a thought with itself. However, the information of a theory can therefore never be certain on her own.

### 1.3.5 *Theories about contradictions*

$$\text{object} \rightarrow \text{theory about the object}$$

The precursory term stands for a thought about a thought and not a pure thought itself. One is thus tempted to just hold them equivalent to the information the following form:

$$\neg(\text{object} \ \& \ \neg\text{theory about the object})$$

Yet, as it was argued before, such a transformation is only possible if the object of the theory is itself thinkable. If one forgets to test the object of a written

theory for thinkability, one creates the false view that a theory on a contradiction is *always universally certain*. However, a theory can only be universally certain if her object is thinkable, as the laws we use for the certainty of theories come from the limit of thought and therapies the law of identity that forbids contradictions in true objects in thought. This does not mean that a theory on contradictions is always false, as the law of bivalence is only valid for thinkable objects - the principle simply loses its validity when it is confronted with object it is not derived from.

### 1.3.6 *Present as the only tense of thought and proposition*

We can only have thoughts that affirm themselves in their point of thought. They are thus only valid when they are thought and are only then present in thought. Consequently, the correct representation of any thought in language can only have the form of the present tense. One might argue that there are a lot of propositions that have a different tense, e.g. *Yesterday, it was raining*. Yet, such a proposition evokes a thought in the present, since it is a theory on an object rather than an object itself - it tries to achieve agreement with the world in the past and thereby with a point of thought in the past. However, the theory on the past can only take place in the present point of thought. When we say: *Yesterday, it was raining* we thus rather say: *It is the case that the property raining is also the case in the present thought representing the past*.

### 1.3.7 *Lack of modality in thought - modal propositions as pseudo-modal theories*

The mind does not know possibilities. When it affirms a thought, then its content is necessary within that thought. If, on the other hand, it doesn't affirm a specific thought, then such thought is impossible within that point of thought. Therefore, we cannot maybe or probably affirm a thought. When we make propositions that hold the possibility of certain properties, we rather make a theory on an object that does neither contain or not contain a property as we are defining the object of our theory as a set of possible object. Consequently, such a theory will be neither universally certain nor universally impossible. When we say: *maybe p* we thus rather say :  $object \rightarrow p$  is neither equivalent to  $a \rightarrow a$  nor to  $a \rightarrow \neg a$  and thus equivalent to  $i \rightarrow a$  which is equivalent to  $\neg (i \mathcal{E} \neg a)$  and thereby to a negatable and affirmable information. Yet, we often feel that the object of the theory changes its information and might contain it in the future, for which we hold it for possible that the theory might either become universally certain or impossible. This is possible since our world as an objects changes although we still feel it is the same object, which is, as it will be shown later, a contradiction. When we now additionally mix temporary certainty with universal certainty, we believe that a thought can affirm a possibility, just because we have not really defined the thought properly, not representing a possible. Therefore, modal propositions don't challenge the univalence of our thought, nor the bivalence of our theories on them.



### 1.3.8 *Only one certain theory - law of thought*

One can create a universally certain theory for every thinkable thought by creating a theory on him that claims agreement with him. Furthermore, there is only one limit of thought since the only impossible thought is the fraction of its form and thus the leaving of his all-embracing object. As our definition of a certain thought is based on the impossibility of the negation of that limit, all certain theories have the same form. Therefore, one can perfectly argue that there is only one certain proposition at all, just restating the information of its object.

### 1.3.9 *Full vacuum - unfillable vacuum*

At the beginning of this theory of thought our goal was set pretty high: without accepting any unquestionable thought, we wanted to find unquestionable thoughts themselves. We failed. And we failed for a specific foundational reason: We can only find certainty with thought and thereby with the connected certainty arising from unbreakability of its limit. Therefore, we cannot fill the vacuum. We never have a vacuum, as a vacuum would abolish the subjectivity and hierarchy of thought. Trying to fill the vacuum thus already induces thought as an authority that we need, but which we cannot escape. Through the unquestionability of thought we thereby always have a filled vacuum, yet we cannot fill it with more than it already contains through the unbreakability of its limit. Surely we gain more temporal certainty within new points of thought, yet the theories that are certain allays have the same form. Its filling seems terribly limited, yet it is infinite, as thought is infinite for us, never being able to leave it - we just don't have a measure outside of ourselves. Consequently, we are either objective, yet without mechanism for deciding certainty, or we just accept our limit and hold it for unbreakable, but cannot add or produce any more certainty of theories then already defined through the imprisonment in thought.

## 1.4 **Certainty as truth**

The concept of certainty seems to be closely connected with the concept of truth. If a thought cannot be negated in a point of thought, then it represents a temporal certainty as well as a temporal truth, as thought is the actual object of truth. Furthermore, if a theory/proposition cannot be negated representing a universal certainty, then it also represents a universally true theory. Moreover, we already know that since it was argued that thought can be seen as an all-embracing object, giving birth to our definition of truth. Yet, what exactly does that mean? Thought does not definite truth on an abstract level, but rather represents the only object of truth we have and thereby defines its form.

### 1.4.1 *Differentiating between universal and temporal truth*

Yet, there is the danger of mixing universal and temporal truth, just as there was the danger of mixing certainty of thoughts and propositions. When we claim information is true we often both imply that it is a true information, as well as

a universally true theory on information, forgetting that truth either lies in the changing points of thought or the agreement of theories with those points and not in a mixture of both - e.g. by a certain thought that is himself universally true.

**Definition of truth:** A thought is true in a point of thought if and only if he corresponds to himself, if he is thus not contrary to himself. His form is thus  $\neg(\neg a \ \& \ a)$ . Every point in thought *dn* thus defines a temporal truth. The only source of truth is thereby only those temporal truths.

**Universal truth:** A theory is universally true if and only if she claims agreement with an object of thought. A theory is thereby universally false if and only if she is impossible.

**Informative thoughts:** Thoughts that contain information are neither universally true nor universally false.

#### 1.4.2 *Truth of theories about thoughts*


Theories about thoughts can represent universal truths - but only if they lie within in the theory about an object that contains the information of the theory on him. It is then not the information of the theory that is itself unnegatable, but rather the combination with its object whose negation would break thought. When we argue theories can contain information and represent universal truths, we confuse the information of the theory with the theory that is only possible with respect to an object. Yet, neither object nor the information of a theory can be universally true.

#### 1.4.3 *Truth of our truth-definition*

As truth arises from the same very subjective object as certainty, we experience the well known difficulties when trying to justify our definition of truth, as its associated decision method for truth can only be justified with the hierarchy from which it arises. When we ask whether our definition of truth is itself true, we need the truth definition of thought itself - one cannot decide on the truth of the claim *a thought is true iff it cannot be negated* without using the truth definition that we are trying to check for truth. This results in the same two types of regress as with certainty: When we try to establish the truth of our definition of truth, we can only build up levels of justification that never transcend the level of our own thought and its attached truth definition, leading into a positive regress. On the other hand, when we try to claim that our definition of truth is false, we still use the truth definition that we want to get rid of by trying to give the claim a truth value derived from the definition. This leads to a negative regress, since the level we want to get rid of tries to get rid of the level we are using for that.

#### 1.4.4 *Truth definition without truth value*

The two regresses seem to undermine the law of bivalence in its linguistic form: our truth definition is neither true, nor false. Truth values can only be



**Fig. 1.13.** The review of our definition of truth requires the definition as a prerequisite. The means of the decision is the object of the decision. The object on which we decide does not lie on an lower level then the decision.

given to theories. The claim of our truth definition does not have a thinkable object, as our truth definition is not a thought itself, but rather defining the form of all thoughts. Yet, this does not break the principle of bivalence, it just shows that we should not set linguistic objects equal with thinkable objects, as the principle of bivalence is derived from laws of thought and therefore only valid to objects in thought.

## 1.5 Deductive logic - building dummy records


### 1.5.1 *Logic: method of valid inference - decision method for certainty of theories*

One can see deductive logic both as a decision-method for certainty of theories, as well as a method of valid reasoning:

1. When we argue, we want our conclusions to validly follow from the premises of our arguments that we agree on. Logic can thereby be seen as the method we can find a certain theory for an object. We thereby use rules of inference that don't break any of the laws of thought and strictly separate the validity of a conclusion from its truth. For a conclusion to be true, its premises must also be true. An argument is therefore equivalent to two theories: one theory of the conclusions on the premises, and another of the premises on the world/some other object to which they refer.
2. When we check a proposition for certainty, we check whether it creates a possible or impossible thought.

Yet, those two aspects represent two sides of the same medal: Drawing conclusions from premises can be seen as the attempt to make a theory on them. If the information of the theory is contained within them it, then is impossible to

affirm the premises and negate the conclusion (or the theory) without breaking the law of thought. When we then transform the conditional of an inference to the negation of a thought in which both the object of theory and the negation of the theory appear, we are basically rejecting the possibility of combining them in a single thought, claiming the unnegatability of the theory through the unthinkability of contradictions.



**Fig. 1.14.** Valid inferences are theories on objects of thought that have the form of the law of noncontradiction when they are true theories, showing us the certainty or impossibility of theories.

### 1.5.2 Law of thought binding and not only normative - only one logic

At this point, it should be made clear that the law of thought is not just a *normative demand*, but rather a *factual description* of thought. It does not state how we *should* think, but rather how we *must* think. It represents an actual limitation of the content of our thinking and not just a limitation that we give to ourselves to gain good results with. Yet, what connection is there between the laws of thought and the laws of logic? If one sees the laws of logic as laws for what we write down as inferences, they are only normative, as we can write down a contradictory theory without thinking it. Yet, if we except our inferences to produce certainty and universal truth, then this can only relate to the factual laws of thought, and therefore to the laws of logic which are derived from them. We often believe that the laws of logic are comparable to laws for road traffic, which are given to ourselves to cause less chaos on the streets, but can be broken as easily as they can be reformulated. However, we don't just follow the laws of thought because we want our written or spoken conclusions to

cause agreement between people, but rather because a claim that breaks them is unthinkable itself. Yet, this difference is often not recognised, since we apply the laws of logic to written claims, which are checked for certainty with methods arising from the laws of thought without actually checking it for conformity with the law through actual thinking. When we claim a proposition that breaks the law of thought, we thereby don't necessarily need to break the law of thought, since we can just claim it in writing or speech, without actually letting it become an impossible object. However, the methods that we use to check propositions for certainty can only be derived from the factual limit of our thought. The laws we use when we check propositions for certainty are therefore not open to interpretation - one cannot just put them up for negotiation like in parliament. One cannot find proof or disproof of them outside of thought, since all proofs we make are based on the definition of certainty that derives from the factual law of thought. We can thus only base logic as a method to decide certainty of propositions on our own limit of thought, which defines the certainty of thoughts through the unthinkability of their negation.

Yet, there is a practical difference between finding out about the possibility of thoughts representing theories and propositions: To check propositions for certainty we use rules of inference that conserve the information of the premises, thus don't break the law of thought indirectly by assuming different objects. If those rules of inferences are not in accordance with thought, this may then lead to the dangerous mistake that one thinks that a result of logic is certain, although it is not even thinkable (like the claim that one can conclude anything from a contradiction) Since such a method of inference therefore only relates to *one* law of thought of myself (which all other people need to follow, since they are only objects of my thought) there is only *one logic*, only one systematic method to decide the certainty of written thought, since the certainty of a proposition can only be judged by the thinkability of the theory that it represents and thereby with the subjective hierarchy of thought itself.

### Arguments

PREMISES

PREMISES

Logic is the method for deciding validity of inference.

An inference is rational if and only if it is valid.

An inference is valid if and only if it cannot be negated if its premises are affirmed.

A proposition is impossible if and only if the theory it represents is unthinkable.

A thought is unthinkable if and only if it breaks the law of thought.

There is only one law of thought. (as there is only one limit that can be negated)

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## CONCLUSIONS

There is only one logic.

The laws of logic are derived from an unbreakable and not a normative law of thought.

An inference is rational if and only if the the thought containing the negation of the inference is equivalent to the breaking of the binding law of thought.

### 1.5.3 *Logic as an object of theories? - positive theory of truth positive paradox*

The above argument seemed naturally valid - but does it represent a theory on a thinkable object? Can we use logic to determine the properties of logic logically? Logic represents either a way in which we think about objects or a way in which we check objects for thinkability, it is thereby directly connected to the validity of the laws of thought and as an object equivalent to a positive paradox. Yet, we still seem to be able to use logic to argue about logic, whereby the results seem to be in accordance with the laws of thought. We thereby just make logic an object with properties and use the laws of logic to conserve its information, we thereby get a result that is in accordance with the unthinkable premise, although the conclusion represents an unthinkable object as well. Surely, the above argument therefore represents a true theory on some object that we define through our negative knowledge of the laws of thought. Yet, if one tries to assign some truth value to the actual metatheorem we derive with the argument, one will fail, as the metatheorem is a theory on an unthinkable object, just like the premise about logic.

This leads us into asking whether this theory of certainty is a proper theory of truth at all. According to what we found out about the truth of metatheorems, we must answer no. Truth value can only be assigned to thinkable objects, they cannot be assigned to concepts whose thought builds a positive paradox. Surely, such theories on the truth of every point of thought thought and the derived form of truth according to the law of identity can never be broken, but they don't represent thinkable truths on their own, on which one could formulate universally true theories. This is why this theory of truth is not a positive theory of truth. It is a negative theory of truth, born from the acceptance of the hierarchy of thought. From this hierarchy, the factuality of the laws derives, representing the impossibility of a negative paradox, just as the impossibility of a positive paradox, represented by a positive metatheory of truth.

### 1.5.4 *King of France, are you bold? Laws of thought limited to thinkable objects*

Which truth value does „the present king of France is bold“ have? Is it true, it false, is it neither? Assume that it is true, then something can be true about something that does not exist, as France currently has a president. Assume

that is false, then something can also be true about something that does not exist, namely a non-bold king. If we think it is neither, the law of excluded middle in its semantic interpretation is violated, as neither a proposition nor its negation are true. Furthermore, as the negation of something is true if the affirmed proposition is false, the principle of bivalence, stating that a proposition is either true or false is then also violated. Therefore, it seems like we have a problem, as all three possibilities contradict intuition. How do we get out of this? Do we allow truth in non-existent objects or do we challenge the most basic laws of thought?

To find an answer to this question, one must be conscious of the foundations of propositions and the laws of thought: propositions are either explicit or implicit theories. Whether we give them the form of conditionals or not, they are conditioned by the object they derive their truth from. We thereby assume a certain law that all objects of propositions need to obey: the law of identity. From this law, all laws of thought about propositions follow: a proposition that claims a contradiction in an object is always false, as such a proposition cannot reach agreement with its object (law of noncontradiction). Furthermore, a proposition that claims that a certain property is true or not true within an object must reach agreement with any object, as every object excludes everything not in it due to the law of identity.

Yet, those laws only apply for theories on objects that are uncontradictory, as they are derived from the law that states their identity. If one makes explicit theories on contradictions one must then also allow contradictions to be factually true, as every proposition is a theory that gets its truth from such an object - when we assume contradictions are proper antecedents, we must then also assume that the factual truth can be contradictory, for which the conditional having a contradictory consequent can then be a tautology also violating the law of noncontradiction.

There are therefore two aspects of the foundation of propositions and their laws that we need to combine to solve the puzzle about the present king of France: Firstly, all propositions are actually theories, whether we assume them as abstract objects in mathematics or just take the world as an implicit object. Secondly, the objects of such theories cannot be contradictions, as the laws we derive for propositions only cover objects subject to the law of identity. When we now look at the example of the king of France, we see that there we combine an implicit and one explicit theory leaving us with a theory on a contradiction:

1. Assume there is a world in which there is no king of France.(factual, implicit truth/conditional) and claim that that in this world there is a king of France.
2. Assume that there is such a king of France and claim that he is bold. (explicit conditional)

Therefore, the proposition „the present king of France is bold“ is neither true or false. This means that the law of excluded middle and the principle of bivalence

are violated if we formulate them independently of the objects to which they apply. If we limit them to the objects from which they are derived - uncontradictory identities, they are then perfectly valid.

#### 1.5.5 *Truth table of conditional flawed - theory on contradictory theory*

The truth table for the conditional is thereby flawed through the false use of the principle of bivalence: we believe a conditional can only be false if the antecedent is true and the consequent false. If the antecedent is false, we just believe that the whole conditional must be true as it is not false. Yet, this principle of bivalence only applies if the object of the theory is subject to the law of identity. However, a conditional with false conditions is equivalent to a theory on a contradiction and therefore as a combination of factual world premises and explicit premises impossible, it cannot be assigned a truth value through any theory.

#### 1.5.6 *Universal quantifier demands existential quantifier*

A major difference that is often seen between the quantifiers "all" and "there exists" is the way in which they proclaim existence: "all" seems to leave the possibility of the non-existence of the objects of the theory open. Yet, combining the view that it is impossible to make theories on contradictions and that a conditional with a factually false premise can be seen as such a theory on a contradiction, we can conclude that the quantifier "all" already demands that the conjunction of everything fulfilling a property is not empty within the object of the theory. Existence is thereby not a property of everything in the world, but rather of everything within thought and therefore within the objects of our theories.

#### 1.5.7 *Factual truth as pseudo informative truth - no soundness - just validity or invalidity*

The interpretation of logic as a decision method for certainty of theories seems to take away one important aspect of inferences: the possibility of soundness. When we try to make valid inferences, we often don't state anything about factual truth: If an inference is valid, its conclusion might well be factually false. However, what do we mean with that? When we talked about the truth of thoughts, we were only confronted with universal truth and temporal truth. How does factual truth fit into that framework? For sure, logical truth is equivalent to universal truth. But what about factual truth? When we make a claim (conclusion) that follows from other claims (premises), we think that the conclusion could but does not have to be factually true, dependent on the factual truth of the premises. Yet, premises must contain information if one wants to conclude something informative from them. If they were universally true, they would just be meaningless tautologies. Instead, when we believe a premise is factually true, we believe that it is a universally true theory about some object (most of the time the world):



factual truths (object)  $\rightarrow$  premises (theory)  $\rightarrow \dots$  conclusion (further theory)

Thereby, we mix temporal and universal truth by confusing the universal truth of the theory on a factual object with the universal truth of the object itself. Therefore, we just mix the temporal truth of an object of thought that possesses information with the universally true theory on such an object that we might use as premises for an argument. Thus, logic does not actually know sound arguments. It only knows valid or invalid arguments, certain or impossible theories:

**Missing information:** A proposition is either universally true or false. A proposition can thus not be informative and universally true at the same time.

**Validity:** A theory on an object /a conclusion from premises is either valid or invalid (forms a universal truth or not)

**Soundness:** If a conclusion from premises ( $p \rightarrow c$ ) is sound, meaning

1. ( $p \rightarrow c$ ) is universally true
2.  $p$  is in agreement with the facts (object of the theory)
3. the facts are universally true themselves,
4. then  $c$  does not contain any information.

#### 1.5.8 *Indirect proof as the only form of proof - unprovability of information*

A proposition can thus only be proven by another object, if the object is itself a universal certainty. Yet, the object is only universally certain if it doesn't contain any information representing a certain theory. One can therefore only use external objects for proofs if they don't contain any information, for which the proved propositions can also only be such empty propositions. Therefore, the only possible proof is indirect - one can only proof propositions that are already universally true themselves. When we try to prove informative propositions we only try to push away the need for universal certainty, until we are not even aware of the difference between factual and universal truth anymore. Consequently, informative statements are never universally unnegatable. As trivial as this sounds, a proof of a theory is only showing that object and theory contain the same information. There is only one possible form of proof, namely an indirect and negative proof that shows that the negation of a proposition forms an impossible thought.

This just confirms what everyone already knows in kindergarden when finding the regress that occurs when a parent tries to give a certain proposition a sufficient foundation to stop us asking. We don't. And as we can always do that without breaking thought, there can be no information that is universally true. This will later support the claim that there is no such thing as factual truth whose negation leads to contradiction in all points of thought, as such factual truth can only arise from the temporal truth of mental objects in their points of thought. Propositions one can give *a why* for are therefore never informative - and the world that we think exists and is true in every point in time cannot have

an answer to a *why* just *because it is not empty*. Furthermore, this thesis will *not only claim that there is no why for the information* of the world, but rather that *it does not contain information* in the form of thought at all, for which we can ask in the first place.

#### 1.5.9 *Hierarchy: Does ‘every true proposition needs a proof’ need a proof?*


It was fairly easy to understand the regresses one experiences when trying to justify or question our definition of certainty as it is coming directly from thought - since both justification and questioning of thought takes place on the level of thought - which is at the same time the object of our description, we get in trouble when we either try to be objective about it trying to flee from it. As provenness is just a paraphrase for backward certainty of theories and arises from our definition of it, we experience the same difficulties when trying to defend or question our notion of provenness. Yet, understanding this becomes endlessly more difficult, as we have drifted away from thought towards propositions during the course of this thesis. When we talk about propositions, we tend to forget that they represent theories on thoughts and that the notion of their provenness is also derived directly from the negation of the breaking of the factual limit of our thought. To understand how easy it is to find a regress, consider the following proposition:

*A proposition is true if and if it has a proof.*

If we affirm the proposition, then the proposition is only true if it has a proof itself. Yet, it cannot need a proof without already being proven. If on the other hand, we negate the proposition since we can’t find a proof for it, then propositions can be true and not need a proof. However, then the proposition that we negate might as well be true, as we only held it for false since it didn’t have a proof. If one then again tries to justify the need for proofs, one begs the question by already assuming the necessity for proofs that one was just about to justify leaving us with the unprovability of unprovability, representing a negative regress. One therefore makes the means of the proof an object of the proof, for which one can on the other hand not negate the proposition without entering a nasty circle of self-reference that is caused by object and description taking place on the same level.

#### 1.5.10 *Questioning: Caught in the compulsion of thought*

There is thus a close connection between the process of questioning ourselves with the means of logic and common schizophrenia. A logician questions everything. He doesn’t believe claims without proof and thereby gives proof for everything he claims. He doesn’t accept uncertainty and rejects possibility and randomness. Yet, he can only overthrow irrationality by leaving thought intact and entirely unquestioned. Everybody who wants to start from scratch must thus first accept the validity of our boundaries. He can then question everything in his mind seemingly thoroughly, yet he is thereby only an instrument of his compulsion of



**Fig. 1.15.** If one questions that true propositions need a proof, then the negation of such a claim does not need a proof either. If one justifies the need for proofs, one needs the observed objects as means and therefore begs the question.

not being able to leave the object of thought in his thoughts. He just believes in the indisputability of his results since their disputability is limited to thought. All evidence that he could use against his thoughts has to keep to the form of our thoughts. Hence, we are slaves of our human compulsions and still as successful as a warrior without enemy.

#### 1.5.11 *Avoiding liar paradox with meta levels impossible - yet not even necessary*

The vicious circle we arrive at when we try to question thought with thought is equivalent to the very famous paradox of the liar and many other self-referential statements. As an example consider

*This proposition is false.*

Assume the proposition is true. If it is true then it is true that the proposition is false. Yet, if it is false that the proposition is false, then the proposition is true. There are many suggestions of how to avoid this, most notably the attempt to differentiate between object - and metalevel. However, as it was already shown, there is no higher metalevel than thought - when we try to think the paradoxical proposition this is only possible in the level of thought and therefore breaks thought. The liar paradox thereby gives us the following order:

*Think a thought and let it thereby represent a temporal truth that does not represent a temporal truth.*

Or:

*Break the form of thought*

$$a \ \& \ \neg a$$


where  $a$  stands not for a single property, but for a whole thought. It is not even necessary for the paradox to state what exactly the sentence states, but rather only that it is false, so that the law of thought is broken. If one breaks the law of thought, this is equivalent to a common contradiction. Consider therefore the following contradiction:

$$(A \ \& \ \neg A)a$$

When we try to think the proposition  $a$  we try to give  $(A \ \& \ \neg A)$  the temporal truth value “true”. If we affirm its truth, then we affirm its falsehood. Yet, as that is exactly what it states, one could call it at the same instant “true” since the inability to think it is the perfect confirmation that it is really false. Yet, it is not even necessary to avoid the paradox. It doesn’t break the law of thought, since such law applies only to thoughts - when a a proposition is supposed to be seen as a theory on an object, the object must then be thinkable for the laws of logic to apply. Yet, the proposition “this proposition is false” does not have a thinkable object - it rather represents a self-referential, negative and contradictory theory. Surely we can write down the liar paradox, but we can never think it. It never appears in thought and thus never breaks the law of thought - it simply does no take sense giving him a truth value, as the scheme of truth only applies to thinkable object, as truth is derived from the content of thought. Furthermore, whoever tries to avoid the paradox by forming metalevels is guilty of two foolish mistakes that balance themselves out: First one sees the law of thought as normative and ignores its validity and source in factual thought. One therefore thinks one can try to give contradictory propositions like the liar paradox a truth value, although truth values can only be assigned by thought in a point of thought according to the law of thought, which the liar paradox would break. One then tries to avoid the problem by just ignoring the limit of our thought from which logic arises again to form higher metalevels then thought. One thereby comes to the conclusion of having solved the paradox, reaching the same conclusion one would have gained without making any mistake, namely that there is nothing wrong with paradoxical propositions that tell us to think contradictions as long as we are not able to think them. If we don’t think them, they cannot be temporarily true and one cannot make a theory on them. Therefore, there are no contradictions due to the hierarchy of thought and its law that forbids that. This view will be challenged, but it will lead into the same circle we already went through often enough. As long as we think, no contradiction will ever cross our mind. At least that’s what we predict according to our experience.

1.5.12 *Deductive logic as a meta-induction within deduction: unfalsifiability of the limit by experience*

We obtain the law of thought from which we derive all formal reasoning from nothing more then the inability to transgress her. From that we conclude that they are not only untransgressable by us, but also by everyone else. This seems very weak. How would we check that claim? How could we overcome it? Just believe anyone who claims he can think a contradiction? This would not even change anything about the claim: everyone who claims contradictions can for us only do so if he is an object of our thought and thus follows the law of thought. we will never be able to transgress the limit of thought in all future points of though. We might be able to break it in the future, but to make that prediction of a possible infringement, we need the thought in the present in which we cannot break it - in which we cannot hold it for possible that there will be a contradictory thought (such a claim would only be possible if it is not actually thought in a contradiction but rather only formulated in language - claiming does not always imply actual thinking When we believe in the unbreakability in the law of thought and therefore in the deductive method we are thus subject to an *induction* . However, to note that, we need the law from which the deductive method arises herself. Consequently, we try to make the deductive method an object of thought that is subject of induction, although the means of such a description is the deductive method herself. This is similar to when we claimed the subjectivity of thought with thought itself trying to find an objective point of view from which we can look on our own thought in thought. When we claim that we are conducting an induction when we hold the law of thought for universally certain, we can only do so with thought as the decision-making body giving rise to the factuality of the law from which deduction follows.



**Fig. 1.16.** If we look at thought from outside and see it as an induction coming from the untransgressability of thought, we are then subject to exactly that untransgressability of thought. Our object of description is equivalent to our means. The outer observation is part of the inner object.

### 1.5.13 *Impossibility of a genuine meta-level - Why this work is not formalized*

This shows the mess in which we got ourselves by trying to abolish all subjectivity. We had to accept that we can only attempt her abolishment through the hierarchy and subjectivity of thought. While we are accepting that, we are trying to formulate this as a true description of our thought from an above perspective. Even while accepting our subjectivity we try to talk about her objectively. Yet, this is only possible within thought and in the form of thought. We therefore only hold such claim of non-subjectivity for certain if it has the same form as all common certainties that are equivalent to the law of thought. This also explains why this theory of thought is not formalized in meta-theorems - I would have made premises with thought as an object and have made conclusion about thought - the thoughts that resulted would contain the same information as the universally certain premises that I would choose: none. This is due to the fact that there is no higher meta - level then thought. We can always make thought an object of our language, but we thereby never transcend the level of thought on which we always think. And although a thought can represent more then one level ( there can be theories about objects that are theories themselves resulting in a single thought) those thoughts are not metatheories on themselves but rather normal thoughts that are theories on sub-level objects.

## 1.6 Thinking and Being

### 1.6.1 *Thought as being as being and thought*

Existence takes place in thought, as it is the only all-embracing object, the only object that is able to give rise to anything at all. Being can thereby not lie in the world, since she cannot exist without thought. Therefore, all being that we know is thought. Furthermore, there can be no thought that doesn't affirm the existence of itself in his point of thought. No matter how we think about the world or about abstract objects, we cannot think what doesn't exist without breaking the limit of our thought. Existence does therefore not only lie in thought but rather rises with it, being equivalent to it. We can therefore not differentiate between the real things in the world and their place in thought, as the only reason why they exist is their existence in thought. We can claim that existing things have information on their, independent of thought - yet such claim is bound to thought. Existence is thus bound to thought and thought bound to existence through the law of thought.

**Existence and thought:** Something exists in a point of thought if and only if it is part of the information of a point of thought.

*Indirect proof:* If something existed without thought, then thought would not be an all-embracing object. If thought would not be an all-embracing object, it would not be valid as a decision making body, for which the thought that it is not all-embracing claims that it is itself not to be affirmed while being affirmed, as it is still the decision making body we use for this conclusion (negative regress)

**Thought and existence:** Something is thought in a point of thought if and only if it exists at such point of thought.

*Indirect proof:* If something was thought and not temporarily exist, then thought would have affirm and not affirm itself and thus break the law of thought.

#### 1.6.2 *Inseparability of thought and existence as the insurmountable law of thought*

The inseparability of thought and existence is thus equivalent to the law of thought - it is valid, but unthinkable and only inductive, negative meta-knowledge gained from the inability to factually overcome it. If we think *A is not* we then don't only have to claim non existence, but also think it. We must then hold this thought for temporally existent and non-existent. Therefore, we are confronted with the law that states that existence and thought are inseparable, since a law is only a law if it is unbreakable and an infringement of a law only possible if it is thinkable. If one tries to put this limitation of thought into question or asks for a proof by assuming the possibility of its invalidity, one thereby uses the means that limit thought allegedly in the first place. If we thus negate the law, our own conclusions of the invalidity of the law are put into question, since by questioning the law of thought we have given away the unambiguity of thought and language. One does therefore need the unambiguity of the definition of existence from thought to doubt it. Somebody that claims he can think non-existence must think exactly that thereby holding the thought for existent, which he can't due to the limit of his thought that is imposed to him.

#### 1.6.3 *The mental structure of being*

The form of our thoughts therefore defines the form of all existing things - the form of ourselves as well as of the form of the world. Something therefore exists, if it coincides with itself and if it is thought

We thus extend the law of thought to all things, as they are bound to the all-embracing object of thought. If we thereby forget that existence is ultimately always bound to thought, we consequently believe objects exist just because they coincide with themselves, although such believe is always bound to thought, for which at least the belief that the existing object could become part of thought through observation is held possible by the mind. If we now try to question the definition of existence, we face the exact same problem like when we tried to question our definition of truth with the truth definition that lies in thought. To deny the definition of existence, we would have to use it in the same breath. That it is insurmountable also needs no proof, since we already recognise it with the call for a proof: a proof is the outline of necessity and the impossibility of negation that can only lie in the unambiguity of existence itself. One can therefore never disprove the definition: In order to break it we would not only have to question ourselves with our own thought, but also question our own thought with the means that we want to doubt.

1.6.4 *Existence as property of all properties? Precondition for property - not a property itself*

No matter what properties the existing objects in our thought have, they all have in common that they exist. The question which consequently arises: Is existence thus the *property of all properties*? Regardless of what properties an object of our thought has, we always acknowledge that it has the property of existence. Accordingly, one could claim that the existence is the property that unifies all existing objects. This would create a set of all sets containing all objects with the property of existence. Yet, an information is exactly defined as something that sets a thought apart from all other thoughts, for which it can thereby be negated in another thought, which is the only reason why it is informative in the first place (if it would be part of all thoughts, it would not be new). The existence of the objects of thought is thereby surely a precondition of their being in thought, yet it is no property for itself. It is not informative, it does not set a thought apart from all other thoughts, for it does not divide all properties in the two sets of everything that is inside and outside of the thought, as everything thinkable must be part of the set defined by the property of existence. Existence is therefore not a property for itself, but preconditions every property, since properties are only possible within thought and therefore the framework of existence defined by it.

1.6.5 *Thought that contains its own existence - equivalent to objective justification of certainty*


If one assumes that the existence that every thought possesses can be seen as a property of a thought itself, one creates a positive paradox:

*This thought has possesses the property of its own existence.*

*This thought assigns its own temporal truth/existence to himself.*

and:

*This thought has a sub-thought that is equivalent to the whole thought.*



**Fig. 1.17.** A thought assigns its own truth to himself within himself - this is equivalent to having himself as a part.



this is unthinkable, since it tries to found the temporal truth/existence of a thought from a higher level, although that is only possible within thought. The attempt to think existence as a property of thought, rather than a precondition of it, is therefore equivalent to the attempt to justify our definition of certainty/truth/existence with a higher level than thought, making it both the factual form of thought and an eternally certain thought itself.

#### 1.6.6 *The two paradoxes: positive/Set of all Sets -negative/liar paradox*

First of all, one must make a distinction, that was up to this point only implicitly made: A regress is not equivalent to a paradox. A regress is the processes that occurs of one tries to break a thought either by:

1. trying to found thought with itself by making it one of its objects and thereby losing itself through a breaking of hierarchy.
2. trying to abolish thought by making it one of its objects and thereby losing itself through a breaking of hierarchy.

or

1. If we want to *found* thought within thought we are trying to *lose* it.
2. If we want to *abolish* thought we can only do that by *using* it.

where we have called

1. *positive regress* and
2. *negative regress*

Yet, there is nothing paradoxical in those regresses, as their formulation in language are only possible due to the hierarchy of thought, that is never factually broken. A paradox on the other hand, is a propositional claim that suggests the breaking of hierarchy without ever being thought, although an attempt of thinking it leads to a regress. Those paradoxes appear in different forms:

- a) a form that is based on the notion of truth
- b) a form that is based on the notion of certainty
- c) a form that is based on the notion of proof
- d) a form that is based on the notion of existence
- e) a form that is based on the notion of a set as the content of thought.

Therefore, we can define the following paradoxes for the two kinds of possible ways of breaking thought:

- 1.a *This proposition is true/ This thought assigns its own truth to himself.*  
(although this is against intuition, we can't actually ever think truth that is explicitly affirmed to himself without thinking a positive paradox: when we state *I have a thought a that is true*, then the actual thought that evokes the sentence while thinking is just *a*, which is temporally true

already because it is thought. Therefore, we here have to differentiate between the representation of a thought the thought that is evoked by trying to gain a thought from the written or spoken representation.)

*2.a This proposition is false/ This thought assigns its own falsehood to himself, while this shall still be a temporal truth.*

*1.b This proposition is certain./ This thought assigns its own unnegatability to himself.*

*2.b. This proposition is impossible. / This thought assigns its own negatability to himself.*

*1.c This proposition is proven./This thought assigns its own unnegatability to himself.*

*2.c This proposition is not provable/ This thought assigns its own negatability to himself.*

*1.d The information of this proposition represents something that exists/ This thought assigns its own existence to himself.*

*2.d The information of this proposition does not represent something that exists./This thought assigns its own non-existence to himself.*

As a thought can be seen as a set with subsets with objects themselves one can establish paradoxes for the notion of a set that create sets that don't form thinkable thoughts themselves.

*1.e This proposition contains all propositions (=itself)/ This thought contains all thoughts (=itself)*

*2.e This proposition contains no proposition (=not itself)/ This thought contains no thoughts (=not itself)*

Thus, not only the idea of an object being explicitly made a set of all sets is paradoxical, but rather any thought that contains itself as a sub-object and that assigns its truth to itself. Yet, a thought is in fact a set of all set, as it represents everything that exists within a point of thought, however, if we try to think that we try to make the factual form of our thought an own thought, just like when we tried to think the law of thought positively. On the other hand, an empty set is not thinkable - there are no thoughts that claim that they have nothing in them just as there is in fact no thought that factually has no content, which is a different to the positive paradox that only arises through the formulation of a meta-fact.

*1.f There is no thought of a set of all sets since it doesn't form a thinkable thought. ( Yet, all thoughts factually represent sets of all sets!)*

*2.f There is factually no empty set in thought since such a set doesn't form a thinkable thought.*

whereby the empty set actually builds the same thought that breaks the law of thought as the liar paradox. Furthermore, we can gain the same paradoxes

by claiming metatheorems about the truth of our own truth definition and all the other definitions that are equivalent:

- 1.a. *Our definition of truth is itself true/Our definition of certainty is itself certain (This thought of our definition of truth assigns its own truth to himself)*
- 2.a *Our definition of truth is false/Our definition of certainty is negatable or just: The proposition: "A proposition is only true of it has a proof" is true.*

Concluding, there are two different paradoxes that would break thought: either transcending thought by leaving its form onto an impossible meta-level outside of thought, or breaking thought through its content within - leaving its boundaries to the outside or breaking its law in the inside both result in the breaking of thought. This factual forbids us to either think thought is itself proven or that thought is itself disproven.

#### 1.6.7 *Metatheorems as positive paradoxes*

It was already shown that the metatheorems we made, have to take place in thought and are thus no real metatheorems. When we try to find out about the impossible thought and then negate its limit to find certainty, we tried to make a metatheorem out of that, stating that all thoughts have a special form defined by the limit of thought. Yet, those metatheorems are not only no real metatheorems as they would have to take place in the level of thought - they are also equivalent to the positive paradox: whenever we make our own thought object of our own thought, we break thought: we cannot built a metalevel over thought, since thought is the highest level that is possible within a thought. When a thought consists of a theory on that thought, hierarchy is broken. When we make a theory about thought, we try to achieve agreement with something that we already are in agreement with. This seems very much against intuition; it seems natural to understand the impossibility of thinking the liar paradox, yet we constantly set propositions equal with the claim of their truth. However, we can only do so, because we don't actually think truth as a property. Both the negative and positive limits of thought are thereby born from hierarchy - they are just two sides of the same medal: we cannot give thought a foundation higher then already defined by the limit of our thought and we can equally never question it within that limit.


### 1.7 **World as an object of thought**

#### 1.7.1 *World as an object of thought - mental laws of the world*

The hierarchy of thought over the world that was established in the beginning of this thesis, makes the world a simple object of our thought. If we perceive her, then she is temporarily true in our thought. What distinguishes her thereby from abstract but non-existing object is only that she is incredibly more penetrant. We therefore see the world as the sequence of information that we interpret as

the flow on a timeline. The law of thought thereby represents the law of the world and through that also the form of the world. The following laws of the world are hence derived from the factual laws of thought:

1. The world is consistent with herself in every point of thought. *law of identity*
2. It is impossible that the world contains and does not contain specific information in a point of thought. *law of noncontradiction*
3. The world either contains a specific information or does not contain it. *law of excluded middle/principle of bivalence*
4. If the world is true in a point of thought, then her truth is necessary and sufficiently founded in this point of thought. *weak law of sufficient reason*



**Fig. 1.18.** The mental structure of thought creates the natural view of the world as changing factual truth on a timeline.

### 1.7.2 Distinguishing between world and abstract objects - reality vs imagination


If one claims that the world is nothing more than an object of our thought, sharing a point of thought with abstract objects, one gives rise to an interesting question: how do we differentiate between *real* and *abstract* objects within a point of thought? Well, the simple but disappointing answer: we can't. At least not within a point of thought, as thought does not know different levels of temporal truth. What is thought is temporarily true. Nothing that is thought is temporarily truer than anything else thought in a point of thought. Yet, we can usually well differentiate between abstract and real objects through the course of more points of thought - we can get rid of imagination, while the information of the world has a natural place in our mind at every point of thought that is harder to reject. However, in that view, the only difference between reality and

imagination is only that reality is a more penetrant content of thought through a sequence of points. The world controls our behaviour, since she seems to be the ruler of our thought, while we seem to be the ruler of our abstract thoughts. On the other hand, if one would not be able to get rid of a certain abstract object in our thought, this would only mean that it would be not real if we could realise such, which would again imply a higher penetration by the world through sequences of thought. If we could not differentiate between reality and dream, such dream would then be reality. This would not mean that we are subject to a deception, quite the opposite: such an object would then be perfectly true and real for us, while the claim that it was not true would be laughed at as naturally as we laugh at somebody who tells us that our reality is formed by a computer simulation. To differentiate between reality and imagination, we need an instance of decision which can only be thought. When somebody else thereby claims that we are deceived, then this is only possible if they claim is part of our thought, which gets its decision of reality dictated from the hierarchy to which we are subject to. Hence, abstract thoughts are only deceptive if they are unmasked - yet, if they stay persistent in our thought, then they represent the reality that we are subject to.

### 1.7.3 *World as a biological construct? Biological constructivism attempts to break hierarchy of thought*

Is the world then nothing more than a construct of our mind? She is nothing more than an object of our thought that has no truth value apart from her existence in thought. Yet, the claim that she is constructed implies that there is a gap between the world we perceive and construct in the brain and the world herself. However, from the view that is founded through the hierarchy of thought she is an all-embracing object, there is nothing apart from thought - what is in thought is the actual world and all thoughts that claim otherwise represent negative paradoxes. Therefore, as there is no other unconstructed pure truth from which one could distinguish the world within thought, she is not constructed, but perfectly in accordance with truth. When we claim such constructivism, we try to escape hierarchy by bringing up that we are unable to see the world like she really is due to the flaws in our thought. Yet this view is itself subject to this flaw within the object that gives rise to it. When we try to imagine the world as she really is without the interference of thought, we can only imagine that with thought. If we assume that there exists a world outside of thought, then it exists only because it is object within our thought. Therefore, as there is no authority above thought, the world as part of thought is not constructed. This will later be interpreted the following way: if one sees hierarchy as the birth of constructivism, one can then not claim that thought is flawed, one can then not flee from its hierarchy by such prediction. *A constructivism that claims both the validity and falsehood of a construct due to scientific evidence,*

thus leverages constructivism and leaves us with thought as the only object, in which all our science must then also take place.




**Fig. 1.19.** The claim of the world only being constructed in thought is pre-conditioned by the hierarchy of thought as an all-embracing object, which then enables us to claim constructivism in the first place. We are therefore subject to it and can only hold the thought of the world for the world herself.

## 1.8 Theory of the world in thought

### 1.8.1 Foundations of theories on thoughts as foundation of physics

Theories of the world can only be checked with simple thought. Theories about the world are therefore just a subset of all theories (other objects might be abstract mathematical objects, imagination etc..). Moreover, the foundation of theories on thoughts and logic as a discipline making theories on thinkable premises define the foundations of physics. Therefore, the same rules we use to assess the truth of a theory in logic must also apply for the assessment of the truth of a theory of the world.



**Fig. 1.20.** In thought, there are theories on thoughts of which physics is a subset of. Physics is therefore subject to the same foundations and laws as logic, in accordance of which it assess the universal truth of its theories.

#### 1.8.1.1 All science is mental science - dummy records

Therefore, every science is first and foremost a mental science: Firstly, any science takes place in thought and must comply with its laws. Secondly, the objects of every science are mental in nature, for which every science that claims agreement with an object of thought wants to reach universal certainty. Such

certainty is therefore already part of the certainty that lies in propositions of the same form, claiming agreement with its objects. Hence, the activity of science cannot both produce universal truth and information - theories in science are thus just restating what has already been in the mind.

#### 1.8.1.2 Everyone is a physicist

To be a physicist one must therefore not be working in an institute, must not sit in a lecture, but just look at the sky in our thought. Everyone is a physicist. We all explore the world as an object of our thought with every glance and describe her with each theory we make in form of truth-claims. Each observation of the world, whether we make it as a child in the woods or as a researcher in the experiment leads to universal certainty insofar, as the proposition that claims agreement of the world with herself is never questionable in our thought.

#### 1.8.1.3 Information on information : Theory of the world without information

The statements that we make about the world contain information, yet they are without information in combination with the world. It is thereby also not the world that is without information, but the theory on her that repeats her information, claiming she agrees with herself in her point of thought. Every true theory is hence restating the law of identity, thereby confirming the form of thought through negative unnegatability of the theory.. Therefore, there is a difference between the information of the world itself and the information on this information that is without any news. The world can be written down so that her information can be communicated, yet this information is interpreted as a theory of the world that is either true or false. Nevertheless, if such theory will turn out to be true through agreement with our thought, she will not show the universal truth of certain information in the world, but rather just the agreement with a certain thought of the world. We often confuse that since it is often not clear whether the statements we make are representations of or theories on thoughts. I can say *the leaf is green* - this is what I think - a green leaf, but when somebody reads the sentence, he might think that this is the claim of the information of the thought agreeing with another thought.

#### 1.8.1.4 Explanations of temporal truths as pseudo-proofs - true theories never contain why

When we tried to prove information and thus thoughts that cannot be proven directly, we had to realise that every such attempt will never be successful, as the information is itself never a universal truth, for which all other objects one could derive its truth from would also themselves not be informative and therefore not represent a universal truth neither. Surely one can use an object one is more convinced of then the object that shall be proven. Yet, this does not prove anything, except for that the truth of the object is dependent on the truth of another object, which has enough information to derive another object from it, for which it is at least equally difficult to prove the object we

use for the proof as it is proving the object that does not already represent a universal truth on its own. We have to bear this in mind when we try to make a theory that tries to answer *why* a certain information of the world at a point in thought is temporarily true. When we are looking for a *why* that explains the necessity of a certain present, we are looking for an object that already contains the information of the present, from which the present can be derived because it is already included in it. Yet, the truth of the explanation does not lie in the truth of the object we use for the explanation, but rather in the claim “if the object we use for explanation, then the object we want to explain”. The object we use for the explanation can however, not represent a universal truth on its own, as it needs to contain enough information to derive the present state from it.

### 1.8.2 Law of nature without change

#### 1.8.2.1 Law of sufficient reason invalid

We are often convinced that a certain state of the world must have a *sufficient reason* that explains exactly *why* the world is how it is at one point and not entirely different. This *principle of sufficient reason* seems so certain that one might even call it a law of thought since we seem to be unable to accept that something is in the world without having a reason for being. Yet, what do we mean by “sufficient reason that explains a state”? We mean exactly the kind of proof for information that we deal with when we try to prove informative thoughts. Therefore, such proof can only be a pseudo proof. Furthermore, according to our *weak law of sufficient reason* information in a point of thought does not need proof for being temporarily, true apart from being temporarily true. Consequentially, if one ever found an explanation for *why* a certain state of the world is true at one point, then this proof will only be a pseudo-proof that uses the information of the state as object of explanation itself.

#### 1.8.2.2 Laws of experience as justification for states - confusing temporal and universal truth

If one finds an explanation for a certain state of the world, such explanation is only complete if the explanation has the following form:

$$A \rightarrow A$$

for which the whole proposition represents a universal truth. As it was already shown before, one can see a proof as the search for an object of a theory. If one now sees the state of the world at a certain point as the information of the theory one then wants to find an object of which the information of the theory is part so that one can derive its truth from it by falsely mixing the agreement with the object with the necessity of its theory. Therefore, the state of the world represents a universally true theory on the object that one uses as an explanation: namely only a universally true theory on itself.



Yet, we don't want to see the explanation for a state in itself but rather outside of it. We often see such explanation in the sequence of the states of the world we perceive. If a certain state is followed by another state, then it seems impossible that the same state is followed by a different state then before. Where is such belief rooted? If something could lead to different states, this would seemingly lead to a contradiction, as this would mean that two different futures could arise from the same present. Yet, I argue that the actual contradiction is not in the lack of determinism, but rather in the lack of non-contradiction through a lack of change at all. To avoid such a contradiction, we make the law of noncontradiction a bit less radical:

**radical form:** if something exists, it cannot change. A point of thought will always stay the say regarding to himself.

**weak form:** if something exists, then it can change, but there has to be good reason for why it exists rather then doesn't exist.

Yet, there is nothing in thought that prevents a certain thought to be followed by two different thoughts. However, we still claim that there is a regularity between states that can be seen as the explanation of a certain state. We thereby often call such regularity a *law of nature*. Still, such view still tries to defend the possibility of explaining *why a certain state is temporarily true*, therefore holding up to the strong law of sufficient reason. However, such view tries to avoid the problem of provability by just using what is to be proven as a premise, as an object of a theory: If one wants to show that a certain state *I* causes the state *A* we claim that:

*I* is a sufficient reason/proof/explanation of *A*.

To construct such proof, we then just assume such necessity as part of the object that should explain *A*:

((World in the past  $\rightarrow$  World in the present) & World in the past)  $\rightarrow$  World in the present

or just

$$\begin{aligned} & ((I \rightarrow A) \& I) \rightarrow A \\ \Leftrightarrow & (\neg(I \& \neg A) \& I) \rightarrow A \\ \Leftrightarrow & (I \& A) \rightarrow A \end{aligned}$$

The whole proposition represents a universal truth: If *I* must be followed by *A* and *I* is the case, then, obviously, *A* must also be the case. Therefore, one might think, one has found sufficient reason for *A*. I have two objections to that:

1. we already assume that the law of nature  $I \rightarrow A$  is universally true, which it can't be since it contains information.
2. we don't actually proof the information *A*, but rather show that it builds a universal truth if it is seen as theory both on the past and a law stating that the past arises from the present.

Yet, through the use of laws of nature for justification of states, we falsely hold up to two important views:

1. Every state of our world is there for a reason,
2. such reason is the law of nature combined with another state.

We manage to hold up to those claims since we

1. assume there is a law that explains a state in the first place
2. let the present represent a universally true theory since the only states what has already been assumed:

When one tries to establish the necessity of a state of the world, one is therefore mixing up theory and object twice: Firstly, one confuses the universal truth of the whole explanation based on itself with the information of the present. Secondly, even if one accepts that the truth does lie in the whole statement and not in the state that one wants to find a sufficient reason for, one just holds the *law of our experience*, the so called *law of nature*, for universally true. As the information of the present is equivalent to the law of nature and the past state, we believe that the information of the presents is a universal truth. This view is false. It is entirely based on the confusion between universal truth and temporal truth as well as between theory and object.

### 1.8.3 *Science as Pseudo- Science - Explanations/Predictions no theories of world - interpretation of change*

Now, using the definition of truth from the law of identity, which kinds of truths can science produce, and how can it produce them? What is true in what science produces, and what is the right method to produce those truths? Evidently, everything science produces must appear in some form or the other in written propositions that we can assign truth value to. Yet, there are different kinds of propositions science can produce, all of which have to be checked for truth and method individually. Yet, what is a good criterion to distinguish types of scientific propositions? The only thing propositions can differ in is their objects, as the truth of propositions only depends on the agreement with them.

#### 1.8.3.1 Objects of science - points and sequences

What kind of objects can a scientific proposition have? Well, the most simple case is: the world at a certain point in time. This includes four kinds of slightly different objects:

1. the past and all entities in it. ("all/one swan is black at  $t_{-1}$ ")
2. the world in the present and all entities in it (all/one swan is black at  $t_0$ )
3. the world in the future and all entities in it (all/one swan is black at  $t_1$ )
4. the world at all points in time and all entities ever in it. (all/one swan is black at all  $t$ )

Yet, those are not all objects science can make propositions on, as this would exclude predictions or explanations entirely. However, where exactly is the difference between the following two propositions: “All black swans have legs” and “All swans that are hit by a stone run away”? At least logically, there seems to be no difference between the two. Yet, the first one is only a proposition about a single point in time, whereas the second one connects two points in time - one needs to experience two points of thought to check its truth value (is the swan running at the point after he is hit?).

Therefore, we have to include sequences of points in time and its objects in it, covering their relationship. This opens the door for the following sub-classes of sequences:

1. a certain point in either present or past we search an explanation for, in the form of a foregoing point. (“a black swan that runs away at  $t_0$  is black and hit at  $t_0$ ”)
2. a certain point in the future we search at least one following point for. (prediction) (“a black swan that is hit at  $t_1$  will run away at  $t_2$ /the swan that I am hitting right now will run away”)
3. all points whether in past or present with a certain entity or information are followed by the same point in time. (“All black swans at any point in time that are hit run away”)
4. all points whether in past or present with a certain entity or information are preceded by the same point in time. (“All black swans that run away at any point in time were hit at their foregoing point in time”)

#### 1.8.3.2 Falsification as verification of negation within incomplete set

Now, what would be the methods of finding agreement with these classes of objects? Every point in time verifies its own content and falsifies what's not part of him. A new point of time automatically falsifies its predecessor and thereby verifies a new point in time. Falsification and verification are thereby to be seen as equivalent, as we divide the world in two sets based on the law of bivalence in every point in time: what is not in it automatically defines what is in it and vice versa.

What about propositions on all points in time? To know what is, and what is not in the set of this object, we need to have experienced all points of time including the future - the set we use to determine what is in it and what is not is always incomplete, for which we need induction, as we can only use the set of information we gained up until the present. If we use verification, we cannot be sure that no information joins the set, forcing us to revise our verification to a negation of the proposition. This can then be seen as a falsification. If we claim that information is not part of a single object (point in time), then we can conclude that it is never true in all points in time, for which we have gained logical truth on the set containing all points in time. Many points in time as a single object therefore take away the equivalence of verification and falsification,

as the set is always in the process of being filled up, for which falsification needs only one point in time, whereas verification needs all points in time, for which only falsification gives us an unrevisable logical truth on an object (if there were no new points of thought, then we could not create propositions anymore).

This does not mean that falsification is by any means superior to verification, it is rather just another side of the same medal: Due to the principle of bivalence, they are equivalent if their object is clearly defined. One could thereby also see the falsification of a proposition on all points in time as the verification of the negation of the proposition. It is hence not falsification that is easier to achieve, it is the truth of a negation that is easier to gain, as it gets the value true if only if it is true within the whole incomplete object, but the value false, if it is not true in at least one point in time (possibly already experienced).

What about the second class of objects, what about sequences or sets of sequences? A sequence can be falsified by any point of the sequence not being the case, while the rest is the same. Yet, there are the same problems as with the verification of a proposition on an incomplete set: A proposition that claims all points are followed by certain other points can only be verified if all future sequences are already experienced. Therefore, we can only verify the negation of the sequence as long as we still experience anything at all.

#### 1.8.3.3 Are sequences proper objects?

This shows how we can gain logical truth in scientific propositions, but it does not tell us whether we actually gain truth about the world with them - Scientific propositions could still have the same epistemic value as propositions on abstract objects. From the view that we gained in the beginning, namely that truth lies in what exists in a point in time according to the law of identity, we have to question whether the unification of points in time or the sequence of points in time is a true object. The clear answer according to our truth- definition is: neither of them are true objects. Their members are true objects on their own, but they themselves are not. Falsifications of universal propositions about all points in time are to be seen as the verification of a universally true theory, assigning a negation on exactly one point in time. Yet, the whole negation that is a logical truth on all points in time is not a proposition on a true object. The similar applies for sequences of points in time, just that not even the single sequence can be seen as a true object.

#### 1.8.3.4 Objects of science - points and sequences

Do explanations or predictions of states then not count as physics? This seems ridiculous. Defining physics only as making theories that try to reach agreement with states of the world seems to leave out most of what makes physics so successful. We believe that physics needs *both* the observation of the world, as well as the production of laws of experience that arise from it, that can be tested and then later be used for the prediction of states. Science seems worth nothing if it can't give us explanations why the world changed and without

giving us predictions on how she will be, if we change her the one or the other way. Yet, as we have found out, explanations of states are nothing more than empty theories that use the necessity of each state as a precondition through the assumption of a natural law ruling the sequence of states. Nobody has ever seen a law of nature running around, the only thing that ever exists for us is the information of the world, whereby laws of nature are only an interpretation of the way this information is changing. Consequently, if we were just dropped on earth without any further experience, we would not have a clue why a certain state would cause another. Yet, after experiencing their connection, we would call the experienced connection a law of nature and use her to change the world to our image.

#### 1.8.3.5 Property of change as integration of sequence in single point

Points and sequences are the only possible objects of propositions. Yet, we find a way of letting it seem like we assign information to a single object, although we actually form a theory on a sequence. For that, we simply call the necessity for a new state a property of the present state (e.g. "The swan is running incorporates the swan in the present and the future). This sentence then seems like a normal proposition trying to reach agreement, although the object is not limited to a single point in time.

#### 1.8.3.6 Property of potential change/sequence in all points in time

We even find a way not only to incorporate change into a single object, but also to incorporate change in a certain universal situation into an object over many points in time. When we say: "the swan is timid:" we give him a property that is both part of the swan in every point in time, as well demanding a sequence in a subset of all points in time (everytime this property explains his behaviour).

#### 1.8.3.7 Natural laws not part of world in thought

##### **Argument:**

Physics is the activity that creates theories about information of the world.

The world is governed by laws of nature if they explain the necessity of each temporarily true point of the world arising from a foregoing sufficient reason in the form of another true point.

If laws are information of the world (exist in the world), then all points of thought are contained in one point of thought,

There is more than one point of thought.

---

The world is not governed by natural laws/the world is not determined

The formulation of natural laws is not part of physics.

*Remark:* One must add that as this argument will, during the course of this thesis, ultimately lead to a rejection of all temporal truth and information in the world, for which nothing that we do, not even the theories about the information of the world according to her presence in our thought, can be regarded as physics, which will open the door to a physics that uses *both observation and natural laws*. Yet, as we are looking at physics from a perspective of hierarchy in this section and since we thereby define physics as theories about the information of the world, we can now only reject formulating natural laws being part of physics.

#### 1.8.3.8 Law of sufficient reason gives rise to biconditional - present depends on past

Another aspect of our method of doing science that should make us suspicious, is that it theoretically also makes the past dependent on the present. When we believe the present can evoke the future, we thereby assume that the future belongs to the present logically. Yet, this also means that the present is only equal to itself if it is dependent on the past, since otherwise two different futures could arise from the same present. Therefore, one may equally claim that the future explains the past and even more drastically, that the present depends in the same right on the future as the future depends on the present, which entirely undermines our view that the world is developing from one state to another with sufficient reason into the future and at the same instant needs that process of every state having a sufficient reason, so that the future can finally evoke. In my view, this weird consequence of the assumption of laws of nature shows that:

1. natural laws don't give a sufficient reason for change since such reason would lead to the equivalence of present and past with the past being a universally true theory on the present, creating a world in which present and past are equivalent without change.
2. that there is something paradoxical about the view that both present and past are temporal truths according to the law of our thought.

#### 1.8.3.9 Determinism creates single temporal truth that determines itself- weak law of sufficient reason as law of thought

To show that the assumption of determination through natural laws leads to a single temporal truth, rather than a sequence of truths that are evoked from their predecessor as their sufficient reason, consider the claim that such determinism is based on:

$$t_n \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+1}$$

Yet, we can only hold the claim for universally true if both object and theory contain the same information and add a law of nature:

$$(\text{World at time } t_n \ \& \ \text{Law of nature}) \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+1}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow$$

$$(\text{World at time } t_n \ \& \ (\text{World at time } t_n \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+1}) \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+1})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow$$

$$(\text{World at time } t_n \ \& \ \text{World at time } t_{n+1}) \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+1}$$

for which such theory will reach agreement with its object only because the object of that theory already contains the information of all points of thought. If one assumes that there is a temporal truth of the world that is sufficient reason for a new point of the world, then one is confronted with:

$$\text{World at time } t_n \ \& \ (\text{World at time } t_n \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+1} \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+2} \rightarrow \text{World at time } t_{n+\infty})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow$$


$$\text{World at time } t_n \ \& \ \text{World at time } t_{n+1} \ \& \ \text{World at time } t_{n+2} \ \& \ \text{World at time } t_{n+\infty}$$

If one affirms one of the temporal truths of the world, then one must equally affirm all of her other points. The information of all points in time would therefore already be included in the first point as the law of nature states that the affirmation of the first point *must* lead to the affirmation of the next one etc. Therefore, the result is then a single temporal truth rather than a sequence of temporal truths, for which there is then also no change that would enable thoughts with temporal truth. All future points are thereby equally necessary condition of the past ones and the other way round, since there is only one point. All future points thereby determine the past points as there is only one point, just like it was already indicated by the biconditional in the previous section.

For the present to be the sufficient reason of the future, the present must already contain all future temporal truths of the world. If the world is thus determined, then the world determines herself and follows the strong law of sufficient reason, which is equivalent to the law of thought: if the world existed in a point, than within that point, she would always coincide with herself and therefore represent a sufficient reason for herself.

Concluding, this chapter has shown mainly two things:

1. that an explanation of temporal truths can be universally true - but only because the information that is to be explained is already assumed. The actual temporal truth is therefore never a universal truth, as it is informative.
2. that the assumption of such information in the form of a law of nature in combination with the present, leaves us with a single point of the world, rather than many, in which the world determines and is sufficient reason for herself.



**Fig. 1.21.** If the present state of the world has its sufficient reason in the past, indicated by a law of nature, then all future points of thought are already part of the first point from which necessity arises, for which they all form a single informative, temporal truth rather than a sequence of temporal truths.

The strong law of sufficient reason therefore tries to falsely hold up to two views:

1. that there is a sufficient reason for everything that exists at every point in time outside of itself, because the theory (present) on the object of explanation (past+law of nature) is universally true.
2. that using the claim of an outside sufficient reason in the form of the past and a law of nature still creates a sequence of temporal points of the world, rather than just one that is sufficient reason for himself.

#### 1.8.3.10 Proofs in science

What then can we proof in science? What evidence would such a proof be based on. Proofs can only be the reverse of a theory. They search objects that are equivalent to themselves to make the negation of themselves impossible while keeping up to the object. A point of thought with a certain information about the world is thus evidence enough for the truth of itself. But what about the proofs for past states or events? As we cannot differentiate events and states, we then either search for a proof of either single states or sequences lying in present states combined with natural laws. Therefore, when we see a certain present, we believe it was proof for past information that makes the present necessary together with laws of experience that state exactly that.






## TRANSITION LEVEL: IS THOUGHT FLAWED? HIERARCHY OF THOUGHT LEADS TO CONTRADICTION

### 2.1 Change of perspective due to interlacing

Although we have recognised the hierarchy of thought over the world, thought is still interlaced with itself, as it is object of the world and therefore object of our own thought. We can think about ourselves because we are part of the material world in thought. This does not yet infringe hierarchy, but rather changes our perspective: we are now dealing with the world. Surely, this still takes place in thought and is subject to its hierarchy, yet it will become very tempting to just forget about hierarchy and make our own thought subject to a world that allows us to be caught in thought. This easily creates the view that claims the actual all-embracing object is the world rather than thought, for which the world will be seen as the actual bearer of truth, that must be distinguished from our construct of her caught in the form of our thought. Yet, such a view that sees us caught in a construct, sees us imprisoned in thought will be subject to the construct that it predicts itself. The second big part of this thesis will therefore consist of an attempt of breaking hierarchy. We will see that we are not even allowed to *truly think* that thought is flawed.



**Fig. 2.1.** Thought looks onto the world with thought and its limiting laws as a material object.

### 2.2 Change as the foundation of thought

#### 2.2.1 *Change: Condition for inseparability of thought and world*

The last chapter represented an outline of an important precondition the world must fulfill being an object of our thought: she must exist and obey the law of thought. Yet, another precondition for her existence in thought is that she changes: only through the change of the world can we think and make her subject to the law of thought. We can only perceive her through change. As we only know the world from thought, something can therefore only exist, if it enables its thought through change. The existence in thought is the only form of existence

we know - it is exactly that existence that can only occur in a changing world. The parts of the world are not blue or red; warm or hot because they contain these features per se, but rather because they communicate them, because they make them accessible to us by causing a change in our thought. This is as fundamental as it sounds irrelevant: cognition is only possible if not everything stands still. Perception is only possible if the truth of the world changes. Conscious being is impossible if everything keeps being the same. As banal and unhelpful this might sound, we must not forge about this in the foundational thoughts about our world. Paradoxically, we can only think an existing world due to change. She is not despite of her change, but rather because her change enables thought and thereby existence in the first place.

### 2.2.2 *Existence and information as an event*


All existing objects that we know are bound to an event. We experience the world not as an object of our thinking because she coincides with herself, but rather because she evokes thoughts through her impact. Therefore, we have never the things themselves, but only what we create from their impact in our thought. Existence in thought does not arise from a world just obeying the law of thought without changing, not just because she exists but rather because she evokes existence of our thought through change. Although thought only knows existence and temporal truth of the points of thought, all such existence in our thought is equivalent to an event: Imagine a traffic light at a time  $t1$ . The traffic light has temporarily true properties in our thought that we hold for properties of the traffic light itself, for example the property *yellow*. Yet, the traffic light only gains this property in our thought through the event of light reaching our eyes, for something changes in our brain so a new thought is evoked, having the property we then call *yellow*. How the traffic light really is, is thereby of no importance, since her truth for us only lies in our thought: the traffic light existing in our thought is thus the perfectly true traffic light itself. Yet, such view is only possible since the traffic light is not standing still, but changing, for which we can hold her event as a temporal truth in our thought. Even if the traffic light thereby stays the same in our thought over many points of thought, she is then not standing still, as change is necessary for she stays in our thought.

## 2.3 Indistinguishability of existence and change

### 2.3.1 *World as unification of all possible flawless object -observations*

From our inability to hold thoughts for nonexistent and the need for change to have thoughts in the first place, we can derive the view of the world that we always implicitly accept: For us, the world represents everything that *could be* observed and thus gain existence in thought at a certain point of thought. With “could be observed” I thereby mean the sum of all observations in a position that is so perfectly close to its object in the world, that the thought that arises from it mirrors exactly the object’s properties. The world at one point in time

is therefore nothing more than the sum of the information that is produced by the sum of all hypothetical, perfectly accurate observations. This model of the world appears to have strange consequences: according to the model, something does not exist if it does exist and not change us. This makes sense insofar, as we can then not assign any truth value to it in thought. Furthermore, we exclude contradictory observations from different observers, as we just define the actual flawless observation as the observation of the truth. This view of the world therefore combines the truth-definition of thought with the necessity of change for thought.




**Fig. 2.2.** For thought, the world is the sum of all *hypothetically possible* flawless observations of the world in a point of thought.

**Truth model of thought:** A point in thought  $p1$  defines a point  $t1$  of the world including all of her objects  $x1 \dots xn$  that is equivalent to all flawless, but hypothetical observations of the individual objects  $O1(x1) \dots On(xn)$ .

Naturally, such a model seems ridiculous, as there seems to be no valid method on how to decide which observation of the same object is perfect and which is not. Every observer would hold the thought of an object in a point of thought for a truth of the world in the present point in time. Even more: one has to doubt whether such truth in itself, in every point of the world, exists at all. Yet, this model of the sum of possible flawless observers is derived directly from the indistinguishability between the world and her thought, for which we will have to challenge the hierarchy of thought to challenge the model.

### 2.3.2 Indistinguishability between perceived change and perceived existence


From the indistinguishability of existence and its event arises another indistinguishability: When we speak of the world, describing how she is, we can then not differentiate between a world that has *certain properties and does not change* and a world that has *certain properties in our thought because she changes*. We can say: *The traffic light is green*. Although the existence of the green traffic light in thought is only possible due to the event that causes that thought, we hold the content of the thought for the actual content of the world. There seems to be nothing wrong with this view as long as the traffic light does not change its colour. Yet, if the traffic light changes from green to yellow, we have to acknowledge that change has taken place, as the content of our thought has changed. However, can we distinguish between the event that evokes the new



**Fig. 2.3.** For thought, the world is the unification of the objects that could be flawlessly perceived in a point of thought from exactly those positions that enable flawless observations of the objects.

colour and the existence of the new colour? What if we look at processes that are still ongoing and not yet finished? Consider a stone flying in the direction of a window or a an aircraft that is continually moving and changing its position. Can we here differentiate between the unfinished event of movement and perceived existence? Surely we can assign the flying stone the property “flying” and thus already include something about its future in the present thought of the stone. Yet, we can only perceive change in the form of temporal truths in our points of thought. Even if descriptions of the world include properties that already define a future point of the world, then this future point is thereby already part of the present. No matter whether we describe an object that stays the same in our thought or an object that changes in our thought - we are never able to distinguish it from the actual event that takes place in the world due to the form of our thought:

1. An object stays the same in thought, but needs to change to create the thought in every new point of thought. In this case, we cannot differentiate between the event of the object and the object in our thought itself.
2. An object changes in our thought and therefore needs to change just like in (a). In this case, we cannot differentiate between the event and the different temporal truths in thought that this event brings about. Even if we then call the sequence of thoughts an event, this event can only be seen in the light of a number of temporally existing truths.



**Fig. 2.4.** The thinker cannot distinguish between existence and the event in the world that evokes that existence in thought, for him an event is only accessible through the existence of points of thought.

### 2.3.3 Inability to define individual events with thought

This indistinguishability of change and existence brings up an even more general inability of thought: we cannot define an event by anything but by different states. The only way we can come up with the word *event* or *change* is by *interpreting* the relation between temporal truths. Thought only knows temporal truths and no change in a point of thought, until a new point of thought is temporarily true. Therefore, nobody can really say *what exactly* an event *is*, since that would contradict the form of our thought. Surely one can define an event as the transformation between two different states of the world, as the change *from being to being different*. However, to restrict an event to the eventual detection of what differentiates a present state from a past state is short-sighted, as we also have to be able to perceive the outcome of the event, which in its own right represents the continuation of that event. One can therefore only say that an event has taken place, when there is no more change and when one can therefore not confirm the end of the event anymore due to the lack of change. In the course of this thesis it will be argued, that the change in the world represents an event that is not yet finished, for which the change in the world represents a *single event*, that can be seen as the transformation from *existence* to *non-existence* and thereby as the *loss of truth value*.

#### 2.3.4 *Indistinguishability of sufficient reason for existence and change - Change determinism as state determinism - law of thought invalid?*

Until now, we have argued that the law of sufficient reason for states results in a very *hard form of logical determinism* that seems paradoxical, as it results in the claim of only one state of the world without change. To avoid that, it seems natural to see the determination of the world not based on states but rather on events. We thus formulate a *law of sufficient reason for change*:

- (1) An event has a sufficient reason if and only if it has another event that makes it sufficient.

This view seems to shift away from single states and sees the determination of the world not in states being necessary conditions of other states but rather changes in those states evoking the changes in other states. This leads to the definition of a change- determinism that tries to avoid the negative results of state determinism being based on the law of sufficient reason for change:

- (2) The world is change- determined if and only if every future event is sufficiently explained by events in the present.

Yet, the notion of change determinism is produced by a mind that only knows its temporal states, for which it does falsely not see a difference between the notion of change- and state determinism: it can only understand change from the perspective of states, for which the notion of change determinism becomes equivalent to the notion of state determinism. One can thereby look at state determinism as the determination of the event of transformation from present to future that is explained by a natural law. Yet, such state-determinism leads to the claim that there is only one point of the world.

From that view, change determinism leads to a universe in a single point without change just like determinism does. This does not make sense, as the whole point of the law of sufficient reason is to explain why the world is like she is in every point in different point rather than only in one. The notion of change-determinism was thereby explicitly written to avoid the implications of state-determinism, and yet change-determinism leads to a still - standing world. In my view, this shows that even more clearly that our view of change is not valid, as it is even in the attempt to leave states based on states through the dependence on thought (which will later lead to the view that our whole truth definition of thought does not fit a world that changes). Even when we define determinism explicitly only by change and not by states, we get a world that does not change and has only one state

Events are mystical in nature, they can only be perceived through states, but they don't lie within them. Yet, as we cannot differentiate between events and states such law of sufficient reason for change is an invalid workaround, since it means the same thing to the mind as the law of sufficient reason for states as the mind just knows states of mind.

Concluding, holding the two different notions of determinism for equivalent contradicts a world that changes and develops from a perceived present into a

perceived future. Claiming such equivalency is as invalid as it has its roots in thought. The reason for this equivalence will therefore later be seen in the more foundational problem of the validity of our truth definition, as the definition we are subject to within thought implicitly forbids the change that allows thought in the first place.

**Argument:**

Thought cannot distinguish between existence and events.

If the law of sufficient reason for states is valid, then the world is determined and only possesses one informative point that doesn't change.

The world is change-determined if every event has a sufficient reason represented by a foregoing event.

The world does not represent a single informative point.

Thought cannot distinguish between a law of sufficient reason for change and for existence.

If the world is causally determined, then she is also state-determined and only possesses a single informative point.

The world is not change-determined according to the change definition of thought.


The definition of change by thought is false.

## 2.4 Contradiction in the physics of thought

### 2.4.1 *Event and Existence: Two contradictory definitions of existence depend on each other*

An event needs to take place to perceive the world in a certain point of thought with certain properties. Yet, are those properties then part of the object in the world itself, or is this view only evoked by an event in the world for which the properties lie in change rather than existence itself? Does something exist in a point of thought, or does something happen in a point of thought? Thought tells us it must exist for it doesn't break the law of thought. The need for change for the possibility of thought tells us, that we are caught in our thought without being able to see the difference between the real and changing world,, and the thoughts which have her as an object with properties that belong to herself rather than arising from change. Yet, both those definitions depend on each other: If there was only being without an event we could not think. Yet, if there is thought, there must then also its hierarchy that keeps us trapped within the law that forbids us assigning any truth to anything outside of thought and its truth definition. Hence, we are dependent on two foundations and definitions of existence that are contradictory: A material basis that is rooted on change and a mental basis that is rooted in agreement with itself.






**Fig. 2.5.** The two foundational notions of existence are contradictory, as we need both law of thought and change in the world to be subject to her.

#### 2.4.2 *Two contradictory notions of information: information as an event and as a property of matter*

The notion of information arises from the notion of existence coming from thought: information is the content of a thought representing a temporal truth. However, as we are dependent on two contradictory notions of existence, we are also dependent on two contradictory notions of information, namely one that sees her as a property of matter and one that only sees her in the change resulting in a thought with certain properties. The first notion results in the view of matter containing information that is entirely *independent of observation*, the other notion results in the view that information is solely based on energy and change being *only dependent on observation* evoking a thought.

We thereby need both notions of information as much as we need both definitions of existence: If there existed a world with properties in the things of the world itself like thought suggest, then the world would obey to the law of thought and not evoke a thought with the world as an existing part. The information of the world would then not inform anybody. If, on the other hand, there was only change without information being a property of the world, then there would be no limit that we are subject to. We would then not think either and could never say the world existed.



**Fig. 2.6.** Our definition of information is contradictory because we have to see it both as a property of the world being subject to the hierarchy of thought as well as an event so that the world enables our thinking in her.

### 2.4.3 *Restriction of physical description through change - No description of present*

The two conflicting notions of existence limit our ability to describe the world with thought: Theories of the word in thought want to reach agreement with their objects. Yet, if the objects in thought are only in thought due to the change of the real objects in the world, we can never describe the objects themselves, for we will only think objects at a point of thought that have already changed. This limitation seems like a *weak* limitation, since it avoids an *entire* breaking with the hierarchy of thought. We believe that we cannot actually describe what exists in a point in time since the perception of this point in time has the change of it as a precondition. However, strictly speaking, this view already breaks the hierarchy of thought as it sees the world as the actual object of truth with whom we need to compare our thought with. Yet, we still believe that there is certain information in every point of thought defining the information of the world in the form of thought. However, how do we then justify not considering a stronger limitation of thought, representing an even more radical breaking of the hierarchy of thought. Put differently: is the world breaking the law of thought?

## 2.5 Mathematical functions - sequences of temporal truths without change

### 2.5.1 *Change as interpretation of multiple states in function*

We often believe that mathematical functions can both describe the change of the world and represent the sequence of her temporarily true points. Let us assume that the function  $s1(t) = t^2$  describes the distance traveled by a stone flying through the air at each point in time  $t$ . Mathematical functions as mirror of a sequence of points of thought are thereby a wonderful way to show that they don't tell us anything about change, except for it has to take place to connect a sequence of temporal truths. It thereby doesn't tell us anything about the reason of that change, it just represents the perception of different properties in each point of thought.


### 2.5.2 *Indistinguishability of changing and existing objects at points in time*

Let the function of the flying stone intersect with another function  $s2(t) = 1$  describing the same stone, with the difference that it never moves. The function of the standing stone intersects with the function of the moving stone in the point  $t=1$ . At time  $t = 1$ , there is no difference between the information that the function gives us on the moving and the standing stone. Yet, the first stone moves on, while the second remains in the same state forever. Two stones, which have *exactly the same information* at one point, behave differently in all the others. Then, where does the change of the first stone come from? It cannot come from its information at point  $t=1$ , as the same information leads to no change in the second case. In my view, this shows that our thought cannot

understand change, but only temporal truths, for which it cannot differentiate between things that continue changing and that stay the same.

### 2.5.3 Functions without place for change: no representation of world

If thought cannot distinguish between things that continue changing and things that stay the same, the mathematical models that are derived from it cannot represent the development of the world neither. If thought cannot give an explanation for change, but only interpret a sequence of different thoughts, it can never understand the world due to the limitations of the form of thought.



**Fig. 2.7.** The information at time  $t = 1$  is equivalent for both a changing and a never changing stone. How is possible that different futures arise from the same present? Why does something new arise at all? Functions just fake time by a sequence of temporal truths and can therefore neither be a representation of the change in the world nor give an explanation for it.

### 2.5.4 Derivatives as pseudo explanatory natural laws - results in single determined state

To solve those problem we have invented one of the smartest intellectual cheats in human thought: *the derivative*. It seems to solve all the problems we have with change in functions: it distinguishes the stone that stands still from the stone that moves, it gives an explanation for change from point to point and thus seems like a proper representation of processes in the world. Yet, derivatives are not leaving the form of thought and are only superficially avoiding the problems that we faced:

#### 1. Functions don't know change but only states

- a) change is not a property of a state, but rather an interpretation of a sequence of states. If we claim that a certain state already included its

transformation to another one, we would either have to break thought or claim that the world was not changing in the first place.

- b) The actual function only represents a set of theories on a set of points of thought - it can thereby be seen as the experience of a sequence of points of thought.


2. *Derivatives are interpretations of change that beg the question and assume a natural law creating a single present*

- a) For the derivative of  $s(t1)$  we need the subsequent value of the function - if there is no subsequent value, then there is no derivative. If the derivative is solely a property of the world at  $t1$ , how would it be dependent on the future, which is not the case yet? The derivative function is only representing information at  $t1$  due to some other value that one uses to afterwards claim the actual value of the derivative caused the value of  $s(t1)$ , although its is rather the other way round: the subsequent value of the function gives rise to the interpretation of the derivative being part of the information at  $t1$  in the first place. However, if one claims that the derivative both explains and entails the future (as it depends on it) and is equally part of the present, one is then affirming a simple contradiction.
- b) The derivative of the function at  $t1$  is equivalent to a natural law stating  $s(t1) \rightarrow s(t2)$  as a derivative is saying nothing more then: if  $s(t1)$  continues changing in a rate of two units per  $t$ , then it will be equal to  $s(t2)$  in the point  $t2$ . Thus, if we both assume the derivative and a certain point, we will gain a determination of each state by its preceding state, for which one will gain the same result as with logical determinism, namely that all states are not only true for themselves, but rather true at the same point in time:

$$s(t1) \ \& \ (s(t1) \rightarrow s(t2)) \Leftrightarrow s(t1) \ \& \ s(t2)$$

3. *Derivatives don't give a real explanation for change*


- a) Derivatives don't give an explanation for change within the sequence of thoughts, which a function represents. At any time  $t > 0$ , the speed  $vs(t)$  is equal to  $2t$ . At  $t = 0$ , just before the stone starts flying, there is no motion at all. Consequently, there is *no first instant of motion*. At  $t = 0$ , the stone stands still, while in all other points he moves. The motion does not need a cause but is rather just an *interpretation* of a sequence of different states. The reason for the change is entirely left out, as not to say: it is left out *because* we use the the form of our thought to figure out such reason.



**Fig. 2.8.** In the point  $t = 0$  the stone does not move, while in all other points he moves. Where does the change come from?

## 2.6 Change and Contradiction

During the course of the first part of this thesis, a hierarchy of thought was established that created the view that the world is just an object of our thought representing a permanent temporal truth. Therefore, the law of our thought also applies to the world. Only: the world is an object that *must* change to enable our thought. But: all existing objects are also bound to thought obeying to its law. They are also the same as long as they represent the same object. They do not change. And the world is an object. But she is not always the same. We seem to have a problem.



**Fig. 2.9.** The world is an object of our thought that changes while representing the same object.

### 2.6.1 Change of things as contradiction

#### 2.6.1.1 Are things allowed to change?

When we derived the weird consequences of determinism and the law of sufficient reason, we only looked for a sufficient reason for the whole world in the present

rather than just for a single thing, for which the law we found justifying the future with the past was a law of nature *assigning the whole world a certain future*. We just assumed that we would get the same result for a law of sufficient reason stating that the *state of every object has the state of another object as a sufficient reason*. This leads to two questions that are ultimately equivalent due to equivalence of the laws of thought:

1. does the law of sufficient reason for objects result in the same deterministic, logical and still- standing world? If it does, then its is not compatible with the world, as she changes.
2. are objects in the world allowed to change according to the law of thought? If they are, then the law of sufficient reason of objects is compatible with the world. If they are not, then the law of sufficient reason for objects is not compatible with the world.

Are individual objects allowed to change according to the law of thought? How is it possible that a window can both be intact an broken, representing contradictory information? In order to avoid the recognition of the contradiction, we have two intuitive counter-arguments, which, however, give rise to two interesting questions:

1. The window is never completely at rest. The only difference between a window that is not at rest, and a window, that is breaking, is very subjective, for it never stands still in both cases. We thereby try to avoid the contradiction of change by never admitting objects are standing still at all. As it has been argued, such view of non-state change will still be interpreted as a sequence of states by thought, since thought is unable to understand change from a foundation other then state -truth. Consequently, we need to ask: How can the same thing be never at rest and always change representing more then one state?
2. The natural answer: the environment of the windows is never at rest and thus changes the window. Even if we move the contradiction to other objects, we must answer
  - a) why objects can change each other? and also
  - b) why the objects that change the window can change?


#### 2.6.1.2 Why can things change each other? They make up a single object.

The reason why the environment of an object can change it is the key to the generalisation of the contradiction of change. If something exists, then it also represents a sufficient reason for itself and does not depend on the existence of anything else and can therefore not be changed by anything besides itself. The fact that we see objects changing each other shows that they belong to the same world, that we should therefore see the contradiction of change in the whole world rather than in single objects, see the world as the actual object instead of the objects we perceive within through our separation from the world.

### 2.6.2 *Change of the whole world as contradiction*

#### 2.6.2.1 Avoiding contradiction by dividing the world into points of thought

It seems like one can easily avoid seeing the change in the world as a contradiction by the following argument: If one denies the content of a certain point of thought in a subsequent point of thought, one does not break the law of thought, as the law only applies to a single point of thought. In a new point of thought, we are then dealing with a new object. Subsequently, each point of thought with the world as content represents a single object for which the law of thought applies. This seems to avoid a contradiction, but it must be questioned whether we can validly divide the world into a sequence of worlds obeying the law of thought.



**Fig. 2.10.** Claim: There are different objects in thought that each represent the same world while being objects forming worlds themselves.


#### 2.6.2.2 Dropping world as object illegitimate?

If we avoid the contradiction of the change in the world by seeing her as a sequence of independent worlds, we destroy her as an object. Every single thought thereby creates a possible world whose negation equally represents part of a possible world in every other point of thought. We have thereby saved the validity of the law of thought in the world, but have lost the world. If we avoid the contradiction by losing the connection between the different states of the world, there is no actual object that changes anymore, as the points in time can then can all be seen as non-changing objects on their own. We can then no more claim they belonged to the same world.

#### 2.6.2.3 Adaption of the object: World-at-t

To save both the law of thought and the world as an object, we can try to just rename the states of the world, for it seems like they belonged to the same entity. For that, we just call the single worlds in each point of thought a *world-at-t*, so we can then claim they all belonged to the same world, although being different. Yet the law of thought only applies to each single point of thought. However,

the actual worlds are still the *worlds-at-t* that are entirely independent - not even a common family name can change that.



**Fig. 2.11.** There are objects in thought that form worlds in their own points of thought. However, they should still represent states of the same world. This view wants to hold up both to the world as an object and to the law of thought. Yet, the law of thought only applies to *the worlds-at -t*. The similar naming does not make them part of a continuous object.

#### 2.6.2.4 Adaptation of the law: Limitation to points in time

Changing the object to which the law applies destroys the world as a continuous object. The other possibility to avoid a contradiction is to just change the law of thought, for she allows change of an object and thus only applies to points in time of objects rather than for objects in general:

**Law of the world for points in time.** An object is without contradiction if and only if it coincides with itself in every point in time. Therefore, the world coincides with herself in every point in time.

1. The *world -at - t1* is consistent with herself.
2. The *world -at - t1* is not inconsistent with herself
3. The *world -at - t1* is either true or false within any other world -at -t.
4. The *world -at - t1* is a sufficient reason for the *world -at -t1*.

Yet, if the world is an object, then it must be thinkable within a single thought and represent a *world-at-herself*. Even if we change the law of thought for she applies to points in time, those points in time then constitute independent objects themselves. If we now see the world as an object with many points in time, we also break the law of thought, as claiming that she was the same object in many points in time is equivalent to claiming that there is a point in time with the content of all her points in time.



#### 2.6.2.5 Two levels of consistency mixed in thought: necessity of states and change

The mind avoids the contradiction of change skillfully by simply using its laws for something that breaks its law already. When we claim that change is consistent we are claiming two levels of consistency:

1. every state is true within its point in time, being a sufficient reason for itself (law of identity, weak law of sufficient reason).
2. every new state is only true because an event (and thereby another new state) is a sufficient reason for him (strong law of sufficient reason).

Yet, the idea of a sufficient reason for a future object creates a world that stands still, even if we try to cover that with the notion of an event, as an event is only thinkable if it presents itself in a sequence of states. It leads to a world in which all information is already included in the *first and only* point in time. One just tries to avoid the contradiction of change with two levels of equivalence within thought: every point in time is equivalent to itself, but also equivalent to the state that evokes him with his necessity. We thereby just look at change from one state to another like on any other object we want to reach agreement with, although the multiplicity of states is already a contradiction breaking the form of thought. It can thus not be open to its inquiry neither.

#### 2.6.2.6 Present explains future - present and future coincide

We have already tried avoiding the contradiction of change by claiming there was some sort of natural law making the transformation from present to future necessary. Yet, we have found out that the assumption of a determined world creates a world in which there is only a single point of the world and *no change*. This often leads to the interpretation that both future and present must be true at all times. Yet, this view is often rejected because it does not seem to fit our changing world in which the future has to develop from the present. However, the notion of determinism leading to a still standing- world is as true within thought as our own truth-definition telling us the world is consistent with herself. Instead of rejection the odd results of logical determinism, we must therefore reject the weird result of identity within our truth-definition.


#### 2.6.2.7 If change is necessary, why hasn't it ended? Why did it even start? Positive and negative determinism.

One can interpret the still-standing world which determinism and therefore our truth-definition based on the law of identity creates in two ways:

1. as a world that has *not yet started changing*. A world in which the present explains the future has only one present. It stands still because one could never think the present explained anything. *Why has our world then started to change?* If a certain state was already part of the past, why did it even need to occur?

2. as a world that has *finished changing*. If the present state of our world led directly to a certain future state, why is the present not already equal to that state that is part of him. *Why do we still experience change?* If a certain state in the present was caused by a past state making it necessary, how can it continue changing us? It must at the same time be necessary for us in thought and at the same time not be necessary enough, for it would otherwise just be according to the weak law of sufficient reason.

The first case can thereby be seen as a negatively determined world in which the past is entirely explained and determined, for there will never be a perceivable present, whereas the second case can be seen as a positively determined world, in which the future is determined, for there will only be the future already being the case.



**Fig. 2.12.** If the change resulting in a certain present was necessary this would explain the present entirely. Why does the world then continue to change?

#### 2.6.2.8 Limit of speed: infinite and zero-speed lead to positively/negatively determined world

The two interpretations of the equivalence of present and future arising from determinism thereby implicitly give us insight into the result of infinite and zero-speed: if the limit of the speed in the world were zero, there would then be no change. Therefore, there would then just be an eternal past. On the other hand, if speed was not limited in some way, the future would already be logically determined, as there would be no present, for the future would always have been the case already. The first case represents a world in which no change will ever take place, whereas the second case represents a world in which all change has already taken place - both cases thereby result in the same non-changing, determined world. This shows that we should not see speed as a result of logical,

causal consequence, as this would mean that a result is already the case with its first cause (or the interpretation of such by our mind). On the other hand, we should not see the explanation of a state logically in the past, as the world would otherwise not have change for we could never have seen the state we wanted an explanation for. For that, we can already claim that there must be some limit of speed in our world - it does not need to be a set limit, but there needs to be a limit, both positively and negatively.

#### 2.6.2.9 Determination of changing world leads to further contradictions

Showing that the law of thought and determinism derived from it only permit a still-standing world should already be enough to show that the concept of the past explaining all future points in time does not fit the world. Yet, if one is not content with such argumentation, one can also derive two other contradictions that show that our changing world cannot be state-deterministic:

1. *Assume that the change in the world leads to the same content twice (loop)*

Our definition of determinism is based on the present explaining the future. Assume that some content of the world in two not directly subsequent different points in time is equivalent.

$$t0 \rightarrow t1 \rightarrow t0$$

In fact, this would imply a form of time travel, as the past would arise from the present. You do something and then you get the past back - one has then transformed the world back to the future and has traveled in time. Yet, how can the past lead to a new future that then again leads to the old past? Where would that change come from? How can something that exists become something else just to become itself again? Isn't that exactly the definition of a contradiction?

As we don't know why exactly change happens, our definition of determinism does not rule out that the natural law causes such a loop. Yet, the loop entails a contradiction if it is combined with determinism and our truth definition.

What then if we avoid the loop by arguing that the world is entirely different in each point in time? Would she then enable consciousness existence and identity over the course of many points?

1. *Assume that change of the world leads to a negation of the present*

Now assume that a present state of the world leads to a future that is different to the past. With different to the past, I thereby mean that some properties that are part of the present are not part of the future. This definition of non-identity is equivalent to the definition of negation, as the world as an entity in the form of thought is a set defined by all of its members and the relationships between all of them. Consequently, the two different points in time are not consistent with each other, as all properties are either part or not part of every object of

thought. (Propositions can be contingent to each other. If I say: If a, then b, I thereby make a theory on a theory, assigning two properties to an object. Yet, if I see an object as a necessary condition of another object, those objects must be contradictory to each other, for they are not equivalent) Therefore, one is confronted with a contradiction:

$$\begin{aligned} t0 &\rightarrow \neg t0 \\ &\Leftrightarrow \\ t\neg 0 &\& t0 \end{aligned}$$

One can also put this in terms of propositions: If one claims the two theories T1 and T2 representing complete theories on t1 and t2 have a conditional relationship and if one then assumes T1, one will then find their combination claimed. Yet, one thereby claims a contradiction, as T1 and T2 must be inconsistent: both T1 and T2 must contain all properties either affirmed or negated, as all properties are either part or not part of their object and therefore contain at least one property that is affirmed in one and negated in the other, for they were the same objects otherwise.

Thus, a deterministic world is contradictory if she

1. has a future that is different to the present but equivalent to the past or
2. has a future that is not equal to the present.

The only world that does not lead to a contradiction both through (a) or (b) is a world that doesn't change, having a past that is equivalent to the present and future, thus avoiding two different points in a row, and therefore also avoiding paradox loops. Or in other words: the world cannot be deterministic according to our truth-definition and change. Moreover: if we acknowledge that she changes, then she cannot exist according to the truth-definition at all.

#### 2.6.2.10 Time as paraphrase for the breaking of thought

Time as a justification for the change in the world is thus only a paraphrase for a contradiction, gives it a name, but doesn't solve it. The world breaks the law of thought, as she is a single object that is not equivalent to itself. This claim is thereby so trivial, that there cannot even be a proof for it, apart from just noting that the world changes, as change is already the embodiment of a contradiction. If the world ever existed with certain information, how could she ever leave her state and still obey to the law of thought? How could she create consciousness through the event of existence while obeying the law of thought that limits this consciousness? Everything that could be used as a justification for change lying outside of things must already lie within the world. Only a world that breaks the law of thought allows our thought. Therefore, one must question that the world represents information at each point in time and leave the truth definition that limits our thought. We have hereby abolished the entire hierarchy that was established in the first part of this thesis.



## THEORY OF CHANGE - TRAPPED IN THE WORLD

### *BREAKING HIERARCHY WITH NEGATIVE CONSTRUCTIVISM.*

#### 3.1 The world as a contradiction

##### 3.1.1 *World without truth value*

We believe that every theory on the world is either true or false because we believe that everything is either in the world or not in it in every point of time. This law seems to be intuitively valid, but does it apply to the world herself? If the world were true according to the law of identity, she would not change. As the world changes, the world therefore never has the truth value *true* when we perceive, observe, or change her. Every question for the truth of a theory on the world already assumes that there is a true world in every point in time with distinct information one can compare the theory with. Yet, as the law of identity for objects gives rise to all laws of logic in the first place, they simply don't apply to the world. It is therefore not possible assigning a truth value to any theory we make on the world, for even the truth of a negation would imply the truth of something not existing according to our truth definition.

An object has truth value/exists if and only if it obeys the law of identity/thought.

If something changes, then it does not obey the law of identity.

The world changes

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The world is not true/does not exist (according to the law of identity)

We think, and are subject to the law of thought. However, we can only be subject to anything in thought because the world violates the form that thought assigns to her. If she was satisfied, we were not subject to her, as there would be no change enabling thought in the first place. That she changes directly leads to the conclusion that she is contradictory and that she does not exist according to the truth definition of thought. This conclusion contradicts the perception of our world. The acceptance of both the existence of myself and the outside world is a precondition of thought. Yet, that she does not exist according to the law of thought is the second unavoidable precondition thought has. We can gain consciousness of our existence by the change that enables us to observe and change the world being able to separate us from her. This contradiction arises with thought, it only allows thought, yet it also sets thought an unsurmountable barrier. The contradiction is not only in the world, it rather represents the world.

The world is therefore non existing, and all theories that we make on her are false (we even need to use our own truth definition for claiming it is false), as we can never think her like she really "is" as an object, as our thought automatically

attaches a certain truth-definition to the world. There is thereby a difference between claiming the nonexistence of something within an object and the nonexistence of something in general: if something is false within an object then the object is true (affirmed), while when something does not obey the law of thought there is no truth, nothing that could be affirmed in thought instead.

### 3.1.2 *Law of excluded middle violated*

This seems also like a clear violation of the law of excluded middle for theories: both a theory on the world and its negation are false. This does not mean that the law of excluded middle would not be valid in thought, as a certain property or its nonexistence must be in agreement with every thought. Yet, the truth definition of thought is broken in contradictory objects, for which nothing, not even negations of existence can reach agreement with them, as agreement with itself is equivalent to the truth definition of thought that contradictions break. When we claim the world were false (or the present, or the past etc.), we are thus still caught in our own truth definition and thereby in the law of excluded middle. The laws of thought are thereby something that is generally neither true or false - if we thought they were true, we would have to think a positive paradox; if we thought they were false, we would have to think a negative paradox, using the truth definition of the laws to claim they were false. The whole concept of truth only derives from thought and the attached laws, they can therefore not be subject to the concept they give rise to in the first place.

### 3.1.3 *Past, present and future temporarily true? The world is not a sum of things*

The present that we perceive cannot have the truth value true because we perceive the present and thereby assign such truth value by making the world an object of our thought. Naturally, we believe that the present is always true when it is present. All points in time, in the past and future are true in this view just when they are present. Our new view, namely that the present cannot exist because it grows from the past and brings about the future takes away the truth value from both present and future. Only through the lack of such truth can justify the division between past and future in the first place. If we argue that the past had a truth value, we must then ask ourselves how it could develop to the present at all. On the other hand, when we argue that future was true, we must then ask ourselves why we are still living in the present and why future is not the case yet. This does not mean that the present is temporarily false, but rather that the present does just not have a truth value according to the framework that thought gives us.

Claiming that thought is flawed will later lead to the conclusion of a negative regress, as such claim tries to assign the truth value "not true" to and with the truth definition of thought (this is the reason why this whole thesis is circular).

Yet, this will also indirectly show that our truth definition cannot capture the world not obeying that truth definition.

### 3.1.4 *Events and theories on them without truth value*

Both in everyday language and in science, it is very common to give truth values to propositions on event; we often claim it was true or false that something happened. Yet, we thereby don't know event from a single point of thought and the law of identity governing it, but only through at least two separate points of thought, as a change needs to have taken place to talk of an event. Therefore, a theory on events can only be a theory on non-identity, can therefore not reach agreement with an object that obeys the laws of thought, for which the whole theory will herself not obey the laws of thought and neither be true nor false.

This impossibility to assign truth values to events is deeply connected to the problem of causation - when we ask for the cause of something, we only give names to events, as the question only makes sense if we see the possibility of nonexistence through change that enables the existence in the first place - if we don't see something change, then it is independent of everything and does strictly speaking not belong to the world. Through the usage of events as an object of truth, we thereby use our truth definition to find the explanation of an event in other events and thus in other object of the form of thought, leading to logical determinism. We thereby mix the necessity of change with the logical need for an explanation. As it will be argued later, the first one is valid (true is the wrong word!), while the second one is simply an interpretation of change. When we change something, we are aware that it does not change without anything changing it, yet we interpret this in a logical way through our truth definition attached to states. When something changes, we believe that there must be something responsible for the change, as otherwise we are confronted with a contradiction. Instead of seeing the contradiction locally, we thereby expand it to make it a logical identity, use the law of identity for its infringement.

## 3.2 **Change of hierarchy: need for a description of the world through the denial of thought**

### 3.2.1 *First observation about the world: existence from change -no true observations possible*

The second part of this work begins with an observation that could not be more trivial, less unchallenged and more foundational. Every observation wants to observe how something is. Yet, the most foundational observation is the one that claims that the whole world is not. If we were only allowed to make one observation about the world, we would have to observe that she must enable our thinking and therefore that she has to change. A such an observation stated that the world was not according to our truth-definition, all other observations try to state what is are not in agreement with the object. The world contradicts



thought, for which one must make a theory of the world that transcends the law of thought clearly showing the inability of thought.

However, change is so obvious and pervasive for us that we are in danger of forgetting about it in our most foundational descriptions of the world, thereby implicitly creating a world that stands still. Such theories would then be based on the law of thought giving in to the demands of our mind instead of the demands of the world. Through the rejection of that demand, one changes nearly every question in physics as we implicitly many physical notions on the notion of non-contradiction based on the law of identity.

### 3.2.2 *Description of the world under the aspect of change: Both description and denial of any description*

A description of the world that is based on the simple observation of change representing a contradiction represent two things at the same time: Firstly, it is a description of the world from the negation of thought. On the other hand, it limits to the ability of thought to describe the word within that contradiction. It is therefore both a theory of the world and a theory of the inability of all theories on the world in thought. As one can thereby see, the problem of this most foundational description of the world takes away the basis for any description including herself, as she takes place within thought. A description of the world as a contradiction ends where all descriptions must begin and is therefore so foundational, that she is confronted with the breaking of our own means.

The second part of this work describes the world under the aspect she does not meet the definition of truth of thought. Such a description will not be a description we would expect, nor is a description that we can carry out: she cannot reach agreement with the world, as the world is an object that breaks the law of thought, which is exactly what she claims. Every description assigns properties to an object, but a description that tries to assign a lack of property to an object is impossible, as thought does not know negation. We will then make this inability object of the theory and claim that we cannot find agreement with the world with a negative theory that negates property since it breaks thought. This description will therefore try to overthrow the truth definition of thought with thought - she will thereby declare herself incompetent and at the same time try to reach an all-embracing theory through that. Yet, nothing can describe the world less than the statement that we cannot describe her with our thought. Through the self reference that is always present when we talk about our own truth definition, we will prevent us from breaking hierarchy, showing that we are caught in thought and inferior to the hierarchy of ourselves, infinitely certain and still strictly limited. We are subject to this limit of existence in thought - not matter whether thought mirrors the actual world, truth creates the world letting her become a truth according to the law of thought.

### 3.3 What is a world?

#### 3.3.1 *Incorrect definition of universe - indistinguishability of existence and event - both intrinsic and extrinsic properties*

Before I can begin to define a world that satisfies the law of thought in contrast to our world, a definition must be found for what actually makes a world, thereby also defining how worlds relate to each other. Yet, the confusion about the notion of existence is given to the notion of "world", as it is based on the notion of existence, which is both bound both bound to thought and its form as well as to change, breaking its form. This leads to a confusion in the definition of *universe*. You hear about multi-verses, omniverses, parallel worlds, simultaneity of all possible world - if you're lucky, even about the best of all possible worlds. All these concepts emerge from a careless handling of the notion of being and therefore produce dubious results. The word "universe" comes from *unus* and *versus*, meaning *in one*. That's exactly my definition of a world. If one now combines this definition with both our invalid truth definition in thought and the necessity of change, we obtain: the universe represents everything that obeys the law of thought and thereby changes us.

P1: The universe is everything that changes us.

*Right conclusion:*

C1: The universe is everything that exists for us.

P2: Something that exists for us must obey the law of thought due to the form of thought.

*False conclusion:*

C2: Everything which changes us must obey the law of thought.

C3: Everything that changes us and thus exists for us represents a totality of existing objects obeying the law of thought

With *totality of everything that exists* we mean that everything that changes us and which we can then hold for true in our thought in a point that obeys the law of thought. We cannot distinguish between the contradictory change that causes a world in thought and the actual world in our thought that obeys the law of thought. Therefore, we believe that everything that exists for us due to change is everything that exists at all obeying the law of our thought.

When physics refers to many worlds, it does then not mean independent things, but rather things that we can hold for part of the world since they have an effect on us one way or another. Physics thereby only makes our world bigger, but doesn't find everything that exists according to the law of thought (e.g. worlds outside of ours that exist and don't change us). As we often believe change and existence are not only compatible, but also bound to each other, we believe that everything that changes is everything that materially exists.

P1: The universe is everything that changes us.

*False Premise:*

P3: Everything that exists can change everything else that exists.  
 (as the world is everything that changes us and thereby indirectly everything else, and at the same time everything that obeys the law of our thought)

*False conclusion:*

C4: The changing world represents everything that exists materially.

### 3.3.2 *totality of things as a meaningless concept: worlds as non-referential and independent entities*

One can get rid of the view that our changing world represents the totality of everything that exists according to the law of thought in two ways:

1. If the world existed according to the law of thought, then she would not change. Something that does not exist can't represent a totality of what exists.
2. Imagine something existed in the middle of the world, but did not change. Would it then still belong to the world? As it would never change us, it would not change the world and how she develops. For our world, there is no difference between the case in which the thing existed and in which it didn't exist. To show the whole paradoxity of the claim that it belonged to the world, imagine the world was not there. In that case, the thing would just continue existing just like in the case were it was supposed to belong to the world. Therefore, as it could then belong to the world and not belong to the world, something that does not change does not belong to the world, for which the world cannot represent everything that exists.

The worlds relate to each other in a way in which we perceive that objects in the world do explicitly *don't* relate: a world can be or not be while all the other worlds remain the same. Whether and how a world is, has no influence on how any of the other worlds is. The existence of a world does therefore not have any importance for anything outside of herself. The question where those worlds lie is meaningless, as it establishes a connection to our world which is not given.

### 3.3.3 *World as a change space - single entity that changes*

We got rid of the first foundation of existence in thought and took the second foundation, namely change, as the precondition for existence. To make our definition of "world" more precise, let us look at the following premises:

P1: The world represents one entity rather than many (inner barrier)

P2: The world is independent of all other worlds (outer barrier)

For P1, imagine that the world consisted of more than one entity, then those entities would form worlds on their own and would not be dependent of anything but themselves according to the law of identity. For P2, imagine she was

dependent of another world, then if those other worlds didn't exist they would also evoke the nonexistence of the world and thereby belong to the world. As one can see, the outer and inner barrier of the world represent sides of the same medal - if we reject one of them, then we must reject both of them. If, on the other hand, we accept one of them, then we must accept that the world is a single entity without parts that is herself not part of anything else.

If we now add another premise:

P3: The world changes.

then we can derive the following conclusion:

C1: The world is a single entity that changes.

C2: If something in the world remained the same, then the whole world would stand still and vice versa.

C3: If something in the world changes, then the whole world must change and vice versa.

and sub-cases of C2 and C3:

C4: If the world does not change, then I cannot change. If I don't change, then the world must stay the same.

C5: If I change, then the world must change. If the world changes, then I must change.

and

C6: If something changes, then I must change.

C7: If I don't change, then nothing can change me.

This view has weird consequences for both personal responsibility and freedom, which will be outlined later. What we create is a single entity that changes. One might also call this a change space that is by definition limited to itself. Change can thereby only come from the change space itself. Furthermore, the change of the change space is also limited to the change space.

This change space seems to claim some sort of principle of causation: If something in the world changes, then I change and if I don't change, nothing can change. Is this equal to the claim that nothing happens without a cause? Yes and no. If one sees the claim of causality as a necessity of sufficient reason for change in change itself (which we cannot understand but with states as causes), then such causality is fulfilled within the change space of the world. Yet, as we are bound to thought, we must see the causes as temporal truths that are undermining a change space by a lack of change within the form of thought.

### 3.4 The logical world: $A = A$ Universe

To show how clearly our world breaks the law of thought, I will now construct a world that obeys her. Imagine a world was always in agreement with herself. Such a world is called an  $A = A$  universe. The  $A=A$  Universe is a world in the form of a thought. That seems abstract, but it is incredibly simple: the  $A =$

A is the form the world must always have for us, since we need to think her to claim she existed.

#### 3.4.1 *Set of all sets with only one object*

What kind of entity would a world obeying the law of thought represent? Would she have parts? Could she be part of a more comprehensive system and herself be part? Consider the following claims:

The  $A=A$  universe is part of another entity. It conditions and explains the necessity of something else.

Another entity is part of the  $A = A$  Universe. It is conditioned and explained by something else.

Imagine it would be part of another entity, then the other entity would be dependent on it. This would leave the possibility open that the entity didn't exist, which would contradict the law of identity. Furthermore, if the  $A=A$  Universe conditioned and explained something else then itself, then such entity would already be contained within the  $A=A$  Universe.

On the other hand, imagine the  $A=A$  Universe having parts, then they would also leave the possibility of non-existence of the  $A=A$  Universe open, which contradicts the law of identity. If the world would not be sufficient reason for herself, she would thereby break the law of thought as she needed explanation of herself outside of herself. If there were distinct parts of the  $A=A$  universe that existed, those parts would obey the law of thought on their own and thereby form  $A=A$  universes themselves.

An  $A = A$  Universe is a world in the form of a thought. Yet, thoughts have distinct properties that can be interpreted as sets of objects. Why can an  $A=A$  universe then not just have parts like every thought? A thought is only valid and unnegatable within a point of thought. The properties and objects of a thought are thereby not separable from each other in a point of thought. One can therefore only interpret a thought as a set of objects after having thought him. In fact, in a point of thought a thought can be seen as a set with only one object, namely himself. Surely, it then represents everything that exist in that point of thought, but there is not consciousness of that within the point.

When we think a thought and later try to write down a proposition as a representation of that thought we write: *I had a thought that represented everything that existed at that point. It contained itself.* Yet, when we try to create a thought with exactly that content we try to make it an object of another thought, thus claiming that is equal to itself within itself: *This thought has an object that claims that the whole thought is true.* Therefore, when we try to claim that a thought we had was a set of all sets we cannot make this an object of a thought, since it would think about itself. Therefore, claiming a set of all sets is unthinkable, having a thought that is a set of all sets is not. Having a thought that claims that it contains itself is not breakable, thinking a proposition that claims that is not. In case of an  $A=A$  universe this makes sense insofar, as it cannot

claim that it only contains itself exactly because it contains only itself. This also shows that the term "set of all sets" is a meaningless term: if something really represents a set of all sets or everything that exists, then there is no consciousness of such existence, nobody that could related it to anything but itself. If we mix the view that a thought is a set of all sets and the view that the content of that thought represents matter that changes, we gain the view that the world represents a set of all sets although there is consciousness of such and therefore a breaking of the law of identity, enabling formal existence giving rise to the notion "set of all sets" in the first place.

#### 3.4.2 *Fulfillment of law without use - truth through lack of observation - certain information without mental certainty*

As you can see at first glance, an  $A = A$  universe is fundamentally different from our world. In an  $A = A$  universe, the law of thought is fulfilled, but there is no use of this law as thinking is bound to change. The weak law of sufficient reason applies as an equivalent of the law of thought, but there is no change that would enable us to ask for a sufficient reason for something. The question *why* it exists is thereby already answered without ever being posed. Yet, because it finds *a why* in itself, one can never think *a how* that would enable us to ask for a why in the first place. One can therefore interpret an  $A = A$  universe as the content of thought without the thought ever being made, as a content of true informative proposition nobody can make. It is ungetable and still contains information exactly because nobody can try negating it in the inside. It is thereby certain information without mental certainty. It is existing according to our definition of existence, but it would never exist in our thought. It does not influence anything outside of it, for which we would with every right claim it never existed. It is not although nobody thinks it exists - it is because nobody thinks it exists, exactly because there is no consciousness about its existence. It contains information, but never informs anybody. It doesn't create an image of itself and has no meaning for anything outside of itself. One can see it as a thought that is never made.

#### 3.4.3 *Completeness -& Impossibilityrelations*

Our notion of existence in thought ultimately leads to a world that makes the perception of existence impossible. The notion of existence deriving from the form of thought is so foundational, that many other notions depend on it. If they are fulfilled, then one can not think the world fulfills them, although they are in fact fulfilled. They cannot be both fulfilled and used. Since the notion of existence cannot be established in an  $A = A$  universe, all other notions that depend on it are thus also fulfilled, but cannot be established. The notions are fulfilled because nobody can use them and only receive completeness due to the lack of the possibility of fulfilling them. One can thus form the following pairs of notions which exclude their use due to their fulfillment. One can therefore talk of Completeness- as well as Impossibilityrelations:

## 3.4.3.1 Material truth without perception

3.4.3.1.1 Truth without clarity: *Truth and its perception are contradictory*

If there is truth in the form of thought, then there is no change.

If there is no change, then there is no perception of truth.

---

If there is truth in the form of thought, then there is no truth in thought.

3.4.3.1.2 Information without meaning: *Information storage and processing are contradictory*

If there is information in the form of thought, then there is no change.

To process information, one needs change.

---

If there is information in the form of thought, then there is no processing of information.

3.4.3.1.3 Identity without self: *Existence and consciousness are contradictory*

If one has identity, then one agrees with oneself.

If one agrees with himself, then one obeys the law of thought.

If something obeys the law of thought, then it does not change

One cannot be conscious of ones existence without change

---

If the present had the truth value true, then we would not perceive it, would never have consciousness of our identity.

3.4.3.1.4 Order without disorder - *The existence of order and the emergence of order are contradictory*

Something can only have order if it exists.

Something exists if and only if it coincides with itself.

One can only create something if and only if the world is not an  $A=A$  universe.

The world does not coincide with herself.

---

One can only create order if and only if there is no order.

3.4.3.1.5 Logic without thought: *The use of logic and its validity are contradictory*

Logic is valid within the world if and only if the form that logic implicitly gives all objects is equivalent to the form of the world.

(If the objects of logic are break the law of identity, none can find thinkable objects that agree with them

If a world were logical, then it would not change.

The world does change.

---

If the world was logical, then we could not think.

Logic is not valid.

3.4.3.1.6 Law without behavior: *The fulfillment of a law and its formulation are contradictory*

A law assigns information to an object. It has the form If object, then theory on object.

A law is only universally true if it is universally true theory on an object.

For a theory to be universally true, its object must contain the information of the theory

The only universally true law has the form  $A \rightarrow A$ .

A law is true within a world if and only if she coincides with herself.

The world changes

---

A world in which a law applies does not allow its formulation.

3.4.3.1.7 Potential without change - security without possibility: *security and the ability to secure are contradictory*

Something is entirely secure if and only if it can't change.

One must change to stop a thing from changing.

---

If there a thing is entirely secure, then we could neither secure it nor use it for change.

If something were entirely secure in the world, then it would never exist in thought.

If something were entirely secure, every outcome except for himself would be impossible.

3.4.3.1.8 Energy without matter: *matter and its transformation are contradictory*

If there is no change, then there is no energy.

Something can be matter if and only if it obeys the law of thought.

In an  $A=A$  universe, there is no change.

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If there is matter, then it cannot be transformed/then there is no energy.



3.4.3.1.9 Life without death - Death through eternity: *eternity and time are contradictory*

Something is eternal if and only if it exists forever.

An  $A=A$  universe cannot change and therefore exists for ever.

If there is no change, then there is no time.

If there is no time, then one cannot live.

---

If something is eternal, then there is no time.

If someone is eternal, then this someone cannot live.

3.4.3.1.10 Simultaneity without event: *events and their simultaneous are contradictory*

Two events are simultaneous if and only if they are a property of the same point in time.

If something has a property, then it must obey the law of thought.

If something obeys the law of thought, then there is only one point in time.

---

Two events are only simultaneous if and only if there is only one point in time and if and only if there are no events.

3.4.3.1.11 Present without moment: *the truth of the presence and its perception are contradictory*

If the present had the truth value true, then it would obey the law of thought.

If something obeys the law of thought, then it does not change.

One cannot perceive the present without change.

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If the present had the truth value true, then we would not perceive it.

3.4.3.1.12 Necessity without consequence: *sufficient reason and events are contradictory*

A state is necessarily if it is entirely explained by a foregoing state.

For something to be necessary for something else it must include it.

---

If we live in a world in which a state is explained by another state, then it is explained by itself and there is no change that would enable us to question *why* something is.

### 3.4.3.1.13 Determinacy without events: *Change and the determinism are contradictory*

A world is determined if and only if the future is explained by the present

---

If the world was determined, then both past and future would be true at the same time building a single present.

### 3.4.3.2 Causal vs. logical responsibility and freedom

#### 3.4.3.2.1 Ruler without subjects - responsibility without accountability: *Ruling and changing are contradictory*

We have don't have a clear notion of responsibility. The term can thereby either be defined as:

- i One is responsible for a result if and only if one is a sufficient reason for it (if one determines it).
- ii One is responsible for a certain course of action if the course of action would have been different if one acted differently.
- iii One is responsible for something if one could not have done otherwise.

The two definitions (i) and (ii) are thereby often falsely held equivalent, as we cannot distinguish between events and states. Furthermore, there is something annoyingly vague, but valid about (iii): when exactly can one do otherwise? I can do otherwise, if for every change that I evoke I can decide whether I evoke that change or not on my own. I can only decide on my own if I am thereby not dependent on the world. Trough the indistinguishability of change and existence we therefore arrive at two definitions for (iii):

- iv One could not have done otherwise if and only if there is only on possible course of actions within and of the world. One could have done otherwise if from the course of actions that led to my decision two different future course of actions can follow. (lack of negative change-determinism)
- v One could not done otherwise if and only if the states in my mind and therefore the result of my action are determined. One could have done otherwise if from one state two different states could follow (lack of negative state-determinism).

The reason why (iii) is so vague is that it is based on a notion that cannot be captured by though - the notion of responsibility on the ability to do otherwise is equal to the notion based on change-determinism. Yet, the logical way in which thought handles this determinism leads to a contradiction to change-determinism - if the world were state-determined, there would not be change-responsibility that could be misinterpreted.

One is responsible for a result if and only if one was a sufficient reason for (if one determines it).

One is only sufficient reason for something if and only one explains it logically.

---

If one is responsible for a result, then this something is already part of the responsible one, for he is then only responsible for himself.

If one is responsible for result, then one does not change.

Thought interprets responsibility logically, implicitly claiming one single state. Yet, as it is confronted with multiple states it has to use its definition of determinism both for the point when we act regarding the past and the result of the present regarding the future. It therefore created two different definitions of responsibility, one leading to a negatively determined and one to a positively determined universe. Through the indistinguishability of existence and event, we therefore gain four definitions. Two of them are only fulfilled in a one-state universe, while the other two are only fulfilled in a change-determined universe.

#### 3.4.3.2.2 Freedom without choice - *freedom and the opportunity to chose are contradictory*

Somebody can only be free in his action if only if he is not forced to act by the world, if the world is not responsible for him and if he is on the on the other hand responsible for the change he causes. To be free, it is therefore not enough just to be independent of the world, one must additionally make the world world dependent, since otherwise our freedom would not have any impact. Yet, one can only interpret irresponsibility of the world in a nonlogical way, for which the freedom of an agent makes him an  $A=A$  himself, which contradicts the change needed to be free in the first place:

Somebody is free in his action if and only if he is not logically explained by anything besides him.

If something is only explained by itself, then it obeys the law of thought.

A world that obeys the law of thought is an  $A=A$  universe.

---

Somebody is only free according to the above definition if he does not take decisions.

#### 3.4.3.3 Certainty without thought

##### 3.4.3.3.1 Prediction without future - *prediction of the future and her emergence are contradictory*

A prediction tries to contain the future.

A prediction is true if and only if she is a universally true theory on the future.

---

If one had a universally true theory on the future, then the future would be contained in the present.

---

If there was a true prediction of the future, then the world would not change and not allow any prediction.

3.4.3.3.2 Answer without question - How without why: *The emergence of questions and the finding of answers are contradictory*

If information exists, then it does not need an explanation, as its existence is a sufficient reason for itself according to the law of identity.

If something exists, then it does not change.

---

If there was an answer to the question why the world existed, then we could not think such answer.

3.4.3.3.3 Proof without thought: *provability and provenness are contradictory*

Something is proven if and only if it cannot be false.

Only something that coincides with itself cannot be false. An  $A = A$  universe is the only world that fulfills that requirement.

---

If something is proven, then it cannot be proven by thought.

3.4.3.3.4 Target without quest-

the occurrence of thought and the absence of doubt are contradictory

If information is certain, then it cannot be negated in thought

If information cannot be false, then it there is only one thought.

---

If there is only one thought, then we don't change, but we can't think because of a lack of change.

### 3.5 Invalid physics - possible physics

#### 3.5.1 *Constructed physics*

In the theory of thought it was argued that theories can only be universally true if they are equivalent to an object with which they claim agreement. It was thereby argued that explanations of states are universally true theories on themselves, as the combination of natural law and present is equivalent to the future that one tries to explain. Yet, it was also argued that the natural laws one uses to form explanations begging the question are interpretations of a sequence of points of thought and therefore strictly speaking not part of physics, since physics tries to reach agreement with the world and not with interpretations of a sequence of points of thought.

However, the only thing we ever know about change is a change of information in two different points of thought both representing states. We know how the world looks after change, we also know the world before change, but we never

know what's in-between. (and if we thin we do we always believe it *is*). We only know change in the form of many states. Therefore, every explanation we have is nothing more then the observation that a certain present always leads to a certain future. Explanations get complex when it comes to explaining something as abstract as the behavior of an electron, but deep inside, the scheme is the same. The only we can base our physics on is on observation that always has the form of thought and thereby contains information. Surely, when we see different states we believe this change is based on the change of other states, but this still only leaves states (although with new information) as the explanation for new states. We just don't know why the world changes.

Thought is the only object in which truth lies for us.

We can only perceive the world in the form of thought.

We can only search the explanation for the result of change in states.

Furthermore, as the world does not have the truth-form of thought, no activity we call physics can be successful physics according to a definition of physics as the search for truth in the world (whether it is true natural laws or true information). Yet, this also explains why both explanatory and descriptive physics are seen as physics in our daily lives: neither of them is a universally true theory on the world as the world does not contain information in the form of thought.

### 3.5.2 *Invalid physics - possible physics*

Physics in the world is thereby not possible *although* our truth definition does not fit the world, but rather *because* she does not fit the world, for which we experience change and conduct physics. Physics is only possible due to the surprise of change and our ability to change the world. On the one hand, one wants to know how the world is, and on the other hand we, can only want to know how she is because she changes. If we could find the truth of the world, then we could not find it. The world is thereby only a word because she enables cognition in thought but rules out cognition in the form of thought due to its possibility. Thought can therefore not infer the real structure of the world, because there is no such structure in the form of thought. One must recognise this contradiction if one wants to be a physicist. Only if one sees the purpose of physics in changing the world can one use our methods of science. If one only uses them to find answers in the form of thought mirroring the world one will fail.

## 3.6 Antiphysics

This thesis could be finished here. I have argued that the world does not exist and that our thought cannot understand that as it is limited to the impossibility of non-existence in thought. This would then just lead to a negative regress, firstly due to the impossibility to think contradictions and secondly due to the impossibility to avoid the incapability without being subject of her. Yet, I will

argue that we can still attempt to continue the breaking of thought in our language to explore the world a bit more then we can strictly within our limits. Every theory wants to state what is true, how the world is, how she behaves and which laws are true within her. What if we just abolish her existence, don't ask how she is but rather how it is possible that she is not?

### 3.6.1 *Non-physical description - arrow of time, entropy and uncertainty as antiphysical phenomenons*

A description that tries to contain the factual, true properties of the world remains where antiphysics begins: a normal description assumes a *how* where antiphysics tries to overcome the form of our thought building a world that breaks the law of thought. Antiphysics thereby tries to construct a world that changes. She does not describe what we perceive but rather that we can perceive and thereby which structure (or rather lack of structure) allows that. A successful theory about the world doesn't try to explain specific change or perceptions. It doesn't try to find the structure of the world since it knows that such a theory can only be built because the world is not a representing information with truth value. It rather tries to explain why there can be change at all leaving the truth definition of thought. Such a theory is called Antiphysics. All general statements about the world can be made through such a theory of change. Such statements, however, don't include what can be perceived. Statements that include what can be seen, felt and used for the prediction of such are of physical and not antiphysical nature. On the other hand, general statements can never be made through physics, and if seems they can, they are only based on the truth definition of physics that holds the world for true.

What are those antiphysical phenomenons? The only such phenomenon is change itself. Yet, we cannot understand change with the truth definition of thought. Change allows all physical descriptions, but its not a property of the objects of such descriptions. It cannot be object of our descriptions but enable all such objects in our thought. One can therefore see the phenomenon of time equivalent to the phenomenon of change. Another part of change is the missing truth value and the uncertainty of the information in the world which allows all information in thought.

Physics describes the phenomenon of time, but doesn't explain it. The irreversibility of time is always assumed, but does not generally follow from physics. Thermodynamics hovers above physics without making specific statements about the world and also contains the aspect of decay. It can, however, not be concluded for all systems. Everybody knows that entropy grows and that time has a direction, but nobody knows why and why this could not be entirely different. By seeing those phenomenons as non-physical phenomenons antiphysics tries to give a more sophisticated answer to those problems based on the abolishment of the truth definition imposed to us by thought.

### 3.7 A $\neq$ A Universe

So far, the following argument was put forth to show that the world is not an A = A universe:

Thought is the carrier of truth and existence. The definition of existence is therefore derived from the form of thought.

Proof: impossibility of questioning the truth definition of thought with thought on exactly that definition.

The law of thought states that a thought cannot simultaneously be affirmed and denied.

Proof: inability to transgress the law.

---

A world exists if and only if she satisfies the law of thought, if she thus obeys the law  $\neg(A \ \& \ \neg A)$  having the form A=A.

Our world is changing.

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The world does not satisfy the law of thought.

---

The world does not exist according to the above definition. She represents the negation of the law  $\neg(A \ \& \ \neg A)$  and therefore a simple contradiction.

#### 3.7.1 *World loses herself - law of sufficient reason for change in an independent world*

Yet, the world still seems to enable stability. How can she be a simple contradiction and enable life in her, with human beings that refer back to themselves as existing, being able to write theses? Furthermore, how can beings stay alive with thoughts based on a law that is not valid in the world? She seems to guarantee a lot of success in changing the world nearly deterministically with natural laws that can't exist in a changing world according to our own definition, but still work out scarily well. If the world just consisted of a number of random states without connection, we could never even consider ourselves as existing. How could we create the future if she was not open to our intentions, to our actions and to our change? Claiming a contradiction seems unavoidable. It's just the way one can make this fit our world that seems dubious.

Therefore, we have to find a way to combine two views:

1. the world breaks the law of thought and thus represents a contradiction
2. the world allows us to perceive states that are similar; new perceived states seem to follow prior change

Hence, we must find a way to combine a contradiction and the law of sufficient reason for change.

1. A &  $\neg A$

2. Every change in the world is only a result of prior change. Without prior change something in the world does not change. The result of change thereby not to be confused with a state result.

The world is independent of all other worlds, so her change can only come from herself. The change takes place in a change space that does not relate to anything but itself. Change must then be the process in which the single entity of the world moves away from herself losing her truth value. This does not mean that she changes her truth value to false, but rather to non-existent (which can not be given a truth value).

**Argument:**

The world is independent of all other worlds

Change must come from the world itself.

**Argument:**

If the change in the world is complete, then the world is unequal to herself, since otherwise no change would have taken place.

If an object is unequal to itself, then it is contradictory to itself.

If the change in the world is not yet completed, then the world is not yet contradictory to herself.

The world still changes.

The event of change represents an incomplete event in which the world loses her truth value.

### 3.7.2 *World as an incomplete contradiction*

It was already argued that we cannot understand an event except for noting the difference and inequality of past and a present. Yet, we never experience complete events as that would mean that they have resulted in an actual state for which the change would then be complete and we could therefore never perceive its result, for which we could never claim a change had taken place. If we assume the change in the world can be viewed as an event, then such event would have to have a final state. If we define an event as

$$I \rightarrow \neg I$$

$$I$$

---


$$I \ \& \ \neg I$$

where the future state is defined as the negation of the initial state. Yet, this seems to imply that the two states are incompatible. Why can't we just see the result of the event as an information that is just different to  $I$ ? We see the



final state as incompatible with the initial state as he must be different to I and thereby be explicitly excluded from it.

Therefore, we must see an event as a pure contradiction. Yet, what does that have to do with the world? We see the world as an event, for which we must also see her as a contradiction. But if she represents an event, then the event is not complete. If one sees her as a contradiction following from the event, then the contradiction is not yet complete.

If one now assumes that we are in a world that represents an incomplete event one can with every right claim that we are part of an information that is moving towards its negation:

$$Ia \rightarrow \neg Ia$$

where  $\neg I$  is not an information but rather the rejection of any existence:

$$a = I \rightarrow a = \{\}$$

### 3.7.3 *Destruction of something old - no single events or objects*

We have hereby created a world that represents the execution of an event, representing a contradiction. Yet, the change in the world is not complete, because she changes constantly and never stands still, for which her existence can be perceived in the first place. The phenomenon of time can therefore be regarded as the unfinished destruction of something old, rather than the construction of something new. All events that we perceive belong to this single event and our perception of the world and her changes just represents a continuation of that transformation. Furthermore, the independent things in the world belong to the same decaying entity, whose decay allows us to see them as independent parts in the first place. If there were single objects they could not change each other and if there were single events we could not believe they had taken place.

### 3.7.4 *Conservation of change as conservation of energy*

Change cannot be destroyed or stopped as long as the world is still observable. Every change that we see is conserved in the world until she is entirely decayed. This is only another aspect of the law of sufficient reason for change. She needs the continuation of change for her own decay:

The event of change represents an incomplete event in which the world loses her truth value.

Change / inequality in the world must come from the world itself.

---

No change comes not from the change in the world.

No change in the world is ever lost until she is not entirely decayed.

**Conservation of change:** Every change in the world arises from the change itself and remains conserved in the world until her decay is complete.

The conservation of change can be seen in close connection to the notion of energy. Energy can be seen as the potential for change. If there is no energy, then there is only matter but no transformation and perception of matter. Similarly, if there is no change, then there is only existence in the form of thought, as change is defined exactly as the negation of the law of identity. If there is change, then we can transform matter, without matter actually having a truth value. Inside the world no perceived state has a sufficient reason, but those perceived states arise through conservation of change and energy. This interpretation explains why we don't really know anything about energy itself - rather it is just an interpretation of change. Both energy and change have no place in the truth definition of thought and must therefore be understood through the sequence of states in thought.

If there is no change, then there is no energy.

If there is no energy, then there is no change.

---

There can only be energy if and only if there is change

No change in the world is ever lost until she is not entirely decayed.

---

No energy in the world is ever lost until she is not entirely decayed.

### 3.7.5 *Thermodynamic laws in the change-space*

One can therefore formulate the following laws that are born through the infringement of every law in the form of thought and which are derived from the conservation of change within an independent change space:

- i The energy in an independent, decaying change-space grows, driving the further decay, being a result of the decay of material existence.
- ii The decay is irreversible. Circularity is impossible for the whole change space, for the change can only come from the change space itself
- iii If the world changes, then no part of the change space will ever obey the law of identity, representing matter without energy.

### 3.7.6 *Conservation of the past through conservation of change*

The past that we give a truth value in our thought does not have such truth value since it changes and thereby creates the perception of the present that leads to the future. As the present is not explaining the future logically, but rather through change that lead to further decay it is bound to an event. Yet, as change as the carrier of existence is never lost the past is conserved in the world as long as she is still changing. The future thereby needs the past and still dissolves out of her in the process of decay that does not know states. Its a transition in which there is neither past nor future, which also explains the connection between the two. As the present is just what we perceive through the change in a point of time and no entity that obeys the law of thought (no thinkable entity), the change that evoked the thought is never lost in the world.

If the past represented a point that obeyed the law of thought it would not create the perception of the present.

We perceive the present.

---

The past is bound to change.

No change in the world is ever lost until she is entirely decayed.

---

The past is not lost until the world is entirely decayed.

### 3.7.7 *Decay as loss of information - conservation of information through conservation of change*

Information is bound to thought for which we see it as a property of matter and at the same instant bound to an event. Yet, the world does not have a truth value and therefore not have information but rather loses it in the process of decay. The thought of the world with information is only possible since the world does not possess such information. The carrier of all information that we know is change, which is not lost in a change space until the change space does not be observed anymore within. When we see, for example a sheet of paper on which we wrote a series of numbers with a pencil we believe the numbers were a property of the sheet. Yet, the actual information is the light that causes the thought of the sheet. We think that we can just destroy information by erasing the writing from the sheet. In fact, we thereby destroy information by being part of decay but create new information bound to change. For sure, the writing on the sheet is not accessible anymore when we look at the sheet as new information reaches us in the form of change when we observe it. Yet, the actual information bound to change that actually evoked the thought with the numbers has resulted in more change, eg. the light has also changed the wall and one could have recorded that change with a camera. Even that we observe and remember the numbers is a conservation of information bound to change.

However, that does not mean that the information stays accessible for every observer. If we had not looked at the paper, we would not know the number that could have been perceived. Yet, if we had the natural laws that explained the change that took place we could understand the cause of certain specific information reaching us. This is invalid as the world does not contain existing natural laws, but it is nothing else then when we have a thought of a paper and believe in the natural law that, if we perceive a paper, then the cause must be an actual paper, just that we need to connect multiple points of thought to come up with explanatory laws.

### 3.7.8 *Change conservation in the world and natural laws in thought combined: digital communication*

If we interpreted information strictly bound to a point of thought, then it would be gone in every other moment then its point of thought. Yet, we connect information through natural laws: when we experience the end of a sequence,

we connect it with the first point of the sequence natural laws tell us. Therefore, through natural laws we connect present information with past information. Yet, present information is always based on an event and therefore never dies, as there is never information in itself existing in a point of thought in the world. To understand conservation of information, we thus need to combine two views: Firstly, information is based on an event. The same information in the world can be perceived infinitely. Furthermore, information is connected in thought to other information through laws of experience. If we combine both views, then we can even let the same information stay alive. We let the event take place and move the change through cables. And we can then transform the change to the same information, the same point of thought as at a different point in time.

### 3.7.9 *Events at a point in time as a construct*

We see the world as a collection of things that belong to a specific point in time. To construct this point, however, we must perceive it.

To avoid claiming that there is such a point in time with a collection of things with certain information and the value true we just include the change in a point in time that leads to the next one: we believe a point in time represents all events in a certain point in time. This is an invalid way of avoiding the paradox of change. Instead of a sum of things and events in a point in time, the world represents a single entity that loses her truth value in a single event creating the perception of time.

### 3.7.10 *Sequence of events constructed - undecidability by perceptibility*

We naturally believe that individual events have a certain chronological order. Often, we even associate this with the law of sufficient reason for change itself. Surely, change has to take place before a certain other change takes place. Yet, we only know change through states, for which we believe there were single events. The question which perceived event happened before is therefore only answerable by an observer who can only decide the chronological order through the chronology of thoughts he has. Yet, there is no actual chronology of events, as events undermine the agreement with itself that this would demand. Every change that we perceive stays in the world forever just like all other perceived events, for which a objective chronological classical classification is impossible. Yet, there is a chronology of change according to the law of sufficient reason for change, which is, however, not accessible with the truth definition of thought.

### 3.7.11 *Decaying house of cards - philosophical entropy*

The decline of the world and the process of change can thereby be visualised by a huge cardhouse, that after the removal of a single card is on its secure way of falling down. What holds the world together in its inmost folds are not microscopic structures but two antagonists, namely being and not being. An observable present is only possible because no one has yet won. We are thereby

part of the death of the world. We can't stop it, everything we do ultimately leads to her decay.

### 3.7.12 *Impossibility of time travel*

The process of decay is irreversible. Everything we do against him is made possible only by the decay itself. If one wants to travel in time one wants to destroy the phenomenon that enables us the attempt of destroying it. It does thereby not matter whether one tries to let matter or information travel through time as matter is only changing the course of the world through an event, where information represents exactly such an event.

### 3.7.13 *Material uncertainty*

Just like all other other anti-physical phenomena, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does how things are, but that they are not, overcoming the truth definition of thought. She tells us that matter does not represent certain information *because* we can perceive such information. Since the world is uncertain, the same must naturally apply to all of her perceivable parts. The uncertainty of perceivable objects it therefore not only a simple problem of measurement, but shows us that the objects themselves lack truth value in any point. If one believes that all objects in the world are quantum mechanical in nature one must also transcribe the breaking of our truth definition to the whole world. If an object of the world would not be uncertain it would just stand still, not change and never be perceived.

The world does not have a truth value.

Lack of truth value can be interpreted as uncertainty.

The perceivable objects in the world belong are just constructed.

The world is a single entity.

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If the world is uncertain, then all of her perceived objects are uncertain.

---

Single objects are uncertain.

## 3.8 Incompleteness-/Possibilityrelations

### 3.8.1 *Decay of completeness - possibility of pursuit*

In the first part it was shown that there are notions that depend directly on the notion of existence and are thus only fulfilled in an A=A universe. Their fulfillment thereby depends directly on the truth value of the world. As the world loses her truth value the fulfillment of the notions is therefore lost as well. Thereby, we gain the possibility to pursuit their fulfillment. This possibility is directly bound to the incompleteness of the fulfillment of the notions. This does not mean that the notions are false, since this would imply that there is still a world that is true, just lacking the fulfillment of the notion (e.g. when we say determinism is

false we still believe that the world has a truth value in every point). One can hence built the following Incompleteness- resp. Possibilityrelations:

### 3.8.2 *Perception without material truth*

#### 3.8.2.1 Knowledge without truth - collapse through observation - sharpening without sharpness

If and only if there is truth in the form of thought, then there is no change.

If and only if there is no change, then there is no perception of truth.

There is change.

---

There is no truth in the form of thought.

There is the perception of truth.

The accordance of statements with the world is only possible if no statements can be made. Only because the world does not have truth value can we assign truth value to it. The possibility of establishing the notion is inseparably bound to the lack of truth. We create the world by observing her and she creates us by observing us. We can only imagine the world due to her unsharpness, for which we can sharpen our imagination to change the world and thereby make her unsharp ourselves. The unsharpness of the world and the possibility of sharpening the imagination belong together and forbid the complete sharpness of our imagination.

#### 3.8.2.2 Behaviour without law- future through prediction

A law assigns information to an object. It has the form If object, then theory on object.

A law is only universally true if it is universally true theory on an object.

For a theory to be universally true its object contains the information of the theory

---

The only universally true law has the form  $A \rightarrow A$ .

A law is true within a world if and only if it coincides with itself.

The world does not coincide with herself.

---

There is no true law within our world.

Only because she does neither represent nor posses any laws does she allow us to construct them. Every law is nothing more than an everyday bet and nothing less than an incredibly successful game.

### 3.8.2.3 Time/ Moment without present

We know three notions when we talk about time: the past, the present and the future. The only notion that always truly exists for us is the moment. It is exactly that moment that cannot have truth value if the other two notions can be used.

If the present had the truth value true, then it would obey the law of thought.

If something obeys the law of thought, then it does not change.

The world changes.

---

The present does not have the truth value true.

### 3.8.2.4 Possibility without security - Life through death

Something is entirely secure if and only if it can't change.

One can only secure if one changes.

The world changes.

---

Nothing in the world is secure *because* we can secure it.

Something is eternal if and only if it exists for ever.

Something exists forever if and only if it does not change.

The world changes.

---

The world does not exist forever.

Every physicist wants security. Instead of being subject to change we want to rule over it. We want to be independent of everything and make everything dependent of us, so that it can change us for our benefit. We want to have infinite importance and at the same time not assign any importance to everything besides us. The quest for security is the search for identity. Its means is the mind. Its result abolishes the mind. It abolishes insecurity and thinking. It creates a human that is made out of stone and that cannot be cut down by any question. Such a human being stands at attention because all questions are death. For him there is no insecurity, for him there is only himself.

### 3.8.2.5 Meaning without information - Communication through decay

Information can only exist if it obeys the law of thought.

Something that obeys the law of thought does not change.

If and only if there is no change there can be no thoughts in the form of information.

The world changes.

---

The world does not contain information but we are able to have informative thoughts.

When does something in the world have meaning? A person can be meaningful to us. Our parents often mean more to us than strangers. Meaning, in that case is the importance and the influence on the life of a human. Meaning thus never lies in existence but in change. We often believe everything in the world has meaning because it is. The whole world, however, does only have meaning because it changes and decays. It loses its information and gains meaning. We can only tell about the properties of the world because it loses her properties. The perception of information and its existence exclude each other.

### 3.8.2.6 Loss of determination leads to change determination

A world is logically determined if and only if the future is explained by the present

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If the world was logically determined, then both past and future would be true at the same time building a single present.<sup>i</sup>

If the world is logically determined then she does not change

The world changes

---

The world is not logically determined.

A world is change determined if all perceived states are part of an unfinished event where no change occurs without other change leading to it.

The event of change represents an incomplete event in which the world loses her truth value.

---

The world is change determined.

This also explains why we often both believe that our world is determined and not determined: we understand that all our actions are only possible due to the change in the world that force us to act like we do, yet we also understand that the logical notion of the present explaining the would take away the change that we need to cause first before it could come to the perception of the future. We are determined, but not in the logical notion of our thought.

### 3.8.3 *Change dependence - logical independence*

#### 3.8.3.1 Change accountability without logical responsibility

The distinction that was made between logical and change determination also has consequences for the notions of responsibility:

One is responsible for a result if and only if one was a sufficient reason for (if one determines it logically).

One is responsible for change if one determines the course of action where all future states are part of a single event.



If something has a sufficient reason, then it obeys the law of thought.

The world does not obey the law of thought.

The event of change represents an incomplete event in which the world loses her truth value.

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We are responsible for every change in the world but still not logically responsible for a state.

The entire control of the world is impossible because we can change the world at all. A complete control would imply the equality of

subject and world and take away the possibility to change. Therefore, we are not logically responsible for any state as there are no states but responsible as part of the change that represents the decay of the world.

### 3.8.3.2 Choosing without freedom

We are not unfree in a logical sense, as we are not entirely dependent and explained logically. One needs change to be able to claim that one chose unfreely. As the world is change determined we cannot do otherwise, but are not unfree in a logical way. This leaves us the impression that we chose freely as we are part of the process of decay determining the future that needs our decision to lose her determination

### 3.8.3.3 Causing in randomness

We define randomness as the lack of a cause for a certain event or state (which is the same, as we only know change through states). If we demand a logical cause explaining a state, then the world is random. However, only because there is no sufficient reason and because there is thus change can we "cause" perceived states through change and interpret this logically.

## 3.8.4 *Uncertainty through thought*

### 3.8.4.1 Thinking without logic

Logic is valid If and only if the form that logic gives all objects is equivalent to the form of the world.

If a world is logical, then it does not change.

The world does change.

We can only think if and only if the world changes.

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Logic is not valid but we can think obeying the laws of logic

Our deepest definition of truth and existence is without change However, the world we search truth in does not represent such an unchanging world. We cannot make true statements about the world in the world because the world is a contradiction to logic enabling us to think in the first place.

### 3.8.4.2 Realisation without cognition - belief out of preliminaryity

The physical possibility of gaining cognition about the world makes the accordance of thinking and being impossible. We can only realise because the world is not definite. Cognition is only possible because the world does not have a set truth value. Thus, the cognition we have is only preliminary since the world is preliminary and its decay not yet finished. The incompleteness of cognition and its possibility are inseparable.

### 3.8.4.3 Being as thought- Prooflessness due to provability

Strangely, being seems to have the same form as its statement. The form of being is the *so and so being* where a statement assigns this so and so being. A statement is thus a linguistic construction that imitates being in a changing world. A statement evokes an imagination of being in the mind. This imagination is the meaning of the statement. We cannot differentiate between the so and so being as a statement that is not made and the actual statement since the only way we can access what we think is through imagination. The so and so being is bound to thinking, imagination and language itself. A statement creates the feeling of so and so being. The subjective information it contains is its meaning and is only possible because the world does not contain a how and loses its information. Statements thus want to contain information as a mirror of the world as well as meaning since they are instruments of the mind. They want to be true and create imagination at the same time. They want to contain the information of that what is and at the same time communicate that information. They want to explain themselves and still be accessible to the mind. They thus want to be being in the mind. If there was an overlap between information and meaning the world would stand still and we would fall together with the world, which meant that no imagination could be created and used to change the world anymore. Obviously, we always have to assume that our statements reflect the world and improve our understanding, but an overlap with that what is would take away our possibility to imagine. If something is proven it exists and is entirely explained by itself, it does thus not allow any linguistic construction about it, since it doesn't communicate its information. When we try to justify a statement that has the form of being in our minds, we try to find that justification outside of it. Thereby we already give up its truth since if it was true it didn't need a justification. By asking for a reason we have to build up an infinite system of justifications to avoid admitting that we can't entirely justify something because we can justify at all. The impossibility of justifying and answering entirely is bound to the physical possibility of questioning. By that, we have already given up any proof both logically and physically. If the world was a tautology it would be proven but not allow any proof. As the world is no tautology, it allows proofs but forbids their completeness.

#### 3.8.4.4 Question without answer - Why without how

Physics is only possible due to the surprise of perception and can only ask for the explanation of change. Change, however, is a contradiction that cannot be entirely explained. A complete, tautological explanation of change would abolish change itself and make understanding impossible. In a complete understanding of the world the contradiction of change would be entirely resolved and the world would thus herself be without contradiction. She would not allow the change that justifies the why in the first place. The ability to ask why is directly linked to the lack of a definite how. Trivially, we can only ask why the world is because she is not. If one can ask at all why things are the way they appear to be our ability to ask prevents us from finding an answer. We can't find definite answers to question because we can ask. Questions are thereby only allowed because the world itself is not definite. The beginning of understanding is thus its death. One cannot understand how something is because that it is not is a precondition to our understanding. No matter how far we ask, we can't find last answers. The inventions of the problem is more important than its solution. There lies more in the question than in the answer. In the moment when we have a complete knowledge and understanding of the world she stands still. In that moment she is, but nobody can develop consciousness in her. Nobody could say how the world is. She would secure infinite life in her but nobody could life in her. Physics can thus never infer the actual structure of the world, because such a structure does not exist. One thus needs to acknowledge an inconsistency if one wants to be a physicist. One wants to know how the world is but on the other hand one can only know because the world changes: 1. Gain of knowledge about the world. Understanding the world: One perceives the world through change and tries to find an answer to the why. By trying to understand her behaviour one wants to infer her actual structure. One wants to transform the why to a how. Through change one wants to know what is 2. Benefit of knowledge about the world. Changing the world: Through the knowledge of the world's structure one tries to predict and control her behaviour. Through the change in the world one wants to define what will be. We know from change and we know to change. We can only understand the world because she changes us and we are thus able and forced to change her. Only because the world is not a tautology can we 1. understand her in a limited way and built up a picture of her structure and 2. in a limited way predict, control and in the end destroy her. Every physicist who claims he can entirely understand the world contradicts himself since he can only understand due to change. He who only conducts physics because he wants to find last answers and tries to understand because he does not want to have the need to improve its understanding anymore should not even start. The possibility of that is excluded in her nature the world's nature . It is only the lack of such a possibility that makes physics possible and useful. He who sees that the weakness and incompleteness of physics is her actual strength has done the first step to become an Antiphysician.

#### 3.8.4.5 Endless quest - thought without certainty

Certainty - whether it is in a physical or psychological sense - is the end of physics and life at all. In the state of mental certainty no experience can change my picture of the world. In the state of certainty the world could never change my understanding of it since the world would already be part of my mind in all her coherence. The state of mental certainty does not even include the possibility of change - since as a precondition, I would be equal to the world. Everything new or surprising would already be part of it. On the other hand, it seems possible to pursue that state to secure and extend our lives. Surprise is just another way of describing the possibility. The expression of the possibility is the question. The mind tries to abolish that possibility with definite answers. This abolition would have both material and mental consequences. If questions are open there is neither mental certainty nor material certainty. The first thing one asks is: If certainty can not decay can it be established? The beginning of the pursuit of certainty must be non-certainty. It would imply the overlap of certainty and possibility, the transitions from thinking and knowing, from question and answer. The success of such a pursuit would take away its possibility.

### 3.9 Birth of unity from the contradiction

The results on change- and state- determinism are based on the world being a single entity. What now, if we ask ourselves about objects within the world? How about ourselves as part of the world? Constructed identities don't change anything about the results for the world. The world is change-determined, so we must be too. However, we are part of the process of decay and therefore equally determine the world. As we cannot understand this process, we hence divide the world in two objects: ourselves - and the rest. We then interpret the change-relationship between both objects logically: the world determines us and we determine the world. Yet, those interpretations are not compatible as the world changes, getting us into a circle, as the determined object determines the other, although they both change: in the first interpretation, we are unfree and the world is the actual object - in the second interpretation, we are free, representing the actual independent object that explains the world through its own will. We now mix the advantages of those interpretations depending on our preferences. Depending on which change reaches us, we decide whether we try to isolate ourselves from the world being free, or whether we profit from her, letting us determine by her. Depending on how we believe she will develop, we want to explain her, or see her as an own object that we leave alone for it can determine us for our own good. Naturally, this is constructed. Neither do we determine the world, nor does she determine us, as there is only one object, and this object is no logical identity.




**CIRCULAR CONSTRUCTIVISM**  
*BREAKING OF HIERARCHY WITH ANTITHEORY SUBJECT  
 TO HIERARCHY JUST LIKE ITS CONFIRMATION*

**n.1 Circular Constructivism**

*n.1.1 Thinking the contradiction of the world*

When we step out of thought, seeing the world as its own, all-embracing object that is contradictory to thought, we must still conduct such a thesis with thought. Yet, as thought only knows the agreement with itself, the claim of a contradiction can only be made with thought that affirms its content and thereby tries to give the world a truth value according to its form. Thought cannot think objects that don't exist according to its truth definition, but when we claim the world is not an  $A=A$  universe we try to give the contradictory world the truth value *true* anyways. Thought would have to leave his boundaries to think non-existence without affirming existence. If one affirms the contradiction one therefore negates him because one gives the contradiction in the world the truth value true. If one tries to negate thought one uses and thereby affirms it anyways making the theory of the world leaving our truth definition unthinkable.




**Fig. n.1.** The affirmation of the contradiction in the world takes place in thought. The contradiction thereby gets the form of thought and levers itself off.

*n.1.2 Self-reference- Application of the anti-theory to herself*

It is only natural to attempt avoiding the incapability of thought to think contradictions by making thought itself only an object of a description of the world in which thought cannot recognise the form of the world due to his limitations. Yet, one does not escape the limitation by just predicting it. We are subject to it as our description takes place in thought. The limitations of the anti-theory must therefore be applied to the anti-theory itself. It wants to limit thought but at the same time transcend thought. The theory is part of its own object negating itself. The content that all theories on the world are false is thereby indirectly confirmed that the anti-theory is herself false forming a negative paradox. One does not bypass the barriers of thought by making the

barrier an object of description. To recognise the mistake of thought I need an instance that can recognise him. Yet, such recognition is only possible within thought. This anti-theory was meant to fail from the beginning since she began her description with the negation of existence within thought that only knows existence according to its form. She limits the ability of cognition within the mind and has thereby needed over a hundred pages to abolish itself. All physicists want to understand. No physicist understands. I am a physicist.



**Fig. n.2.** Antiphysics is part of the object that it attributes lack of cognition, which they attributed to lack of knowledge. Through self-reference the theory confirms herself by denying herself. She is unthinkable and represents a negative paradox.

*quod est dubitandum.*

### n.1.3 Two constructivisms combined

After all, the two theories of this work outline two aspects that we usually attribute to constructivism: a. the world is part of thought, (Hierarchy - Constructivism) b. she is created in thought by certain biological mechanisms. (Biological Constructivism)/ what she creates is different then the actual world (Negational Constructivism). It is thus two things that make radical constructivism radical, the captivity of the world in thought and at the same time the opposition to the actual world, that might be different then in thought. This work starts with the first radical view and the hierarchy of thought. It shows the trivial captivity in thought, shows how certainty is only based on arbitrary laws of thought and how dependent our image of the world on the form of thought thereby is. Yet, it tries to break out of thought with all means, showing how contradictory the form of the world in our thought ultimately is. It gets rid of the world as an object of truth and thereby makes the captivity in thought itself an object of its description. The first view thereby sees material certainty as part of mental certainty and the second one sees mental uncertainty as part of material uncertainty (by having more then one point of thought). Yet, the second view contradicts directly with the view of hierarchy constructivism. It is not compatible with it: if the world is constructed then we cannot observe thought within the world biologically, nor can we claim it is false. This nega-

tive breaking of thought in the Anti-theory being a theory that arises from the negation of existence abolishes itself. A consequent combination of both aspects that we usually attributing to the view of constructivism in its most radical kind predicting our own incapability but captivity in thought does not therefore just distance itself from the truth of thoughts about the world, it distances itself from the definition of truth the mind assigns to the world, becomes circular and collapses. It fails due to the hierarchy of thought that it tries to overcome, that it tries to make an object, which it can't flee after all because we are subject to a construct.

### **n.2 Two contradictory theories of truth - neither of them true**

Yet, this does not mean that the positive theory of truth, that the first aspect of constructivism is a true theory instead. Both radical aspects of constructivism lead into circles although they are contradictory. The positive theory of truth tries to hold up a mirror of thought within thought. The negative theory of truth tries to break its own mirror in itself. The two theories thereby clearly show the invalidity of the law of excluded middle for unthinkable objects. Thought is the only object of truth - only what can be in thought can have truth value; for everything else, the laws of thought simply do not apply. Truth values are therefore not bound to propositions, but to thought, which they may or may not represent. If we now assign a truth value to the linguistic concept of thought, then thought needs to be true before it can be true in the first place. However, it needs its own truth-definition to be true in the first place. It thus needs to assume itself to judge its own truth. If one now sees provenness as a criterion for the truth of propositions, then thought and its attached truth definition is false according to its own truth-definition. On the other hand, if we claim that thought was false, then we lose the truth definition that we need for claiming its falsehood, for which we also have to let go falsehood of thought. No matter whether we claim truth or falsehood of thought, we enter a circle. If we wanted to positively think thought as being unnegatable, then we would have to transcend ourselves. However, if we negatively wanted to get rid of thought, then we would have to get rid of ourselves. This is the carrousel of circular constructivism. It does not only spin when we try combining both radical aspects of constructivism, but already when we claim one of them at all. The unification of both of them can thereby be seen as the claim of the negative aspect that gets circular not because the first positive aspect is true, but because it is factually valid.

### **n.3 God - Meta-argument: higher explanatory for contradiction, but still no truth value**

This thesis abolishes the value of scientific cognition as science is based on a truth-definition that does not allow change: science does not explain anything outside of our truth-definition and does therefore not explain anything in the world. This thesis thereby also gives a new argument in the debate for the




existence or non-existence of god. In fact, it is thereby not even an argument, as arguing is already assuming our truth-definition, whereas this specific argument arises from its criticism in the first place. In the debate about on the existence of god, two questions appear again and again: 1. Do we need a god to explain the world? 2. Even if we don't necessarily need him, does he exist, or does he not exist? If we don't see the flaw in our truth definition, we then believe that we would not need god for the sake of explanation. Explanations then have a logical form and can be made through science. Even if there then was a god, he would then be accessible to scientific methods. He would then just be a scientific object, just like all other objects. However, what if we get rid of our truth-definition? We then need something outside of our truth definition to justify a changing world. Something as vague and undefined as god could therefore well fit the world. If we thus at least theoretically drop our truth-definition (practically, this would mean thinking a negative paradox), science then loses all superiority over religion. Yet, as we are still caught in our thought and its attached truth-definition, religion then equally loses all superiority over science, as it takes religion all justification that could lie within thought, as religion then wants to reach something outside thought. In any case, the question for the existence of anything lies outside of thought. When we talk about the existence of god, we thereby always implicitly assume the law of excluded middle, believe that would either have to exist or not exist. Often, one then tries to solve the question with the help of scientific argument or evidence. Yet, through the lack of change of a world in the form of our thought, neither the thought of his existence or non-existence fits the world. Neither the proposition "God exists" nor "God does not exist" has a truth value, as the object of such a proposition is no identity and as truth value can only follow from objects in the form of thought. Therefore, no matter in what we believe, whether in something undefined and inaccessible to our thought we call god, or in the results of physics - our believe always takes place in thought. It can never find an explanation for a world outside of a thinkable world without change.

#### **n.4 Conclusion**

Where did we arrive? To answer that, let's refer back to where we started. This thesis wanted to achieve an all-embracing theory. Through this very naive aim, we have found out about some foundational problems attached to interlacing of thought and world as equal truth-objects. We could only solve this problem through the trivial but foundational importance of thought for our perception of the world. It was thereby shown how much this ultimate dependence on thought limits us in finding objective certainty, but also on how it gives rise to certainty in the first place. It was shown that we cannot found our truth-definition in thought just like we cannot abolish it within thought. The differentiation between thoughts and propositions as theories on thoughts explained why thoughts can generally not be proven, as they are not universally certain themselves. It

was then shown that the world as an object of thought can only be possible do to change in the world contradicting to the form of the world I thought it, which lead to an Antitheory stealing the truth from the world, leaving us with complete inability of cognition: instead of just not being able to make true theories due to our inability, the problem lies within the object of all our physical theories, it lies within the world herself. Whatever "is" *actually* going on in the world, it cannot be captured with thought and its attached truth definition. Furthermore, this thesis tried to describe the world with Antiphysics, seeing time, change, thermodynamics and quantummechanical uncertainty as antiphysical phenomena that can only be understood by making the unnatural assumption that the world is not true in the form that thought suggests us. Antiphysics thereby creates a world that is logically decaying in a single unfinished event. From that view, she can be visualized with a decaying cardhouse in which information bound to existence is lost and information bound to change conserved in an unfinished event, allowing us both to experience many different states in thought and still to believe that the past is always somewhat included in the present. This gives rise to a distinction between state- and change- determinism that is important for the debate concerning personal freedom and responsibility. Mental uncertainty through the ability to question information by many points in thought in the first place is thereby seen in a direct connection with uncertainty of matter. In the end, this whole theory is yet captured in the trivial limits of thought it has recognized right in the beginning - we can't claim her own inability without being subject to her. Still, the conclusion can be drawn that our science, as taking place in thought, is both fundamentally limited and flawed. Eventually, we therefore have to argue on a higher level than we are used to: instead of asking us what exists, we must consider that our definition of existence in our thought is fundamentally flawed. Science thereby loses its entitlement to truth and cognition of anything in the world. Whatever we have been searching in our own thought indirectly by scientific methods can only be found outside of it. Maybe in god, in confusion, in dizziness. Certainly in nothing that we could think. And thereby outside of everything that was just said.



**Fig. n.3.** Both theories of truth don't have a truth value, although they are contradictory. The concept of truth value does not apply to them, as they are metatheorems about the object from which truth value is derived in the first place.